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Abstract 
The thesis evaluates the impact the inclusion of Prevent had on CONTEST, the UK’s 
counter-terrorism strategy, both in terms of innovative and tension which arose 
throughout the three stages of the policy process: its formation, implementation and 
social impacts. Many of the tensions identified are not unique to Prevent and appear 
to be inherent in prevention and policing policies more generally. The thesis relies on 
qualitative interviews with national policy makers, and local professionals in a case 
study area in the North of England, as well as focus groups with members of Muslim 
communities in the same case study area. Three broad areas of tensions were 
identified. The first policy tensions centred on the debate about how to prevent 
violent extremism, communication of the strategy and the merits of excluding 
community cohesion as a means of tackling extremism per se. The majority of the 
national policy makers, including senior police officers and local professionals, 
agreed that contrary to the Prevent Review 2011, community cohesion should remain 
an integral part of Prevent. Secondly, there are organizational tensions. These 
tensions mainly relate to inter- and intra-organizational issues such as funding, 
information-sharing and evaluation. One of the main areas of conflict identified was 
the relationship between the national and local authorities. Thirdly, the thesis 
identified tensions relating to Prevent’s impact on the local community. This thesis 
suggests that Prevent had little influence, and that most perceptions about counter-
terrorism and Prevent were shaped by negative political and media discourse about 
Islam and British Muslim communities. This has led to disengagement amongst the 
Muslim communities in the case study area with Prevent and local authorities in 
general, the limiting of freedom of expression through external social control, and 
the inability/unwillingness of these communities to tackle such extremism as might 
exist in their midst.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
CONTEST, which stands for COuNterTErrorism STrategy,
1
 is, as the name suggests, 
the UK government’s principal strategy to counter terrorism. Its purpose is to reduce 
‘the risks to the United Kingdom … from terrorism, so that people can go about their 
lives freely and with confidence’.2 The strategy has four main work streams, Pursue, 
Prevent, Protect, and Prepare, referred to as the four Ps. This thesis focuses 
primarily on Prevent, a policy which aims to ‘stop people from becoming terrorists 
or supporting terrorism’,3 and argues that the innovative inclusion of Prevent within 
the established institutional framework has caused tensions between government 
agencies and departments at national and local levels. The thesis is structured around 
two key elements: (1) a policy analysis of the formulation of Prevent which explores 
the potential conflicts and tensions between Prevent and Pursue - a police and 
security led work stream - and which is discussed in parts of Chapters 2 and 3 and all 
of Chapter 5; and (2) a study of the policy’s local implementation, which is discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7. These latter chapters consider the relationship between the 
national policy and its local delivery, as well as the impact Prevent has had on 
Muslim communities.     
This chapter provides a brief overview of CONTEST, particularly Prevent and 
Pursue, and discusses changes which have occurred over the last three years. This is 
followed by an introduction to some of the key literature and the conceptual ideas 
which have emerged and which underpin the Prevent policy. Gaps within the 
research literature are identified, setting the context for the thesis. Subsequent 
sections specify the purpose of the thesis and its originality, and introduce the data 
collection methods. The concluding section outlines the further chapters and their 
content.  
1.2 The background  
This thesis focuses mainly on Prevent and Pursue. Both of these work streams fall 
under the umbrella of CONTEST. The four Ps, mentioned above, provide the 
                                                 
1
 David Omand, Securing the State (Hurst & Co Publishers 2010) 86 
2
 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (HMSO 
2011) 6 
3
 ibid 10 
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government with a comprehensive domestic counterterrorism strategy which goes 
beyond the police and the security services. CONTEST, which has been around since 
early 2003, combines aspects of criminal justice, prevention, protection of the public, 
and preparation for the aftermath of possible terror attacks. Despite the evolution of 
each of the work streams, CONTEST remains structured around the four Ps. Since 
its initial publication in 2006, it has become more transparent, and two 
comprehensive and declassified versions have been published since.
4
  Sir David 
Omand, the original architect of CONTEST, notes that:  
In the light of a realistic view of the nature and seriousness of the major risks 
facing the public we should look at what it would take to reduce those risks to 
the level at which we would all feel sufficiently confident to get out and get on 
with our normal lives taking reasonable precautions for our collective safety 
but not such as to inhibit our sense of freedom and self-confidence.
5
  
Within CONTEST there is an emphasis on anticipatory risks and the proactive 
countering of terrorism because the risk of mass casualties is unacceptable.
7
 To 
achieve CONTEST's aims, multi-agency partnerships have been developed. These 
partnerships, and the government's recognition that it needs to be seen to uphold 
human rights and the freedoms and liberty granted by the law, are key to 
CONTEST’s success.8 ‘This strategy gives us a more effective, better focused, and 
more flexible response to the changing terrorist threat we face.’9 The rest of this 
section focuses on Prevent, but more detail about CONTEST, Prevent, and Pursue 
can be found in Chapter 2. Unless stated, any further references to CONTEST and 
Prevent refer to the 2011 versions.  
Prevent was first introduced by the New Labour government in 2003 as part of 
CONTEST,
10
 which remained secret until its publication in 2006. The 2005 London 
attacks appear to have brought about a shift, challenging the notion of the 
archetypical terrorist embodied by incoming foreign enemies inspired by Osama Bin 
Laden. This is because the perpetrators had lived in Britain almost since birth and 
came from local communities in the north-east of England.  
                                                 
4
 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 2); 
Frank Gregory, ‘An Evaluation of Revision to the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy with a Special 
Focus on the CBRNE Threat’ (Real Instituto Elcano 2009) 
5
 Omand (n 1) 86 
7
 Clive Walker, ‘Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom’ (2005) 44 
Crime, Law and Social Change 387; Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside 
America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (Simon & Schuster 2006) 
8
 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 2) 
9
 ibid Foreword 
10
 Communities and Local Government Select Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth 
Report of Session 2009-10’ (HMSO 2010) 
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In old times, anyone fitting a stereotype – be it national, ethnic, racial or 
cultural – could be marked out as a potential foe. … Yet whilst foreigners 
remain a threat, the menacing figures in the contemporary stage of terrorism 
are often our neighbours from within.
11
   
In its revised 2009 version of CONTEST, the government acknowledged that 
Prevent had been underdeveloped, and that more needed to be done to address the 
evolution of the threat as well as the government's understanding of it. The 
realisation that jihadi extremism was not only an international problem but also 
existed within UK communities meant that more effort was placed into developing 
Prevent.
12
 As the title suggests, Prevent was about preventing individuals and 
communities from supporting and/or engaging in extremism and terrorism. It derived 
from the notion that the socio-economic issues which give rise to anti-social 
behaviour and criminality are similar to those leading to extremism and terrorism.
13
  
The New Labour government believed that engaging local Muslim communities and 
increasing their resilience against extremist ideologies was key to successfully 
countering extremism and terrorism. Collaboration between the police and local 
authorities, as well as working with at-risk communities and the voluntary and 
private sectors, were seen as central to successfully challenging extremist ideologies, 
increasing levels of trust, and fostering cooperation between affected communities 
and authorities. 
Strong and empowered communities are better equipped to effectively reject 
the ideology of violent extremism, isolate apologists for terrorism and provide 
support for vulnerable institutions and individuals.
14
  
Under New Labour, Prevent focused primarily on community cohesion projects in 
Muslim communities – a claim which the government and successive CONTEST 
documents refute. 
Although Prevent has changed over time, its aims remain focused on groups of 
people who are vulnerable to persuasion to provide tacit or even active support to 
terrorist groups.
15
 Often, however, these individuals may not break the law, and to 
this extent legislation and police action can be ineffective.
16
 Under the New Labour 
                                                 
11
 Clive Walker, ‘“Know Thine Enemy as Thyself”: Discerning Friend from Foe Under Anti-
Terrorism Laws’ (2008) 32 Melbourne Law Review 275, 276 
12
 HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (HMSO 
2009) 15 
13
 Omand (n 1) 92 
14
 HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 12) 
83 
15
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HMSO 2011) 
16
 Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 10) 
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government, the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) took a 
lead role within Prevent. This is reflected in the core aims and objectives listed in the 
2009 version of CONTEST. These were:  
(1) to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream 
voices;  
(2) to disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support people living 
in the communities where they may operate; 
(3) to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already 
been recruited by violent extremists; 
(4) to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; 
(5) to address grievances which ideologies are exploiting; 
(6) to develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information; and 
(7) to improve strategic communication.
17
 
Integrating Prevent into CONTEST has lead to allegations of spying, and some have 
argued that Prevent was attempting to securitise community cohesion and social 
policy.
18
 Prevent also included a more hard-edged programme titled Channel, which 
focused on individuals identified as being at risk of engaging in extremism, and 
programmes within prisons. Such programmes moved to centre stage under the 
Prevent Review. Some critics argued that Prevent’s breadth was too wide, and gave 
the impression that the government only included cohesion projects to securitise 
integration.
19
  
Much of the Prevent work has been carried out by local authorities across the UK. 
Over time, local councils have developed their own Prevent policies based on 
national policy. Local councils have been given broad autonomy, something which 
many national policymakers and politicians have criticised. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Until 2011, the Prevent policy focused principally on broad secondary prevention. 
However, it also included specific programmes such as Channel and tertiary 
prevention in prisons. Over the last five years, Prevent has been accused of mainly 
targeting and spying on Muslim communities, misusing funds, funding groups and 
individuals perceived to be extremist, and paying for spuriously related local 
authority projects.
20
 
                                                 
17
 HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 12) 
14 
18
 Communities and Local Government Select Committee (n 10) 
19
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 15) 30 
20
 See: Chapter 2,5 and 6 
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In 2011, the coalition government published its Prevent Review. The Review 
heralded significant changes, shifting Prevent's focus from community cohesion to 
challenging extremist ideology (although generally not through community cohesion 
projects), and identifying those at risk of radicalisation.
21
 Although local authorities 
are still at the heart of delivering Prevent, funding and guidance is now tightly 
controlled by the Home Office’s OSCT (Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism) 
rather than the DCLG. Tackling extremism not linked to jihadi ideologies, and 
addressing real and perceived grievances, are no longer key elements of the new 
Prevent policy. The new aims and objectives demonstrate this. These are: 
(1) responding to the ideological challenges of terrorism and the threat we face 
from those who promote it; 
(2) preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are 
given appropriate advice and support; and 
(3) working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation 
which we need to address.
22
  
This policy focuses on working with national and local government agencies, and the 
voluntary and private sectors. Aside from the organisations already engaged in 
Prevent such as the police, the government aims to involve health care and education 
professionals. It also intends to increase cooperation, and identify and share 
information about individuals perceived to be involved in, or at risk of, 
radicalisation.
23
 Essentially, the policy has moved from broad secondary prevention 
to focused secondary and tertiary prevention. Prevent has shifted towards a 
programme of net-widening and surveillance, although aspects of this were already 
present.
24
 As Power observes: ‘The management of uncertainty is inherently 
paradoxical, an effort to know the unknowable.’25 This quest for knowledge and the 
gathering of as much information as possible, focusing on Muslim communities and 
individuals with perceived links to jihadi extremism, has become ingrained within 
Prevent’s purpose.  
Pursue aims to stop terrorist attacks through detection and by investigating threats ‘at 
the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorists' activities before they can endanger 
                                                 
21
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 10) 
22
 ibid 7 
23
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 15) 
24
 Lucia Zedner, ‘Fixing the Future? The Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice’ in Bernadette 
McSherry and others (eds), Regulating Deviance: The redirection of criminalisation and the futures 
of criminal law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
25
 Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of 
Uncertainty (Demos 2004) 59 
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the public and, whenever possible, prosecuting those responsible’.26 Essentially, 
Pursue is the criminal justice response to terrorism, albeit intelligence gathering by 
the police and the security services also plays a large role. This thesis argues that 
counterterrorism operations and measures influence public perceptions to either 
undermine or strengthen trust in government authorities.
27
 Negative media and 
political discourses, and their portrayal of counterterrorism policing such as stop-
and-searches, dawn raids, and arrests, appear to have influenced public perceptions – 
particularly those of Muslim communities – thereby affecting the level of trust these 
communities and individuals place in the police/authorities and their willingness to 
engage with them.
28
  
Local police work on both Prevent and Pursue. More specialised units, such as the 
regional Counter-Terrorism Units, have taken on the traditional role of 
counterterrorism policing, while local police forces have taken on Prevent and 
community engagement.  At times there have been tensions between the Pursue and 
Prevent work streams. These tensions centre on information sharing and on the value 
given to community cohesion work in the area of counterterrorism. They are 
discussed in more detail in later chapters.  
1.3 The thesis and its purpose    
The hypothesis of this thesis is that Prevent is innovative but embodies inherent 
policy and organisational tensions which are difficult to resolve. These tensions have 
a direct impact on community perceptions and the success of Prevent. The thesis is 
structured around the two aforementioned key elements, namely a policy analysis of 
the formation of Prevent, and a study of its local implementation and impact. These 
two key elements are further broken down and organised around the following four 
research objectives:   
a) analyse and critique the ideas which inform the Prevent policy;29  
b) analyse and critique the conflicts and tensions which have arisen within the 
Prevent policy at national level, as well as the implications for local 
delivery;
30
 
                                                 
26
 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 2) 45 
27
 David Weisburd and others, ‘Terrorist Threats and Police Performance A Study of Israeli 
Communities’ (2010) 50 British Journal of Criminology 725 
28
 Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public 
Support for Policing’ (2003) 37 Law & Society Review 513; see Chapter 3 and 6 
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c) analyse and critique the tensions and conflicts which have arisen between 
organisations involved in the local implementation of Prevent such as the 
police and local authorities, and consider the implications for the delivery 
process;
31
 and  
d) analyse and critique how counterterrorism policing and prevention have 
affected local Muslim communities, and how they have shaped community 
perceptions and willingness to engage with authorities in counterterrorism 
policing and the Prevent agenda, while considering the wider implications for 
Prevent and Pursue.
32
 
Each of these objectives is individually addressed in the chapters which follow, 
providing a policy analysis and study of Prevent's implementation in Maybury.  
The success of CONTEST and Prevent must also be measured against the declared 
aims, although evaluation is a contested issue. The following chapters ask questions 
such as, how does the policy ensure that the freedoms outlined in the policy 
document are upheld? And, what safeguards are undertaken to ensure that the policy 
does not become a programme of surveillance akin to a police state? The thesis also 
examines how the freedoms of Muslim communities are protected and what impact 
the perceived lack of protection has on their level of engagement in both Prevent and 
Pursue.  
To answer these questions and identify tensions, the thesis takes a holistic approach, 
examining the ‘three stages’ of the policy process in the context of Prevent. These 
stages are formation, implementation, and impact, as described by Rose.
33
 
Policymakers and academics recognise that the policy process is not static and 
confined to these three silos, and that the relationships between the policy, its 
delivery, and its impact could affect the dynamics of the policy process. Tensions 
exist between and within the stages of the Prevent policy. As Lipsky notes, much of 
the policy process transpires and is far removed from the daily lives of those subject 
to it.
34
 The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to capture the non-static nature and 
                                                                                                                                          
29
 See: Chapter 2 and 3 
30
 See: Chapter 5 
31
 See: Chapter 6 
32
 See: Chapter 7 
33
 Richard Rose, ‘Comparing Public Policy: An Overview’ (1973) 1 European Journal of Political 
Research 67 
34
 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (Russell 
Sage Foundation 1980) 
  8 
interrelated aspects of the Prevent policy, seeking to examine how this policy was 
reshaped during its local implementation.
35
  
1.4 Thesis originality within its wider context   
This thesis fills a gap within the academic literature around the Prevent policy. In 
their report about Prevent, Innes et al. note that:  
To date, there have been numerous commentaries and policy-level analyses of 
Prevent and of the legislative framework associated with it. There have been 
far fewer fieldwork-based studies that have systematically sought to gather 
evidence about how Prevent interventions are being delivered, perceived and 
experienced in different areas.
36
  
Published studies and reports have generally focused on Prevent’s delivery and 
impact on Muslim communities. A recent study by Thomas provides a good 
overview of Prevent and its links to community cohesion.
37
 This study examines 
some of the policy, organisational, and impact tensions of Prevent in the context of 
community cohesion. Other studies, such as the aforementioned published by Innes 
et al., provide insights about its impact on a number of Muslim communities in the 
UK. Studies by Spalek et al. and Lambert also focus, although more broadly, on the 
impact of Prevent and community-based counterterrorism policing and prevention.
38
 
Spalek’s latest edited volume on this subject pays particular attention to community 
experiences, the engagement of young people, and the role of gender within the 
context of counterterrorism.
39
 Many recent articles also focus on Prevent’s 
community impact.
40
 Numerous media articles and publications by think tanks add to 
the wider discourse of Prevent’s community impact. One notable publication, 
Spooked, has been referred to in academic literature and numerous media and 
government articles. It claims that the purpose of Prevent is to spy on Muslim 
communities.
41
 The Spooked report focuses mainly on local professionals working 
                                                 
35
 James Anderson, Public Policy-Making (Praeger 1975) 
36
 Martin Innes and others, ‘Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of 
Chief Police Officers’ (UPSI 2011) 3 
37
 Paul Thomas, Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism - Failing to Prevent (Bloomsbury 
2012) 
38
 Basia Spalek and others, ‘Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purpose of Counter-
Terrorism: An Examination’ (University of Birmingham 2009); Basia Spalek and Robert Lambert, 
‘Muslim Communities, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation: A Critically Reflective 
Approach to Engagement’ (2008) 36 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 257 
39
 Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012) 
40
 Suraj Lakhani, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and 
Communities’ (2012) 51 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 190 
41
 Arun Kundnani, Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (Institute of Race Relations 2009) 
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on the delivery of Prevent, although this thesis disputes and challenges some of the 
claims made therein.
42
  
Unlike other Prevent studies, this thesis examines the inherent tensions which have 
arisen within CONTEST and Prevent since 2003, while acknowledging the changes 
in the UK government’s approach to counterterrorism since the Northern Ireland 
conflict. This study is also more comprehensive because it analyses the whole 
Prevent policy from formation and implementation to its impact on national, local, 
and community levels. Rather than focusing on Prevent’s impact alone, this thesis 
examines the policy process and how the different stages of the process have been 
affected by the tensions identified. Three broad areas of tensions are highlighted 
throughout the thesis: policy, organisational, and impact. Some of these tensions 
have been identified in other works, such as those of Thomas and Innes et al.,
43
 but 
no other study has examined their impact and the wider Prevent policy together. 
Raising awareness of these tensions is important because some of them undermine 
Prevent’s potential for success. It is hoped that highlighting them may provide 
direction to future research and add knowledge to the policy debate, particularly 
about how to improve Prevent’s service provisions, communications, and evaluation, 
and the need to increase understanding of radicalisation and extremism.  
1.5 Methodology and fieldwork   
Most of the academic literature used for this thesis was obtained through the Leeds 
University library, the British Library, and the Bodleian Library. Policy documents, 
and government and think tank reports, such as the CONTEST and Prevent 
documents, were generally obtained through the Internet. In addition, a number of 
Freedom of Information requests were made to the British Transport Police, 
Maybury Council (Maybury is the pseudonym given to the case study area to 
maintain the anonymity of professionals and local community members), the local 
police force, and other regional agencies with links to Prevent in the Maybury area. 
The information gathered includes stop-and-search data, as well as internal reports 
on the impact of Pursue and Prevent on communities. Qualitative research methods 
were employed. Specifically, data was collected through semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups. This approach meant that professional and personal experiences 
and perceptions could be gathered to develop a detailed picture of the issues within 
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the Prevent policy process at national, local, and community levels.
44 
Fifty-seven 
participants took part including national policymakers such as former ministers, 
senior officials within the Home Office and DCLG, and local professionals such as 
senior police officers and professionals working on Prevent for the local authority. 
Also, individuals from five focus groups drawn from local Muslim communities in a 
case study area in the North of England participated.
45
 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 contextualises CONTEST and Prevent. To demonstrate that CONTEST, 
with its inclusion of Prevent, is innovative, Chapter 2 analyses three counterterrorism 
models: the war, criminal justice, and extended criminal justice models, all of which 
have become established in academia. This is further demonstrated through 
comparative analyses with the American ‘war on terror’ and by highlighting the 
differences between CONTEST and the approach taken in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. With the context in place, Chapter 2 examines the CONTEST strategy, 
focusing on Prevent and Pursue in more detail, and emphasising the tensions which 
have been identified within the literature. In addition, Chapter 2 highlights tensions 
related to the organisational structures and tensions which have arisen due to the 
inclusion of prevention within the existing institutional framework, and which place 
additional strain on limited resources. It further highlights tensions in relation to the 
impact of Prevent on Muslim communities in the UK.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical concepts which underpin Prevent and Pursue. It 
examines terrorism and extremism as political, legal, and social constructions and the 
impact which these have on shaping counterterrorism laws and policy. The chapter 
further explores how CONTEST has shaped and redefined jihadi extremism and 
terrorism, after which issues of policing and prevention are addressed. This is 
followed by a theoretical discussion about policing and prevention, and their impact 
on trust and legitimacy within Muslim communities. Before concluding this chapter, 
the thesis returns to the issue of tensions, especially those between policing and 
prevention, and examines their possible impact on these Muslim communities.  
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The purpose of Chapter 4 is to introduce the research design and methodology used 
to gather data for this project. The chapter considers why the approach taken was 
appropriate and how it enabled the researchers to gather the data in accordance with 
the four research objectives. The chapter further considers participant selection and 
ethical issues, and introduces the participants and the case study area, Maybury. Data 
analysis methods are also discussed.  
Chapter 5 considers the opinions and perceptions of fifteen policymakers, politicians, 
civil servants, senior police officers, and human rights and anti-racism activists, all 
of whom are involved in Prevent work nationally. Initially, the chapter revisits the 
subject of CONTEST's innovativeness, exploring the possible consequences of 
Prevent’s inclusion. The remainder of the chapter is structured around two tensions, 
policy and organisational, with the aim of analysing and disseminating the data. 
First, the chapter examines the aim and scope of Prevent and tensions relating to the 
inclusion/exclusion of community cohesion. Prevent’s target population and its 
assumed impact on Muslim communities is also discussed. Second, it analyses some 
of the organisational tensions between national and local authorities, together with 
issues such as funding and evaluation.  
Chapter 6 also focuses on policy and organisational tensions but examines them from 
the perspective of twenty local professionals. The chapter explains the organisational 
structure in Maybury and discusses the impact of the Prevent Review. Initially, it 
examines the tensions between national policymakers and local professionals in 
relation to the inclusion/exclusion of community cohesion and whom the policy 
should target. Next, the chapter examines the organisational tensions between 
national and local organisations and between local authorities. In conclusion, this 
chapter analyses local professionals' attitudes towards the funding and evaluation of 
Prevent.   
Chapter 7 addresses the issue of impact, relying on five focus groups from 
Maybury’s Muslim communities. Emphasising the influence of local and national 
media discourse on local attitudes towards Prevent and Pursue, the chapter compares 
such influence to the actual impact of Prevent and counterterrorism policing 
programmes. The chapter asserts that perceptions influenced by a negative media and 
political discourse about Islam and the Muslim identity have had a negative effect on 
engagement with the Prevent policy in Maybury, and demonstrates why the policy 
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has had little effect locally. In addition to perceptions, the chapter examines other 
barriers which have influenced the success of Prevent in Maybury.   
Chapter 8 evaluates the findings of the preceding chapters and reiterates the tensions 
identified previously. It is organised around the three main conflicts which tie 
national, local, and community experiences together. This final chapter highlights the 
results and conclusions of the thesis, examines future lessons, and discusses possible 
areas of future research.   
 13 
Chapter 2: Is CONTEST innovative? Counterterrorism 
and Prevent 
2.1 Introduction 
The first part of this chapter is a policy analysis of Prevent. It is based on already 
available academic literature and publicly available policy documents including the 
CONTEST strategy and the Prevent Review. The literature and policy analysis is 
complemented by new data from interviews with national politicians and policy 
makers in Chapter 5. The thesis asserts that CONTEST is an innovative 
counterterrorism strategy because of its comprehensive nature, which is primarily 
achieved through the inclusion of Prevent, thereby providing the UK with a broader 
strategy to tackle radicalisation and terrorism. Prevent, however, must be seen in the 
wider context of the CONTEST strategy of which it forms an integral part. Key to 
CONTEST are its four Ps: Pursue, Prevent, Prepare, and Protect. Traditional 
counterterrorism activities focused on the work of law enforcement agencies such as 
the police, work carried out by the security services, and, as in Northern Ireland, the 
work of the military. This aspect of counterterrorism, led by the police and security 
services, is now encapsulated under the umbrella of Pursue, which as the name 
suggest focuses on pursuing, disrupting, and prosecuting individuals and 
organisations involved in terrorism-related activities.
1
 This chapter asserts that 
CONTEST is innovative for two reasons: (1) it has broadened the traditional 
approach to counterterrorism by including Prevent, and (2) it has developed into a 
much more holistic strategy by going beyond Pursue and Prevent. The focus in this 
chapter is on Prevent; it is however worth noting that Prepare and Protect also add 
to CONTEST's comprehensive nature. These two work streams focus on preparing 
for the eventuality of terrorist attacks and protecting the critical national 
infrastructure as much as possible. They rely on the cooperation of the emergency 
services, local authorities, and the private sector. A revised definition of terrorism 
means that this work can also be carried out under the auspices of the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004.
2
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The policy analysis given here demonstrates that the inclusion of Prevent has led to 
tensions within the overall strategy, particularly between Prevent and Pursue. The 
implications of these tensions on Prevent's delivery are examined in later chapters. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on the theoretical context of counterterrorism 
models, namely the war, criminal justice,
3
 and extended criminal justice models.
4
 
The war and criminal justice models, though useful, often do not represent the 
complex reality of counterterrorism strategies and operations. However, the extended 
criminal justice model converges the war and criminal justice models and thus more 
accurately reflects real-world complexities.
5
 This context provides the backdrop for 
the discussion which follows in this chapter on the ‘war on terror’ and the British 
experience, which ultimately led to the conception of CONTEST and Prevent. The 
thesis further asserts that interdepartmental and institutional tensions have arisen 
during the conception and implementation of the strategy, especially Prevent. These 
have affected the strategy's delivery and the willingness of communities to engage 
with the authorities in counterterrorism matters. The latter sections highlight issues 
that are discussed as part of the policy analysis in Chapter 5, but which have also 
become reoccurring issues during the study of Prevent’s implementation in Chapters 
6 and 7.    
2.2 The war and criminal justice models  
In a democracy, the primary objective of a counterterrorism strategy, Wilkinson 
argues, should be the protection and maintenance of democracy, the rule of law, and 
the protection of its citizens.
6
 These aims, he stresses, override the importance of 
eliminating terrorism and political violence by means which undermine democratic 
values. ‘Any bloody tyrant can solve the problem of political violence if he is 
prepared to sacrifice all considerations of humanity, and to trample down all 
constitutional and judicial rights.’7 The war and criminal justice models 
conceptualise two different approaches to tackling terrorism.
8
 The war model 
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advocates the utilisation of maximum force to achieve its aims, whereas the latter 
advocates the rule of law, using minimal force in only exceptional circumstances.
9
 
These two models appear incompatible; however, they often converge or are used in 
tandem. How the threat of terrorism is framed underpins the approach. Chalk argues 
that counterterrorism measures must be effective and must also conform to the 
principles of liberal democracies.
10
  
Terrorism is not primarily about the people and the objects attacked; it is about 
the construction of the ‘threat’, the identification of its source, and the response 
that is appropriate.
11
     
Most liberal democracies see terrorism as a crime rather than the manifestation of 
insurgent political violence; consequently it becomes a matter for criminal justice 
agencies.
12
 Hence, actions taken are bound by the rule of law, which grants suspects 
rights and protections such as fair trials. In the US, these rights are enshrined in the 
United States Constitution.  In the EU and the UK, individual rights, such as the right 
to privacy and the right to a fair trial, are guaranteed by ECHR.
13
  According to 
Weber, the state holds a monopoly on violence. He describes the state as ‘a 
relationship of rule by human beings over human beings, and one that rests on the 
legitimate use of violence (that is, violence that is held to be legitimate)’.14 
Domestically, the police use violence in extreme circumstances. They investigate and 
pursue those who infringe the law, whereas the courts convict and penalise those 
found guilty.
15
  
The war model assumes that terrorism is not merely a criminal act, but an act of 
aggression against the established order and its values.
16
 Terrorists are perceived as 
enemies of the state and are often framed as evil individuals who threaten the 
established way of life.
17
 Terrorism may be framed in this manner to justify military 
intervention. Theoretically, international humanitarian law (IHL) and the other laws 
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of war govern these interventions.
18
 Terrorism is seen through a manichaeist world 
perspective, polarising society
19
 and dividing the world into two factions, 'one 
responsible the other irresponsible, which requires some kind of initiative on the part 
of the former to [pre-empt] dangers that issue from the latter’.20 This situation can be 
exploited by the dominant culture, legitimising it with political ‘them versus us’ 
rhetoric. ‘The enemy ... represents absolute evil ... it follow[s] that any past or future 
agreement with him [is] impossible.’21 
Justifications for the war approach are based on the perception of terrorists as ‘the 
other’, and deal with the threat of terrorism accordingly. Rousseau and other social 
contract theorists argue that those who infringe the social rights of the public are no 
longer members of the state. Rather, they are at war with it.
22
 Breaching the social 
contract, they argue, removes all legal connections between the person and the 
state.
23
 Some posit that the state is responsible for providing security and protection 
for its citizens, even if extraordinary measures are required. Further, some argue that 
the legal order rests on the sovereignty of the state and that the rule of law can 
temporarily be transcended to restore public confidence and order. Schmitt insists 
that: 
All law is situational … To pretend that one can have ultimate rule of law is to 
set oneself up to be overtaken by events at some unpredictable but necessarily 
occurring time and it is to lose the human element in and of our world.
24
  
In Schmitt’s view, the enemy becomes more than just 'the other' with whom one has 
a dispute; rather, the process is an intense separation between them and us. This, 
according to Schelling, leads to conflict where the interests of the actors are opposed 
and must end in the extermination of one or the other.
25
 Schmitt explains that ‘an 
enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collective of people 
confronts a similar collective. The enemy is solely the public enemy’.26  
Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will; each 
endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further 
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resistance. War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent 
to fulfil our will.
27
 
The aim of the war model strategies, Schmitt argues, is to eliminate terrorists who 
threaten the status quo and to re-establish order.
28
 Overwhelming force is central to 
this model.   
Although rules of war exist within international law, they differ markedly from 
domestic criminal law.
29
 The Geneva Conventions ‘remain the cornerstone for the 
protection and respect of human dignity in armed conflict’,30 outlawing practices of 
torture, the maltreatment of prisoners, and the intimidation of civilians during 
conflict. Theoretically, signatories of the Conventions are bound by their rules, 
giving protection to civilians and military personnel engaged in hostilities.
31
 
Critically, as war whose objectives is destroying terror or terrorist networks of 
global reach, may never end, the terminology of war provides a pretext, ... to 
detain persons by reference to provisions of IHL [international humanitarian 
law] that permits detention of combatants during armed conflict, but on an 
indefinite basis.
32
  
The lack of strong international enforcement agencies, however, complicates the 
enforcement of IHL.
33
 According to Goldsmith and Posner, compliance occurs either 
when it is economically and politically costless or promoted by powerful states.
34
 A 
lack of enforceability leads to the loss of respect for international bodies and 
international law as a whole.
35
 Military interventions which adhere to IHL limit 
civilian causalities and damage. Distinguishing between civilians and terrorists is 
tricky; thus it is difficult to target only those causing harm.
36
 Collateral damage has 
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wider implications because it erodes public confidence and perceptions of authorities' 
legitimacy.
37
  
The differences between the war and criminal justice models appear at three different 
stages: pursuit, capture, and sanction.
38
 Pursuit and capture entail the capturing of 
suspected offenders, maintaining procedural justice, and ensuring the presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty. During the pursuit and capture phases, lethal force is 
limited to exceptional circumstances. Only courts may decide on the suspects’ guilt 
and punish offenders accordingly. The three stages, however, take on new 
dimensions during armed conflict, and are ‘subject to loose international law norms 
of necessity and proportionality’.39 Pursuit may include the intention to kill, and 
detention is not a sanction determined by guilt or innocence but prevents the detainee 
from participating in further combat. Therefore, the length of the detention is not 
determined by the individual’s actions but by the duration of the conflict.40  
Both models provide a one-tier solution to a multi-tier problem. The criminal justice 
model deals with the after-effects of terrorism, attempting to bring those responsible 
to justice; the war model deals with terrorism through pre-emptive military 
interventions. According to Albrecht, counterterrorism strategies shaped by the war 
model undermine or even annihilate the rule of law
41
 because they fail to deal with 
separatism or other forms of rebellion with ‘due regards to human rights principles, 
democracy and the rule of law'.
42
 Jakobs argues that:  
The state has no need to deprive enemies of all of their rights. The state does 
not need to do everything it can do, but actually may refrain from doing so in 
order to leave the door open to a future peace agreement with the enemy.
43
  
The war model transforms a potential bargaining situation into conflict, depriving 
both sides of the possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial outcome.
44
 Military 
interventions, Malvesti argues, are ‘a blunt, ineffective instrument that create a cycle 
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of vengeance with minimal gains at best’.45 Unaccompanied, the war model does not 
present the most effective model to tackle terrorism because it ignores root causes. 
Notably, the war model has evolved towards a more criminal justice approach.
46
  
2.3 The extended criminal justice model  
Criminal justice agencies are the main actors in this model. Political interference in 
the operational aspects of the police and the courts is limited. Thatcher stated that 
‘there can be no question of political status for one serving a sentence for a crime. 
Crime is crime is a crime, it is not political.’47 Committing crimes, Wilkinson asserts, 
implies the moral responsibility of the offender; hence, terrorists criminalise 
themselves because they follow a systematic policy of terror, rendering their acts 
synonymous to crime.
48
 In this model, terrorists are treated within the confines of 
domestic law. It is the rule of law, its respect for the rights of individuals, and the 
perception of a fair process which give this model its legitimacy.
49
 
There is a demand that the rules be legitimate, not only in emanating from 
established authority, but also in the manner of formulation, in a way they are 
applied, and in their fidelity to agreed-upon institutional purposes … The 
obligation to obey has some relation to the quality of the rules and integrity of 
their administration.
50
  
Perceptions of legitimacy increase cooperation through reliance on feelings of 
responsibility and obligation.
51
 Legitimacy is the basis of police action in democratic 
societies.
52
 In an attempt to deal with terrorism, states have developed complex legal 
frameworks. The criminal justice model not only neutralises individual threats but 
has ‘symbolic, denunciatory functions which strengthen faith in societal values. The 
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idea that justice can better be achieved in the context of executive measures is 
implausible’.53 
Reconciling the war and criminal justice models is difficult as there are political, 
legal, and policy implications which may jeopardise the policy of criminalisation.
54
 
The extended criminal justice model acknowledges this difficulty, and according to 
Pedahzur and Ranstorp it is probably the most adopted strategy.
55
 Walker notes that 
the state should be empowered to act in defence of its interests because democracy is 
not meant to be a suicide pact.
56
 In an emergency, the ECHR allows for derogations 
when there is a continuing and viable threat, limiting emergency powers and 
ensuring they are proportionate to the threat. Governments are not, however, given 
carte blanche because derogations can be challenged in the courts and certain rights 
are absolute.
57
  
The extended criminal justice model allows the state, under certain circumstances, to 
infringe civil liberties. This falls outside normal criminal justice practices. Executive 
measures are regulated by law and must be relevant to the threat, accountable, and 
constitutional.
58
 Walker notes that the only correct counterterrorism policy should be 
‘consistent with the rule of law and proportionate response’.59 The war on drugs 
demonstrates that counterterrorism is not the only instance where the extended 
criminal justice model has been used.
60
 Pre-emption remains necessary to avoid the 
loss of life.
61
  
Special anti-terrorism measures have given the police more powers. Adjusted 
judicial processes and special courts have been established to deal with suspected 
terrorists. Crelinsten calls this the elasticity of the criminal justice model. Drawing 
the line between political violence and criminality is difficult because they could 
both stem from political motives.
62
 It is because of these adaptations that the pure 
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form of the criminal justice model is insufficient, and attempts are being undertaken 
to strengthen counterterrorism efforts. The adaptations centre on pre-emption and net 
widening to avoid harm to the public and effectively tackle individuals who may be 
involved on the fringes of terrorism or who represent a future threat.
63
 The extended 
criminal justice model does not deviate from the rule of law because special 
measures within domestic law allow for governmental and judicial oversight. 
However, executive measures usually deviate from liberal democratic principles and 
at times violate civil liberties.
64
 ‘It has primarily been via deformations of the 
criminal justice system that liberal democracies have moved away from the rule of 
law and democratic acceptability.’65 Examples of special measures include 
internment in Northern Ireland, the establishment of special courts in France and 
Spain, and the limitation of defendants’ rights in Germany. Many of these features 
are found in CONTEST and in the American led ‘war on terror’. 
After a period of clear distinction between policing and war, internal and external 
security is merging.
66
 Liberty is no longer the limit of security as the line between the 
two blurs. But if liberty becomes the condition of security, security has no limits.
67
 
Governments attempt to legitimise exceptional measures with reference to the new 
threat of terrorism. Coordination and cooperation become the new paradigm and new 
structures are put into place, forging a closer working relationship between police, 
intelligence services, and international partners.
68
  
Within the extended criminal justice model, executive measures strengthen the 
ability of the police and judiciary to deal with terrorism. If deemed necessary for the 
protection of the public, executive measures may deviate from democratic and 
human rights principles. The law limits executive measures to extreme 
circumstances, while the responsible agencies are accountable to the judiciary and 
the government. As with the other two models, the root causes of radicalisation and 
terrorism are insufficiently dealt with. However, unlike the war model, both criminal 
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justice models offer the legitimacy of the rule of law. The extended criminal justice 
model also allows for the adoption of executive measures into the domestic legal 
framework to strengthen police and judicial powers, and improve their ability to 
tackle terrorism.  
2.4 The American ‘war on terror’  
To illustrate the stark difference between these two approaches, and to highlight the 
innovativeness of CONTEST, it is helpful to examine the American ‘war on terror’. 
The former Foreign Secretary David Miliband states that ‘the phrase gives a false 
idea of a unified global enemy, and encourages a primarily military reply’.69 The 
‘war on terror’ rhetoric was not used by many other nations. Surprisingly, the 
American legislative response to terrorism after 9/11 was ‘mild compared to the 
responses of other democracies’.70 The US government took different approaches 
domestically and internationally.  
The international approach is based on risk elimination and is represented in the 
political rhetoric of the Bush administration, which declared the attacks of 9/11 an 
‘act of war’, and used phrases such as ‘good versus evil’, ‘fighting for freedom’, and 
‘axis of evil’.71  The Obama administration toned down the rhetoric,  
but not the underlying assumptions or the sense of imperative in the war 
against terrorism. … Far from being trapped in the Bush narrative, Obama has 
always shared its core assumptions … he was a true believer in the war against 
terrorism. Indeed, his key criticism of the Bush administration was not that it 
was giving too much emphasis to terrorism in its foreign policy, but that it 
allowed itself to be distracted from the ‘real’ war on terror by invading Iraq. 72  
The Bush administration’s narrative cast jihadi terrorists as ‘the heirs of fascism, 
totalitarianism and Nazism’.73 This political rhetoric based on manichaeism, a 
perspective of the world as black and white, has galvanised the present conflict and 
cast terrorists as adversaries. Such views are reciprocated with Al Qaeda casting the 
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fight as a cosmic struggle against the great Satan.
74
 If politicians are to be believed, 
this is not a political feud, and with both sides perceiving the conflict as one between 
good and evil, the outcome must be the extermination of one of the antagonists.
75
 
Terrorism is seen through the prism of the cold war, an outlook which has influenced 
contemporary US counterterrorism strategy.
76
 The Bush administration’s political 
rhetoric attempted to legitimise the use of maximum force. ‘The only way to defeat 
terrorism as a threat to our way of life, is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where 
it grows.’77  
Many believe that the New York terror attacks in 2001 were the opening scenes of 
the unfolding ‘war on terror’, which eventually led to the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Tens of thousands of civilian lives have been lost during these campaigns.
78
 
Despite perceptions, the ‘war on terror’ has not been a one-tier counterterrorism 
strategy. Rather, it is a twin track approach to counterterrorism, and a continuation of 
previous American policy. The ‘war on terror’ is a combination of military and 
international collaboration abroad, with criminal justice agencies at the forefront 
domestically.
79
 Prior to 9/11, the US was relatively restrained in the use of military 
force as an expression of its counterterrorism strategy.
80
 Exceptions include the 1986 
air strikes in Libya, a response to the bombing of a Berlin discothèque frequented by 
American soldiers,
81
 and a number of strikes against targets in Sudan and 
Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks on American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania by Al Qaeda.
82
 
After 9/11, pre-emptive military intervention, extraordinary rendition, and images of 
torture in places such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib characterise the ‘war on 
terror’.83 Such practices, Duffy argues, violate international law.84 Wilkinson notes 
                                                 
74
 Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism (Atlantic 
Books 2004) 107  
75
 Schelling (n 25) 5  
76
 Bruce Hoffman, ‘Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?’ [1999] Foreign Policy 62, 64  
77
 CNN, ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address’ (2001) 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> accessed 4 August 2010 
78
 Casualty Monitor, ‘Monitoring and Analysis of Data on Civilian and British Military Casualties in 
Afghanistan and Iraq’ (2010) <http://www.casualty-monitor.org/> accessed 12 December 2011 
79
 Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (Penguin 
2008) 
80
 Michele Malvesti, ‘Explaining the United States’ Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists’ (2001) 13 
Terrorism and Political Violence 85 
81
 Global Security, ‘Operation Eldorado Canyon’ (2010) 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/el_dorado_canyon.htm> accessed 8 May 2010 
82
 Hoffman (n 76) 
83
 Leila Sadat, ‘Extraordinary Rendition, Torture and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror’ 
(2007) 75 George Washington Law Review 1200 
 24 
that ‘there is much greater danger of military overreaction that undermines the values 
of the rule of law and the protection of human rights, which democracies have a duty 
to uphold’.85 The US government has adopted ‘a revised legal regime … loosening 
restrictions on security agencies, [hoping to] yield consequential anti-terror 
benefits’.86 This strategy utilises a combination of military forces, security agencies, 
and law enforcement bodies to fight terrorism both domestically and abroad.
87
 
Despite political rhetoric and active military interventions, the US has repeatedly 
shown that its criminal justice agencies are capable of pursuing terrorists through the 
criminal justice system.
88
 For example, the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombings were pursued through the courts.
89
 Since 9/11, individuals involved 
in forty-six terror plots between 2001 and 2009 have been successfully prosecuted.
90
 
The last few years have revealed both a sharp demarcation between the purposes of 
the police and the armed forces, and convergence between criminal justice and 
military practices within American society.
91
 The NSA has conducted warrantless 
electronic surveillance of enemies both in the US and abroad.
92
 Chesney and 
Goldsmith conclude that there has been a convergence between the military and 
criminal justice detention models.  
Convergence itself has helped flesh out the contours of a more appropriate 
model, but the … ultimate unpredictable nature of the convergence process is 
no receipt for sustainable reform.
93
  
Although the rhetoric around the ‘war on terror’ seems to have disappeared under 
Obama, military interventions continue. These interventions, which include drone 
attacks, have killed and injured tens of thousands and form part of the US’s 
counterterrorism strategy abroad.
94
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In the long term, the ‘war on terror’ has undermined America’s reputation and cast 
doubts on the legitimacy of the war approach.
95
 Although the US counterterrorism 
strategy contains aspects of both the war and the extended criminal justice models, 
the growing perception that certain aspects are based on military power and 
commercial interests has led to an escalation of violence and increased sympathy 
towards extremists.
96
  
Despite US government efforts to use a combination of criminal justice agencies and 
the military, the overarching perception is that the US is leading a war. The US 
approach fails to address causes of radicalisation and terrorism because it is based on 
risk elimination. Also, US policy illustrates the effects which military interventions 
can have on perceptions of legitimacy. The fundamental rights of ordinary civilians 
are disregarded, strengthening extremism. ‘The current practices are unprecedented 
and they conflict with the legal values reflected in established principles of 
extradition, refugee and human rights norms.’97  
2.5 The British experience  
Throughout its colonial history to the present day, various British governments have 
dealt with political violence in the UK and its territories and protectorates. Military 
interventions and the use of violence and torture were common practice across parts 
of the British Empire and its territories such as Palestine, Kenya, Malaysia, Cyprus, 
and Aden.
98
 Current military operations in Afghanistan could give one the 
impression that the British government continues to use a war approach to tackle 
terrorism. However, the British government rejected the rhetoric and actions related 
to the ‘war on terror’ such as renditions, torture, and Guantanamo Bay.99 In contrast 
to Iraq, the counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan were backed by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1368.
100
 Unlike the US, the British government 
acknowledged its obligations to the Geneva Conventions in both conflicts, as 
outlined in CONTEST.
101
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During the uprising in Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s, the British government 
developed an approach which attempted to capture the 'hearts and minds' of the 
people.
102
 Jackson points out that the hearts and minds campaign was as much about 
creating fear as it was about winning the social and economic battle.
103
 Force was 
still used systematically, and the campaign was akin to imposing an armed coup.  
Different rules applied in Northern Ireland, a country whose political status fell 
between not-quite-Empire and not-quite-England. The approach in Northern Ireland 
bridged the hearts and minds campaign in Malaysia with the contemporary policy of 
Prevent. Since the partition of Ireland, UK governments have increased legislation to 
give criminal justice agencies more powers to tackle terrorism in Northern Ireland.
104
 
With the growing political violence in the country in the 1970s, the military was 
deployed to support the police within a civil power framework.
105
 At first the 
military was seen as neutral, but its role changed from peacekeeping to counter-
insurgency.
106
 With the Unionist government too slow to address the grievances of 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s,
107
 the IRA, whose main objective was to 
remove the Unionist regime, received growing support from disadvantaged Catholic 
communities.   
As the civilian death toll in the street fighting rose, the Londonderry and 
Belfast Catholics began to arm themselves and took to the IRA as the only 
available armed Catholic defence organization.
108
  
Government counterterrorism legislation veered from a militaristic to a criminal 
justice approach as evidenced by ‘internment without trial, inhuman treatment of 
detainees and lethal confrontations such as the bloody Sunday in 1972 when 13 
people … were shot dead by the Army’.109  
Hickman et al. argue that from the 1970s onward, British anti-terror legislation, 
government policies, and negative media coverage led to the isolation of Irish 
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communities in Britain.
110
 Large numbers were arrested, interrogated, and released 
without charge. Broad stop-and-search powers at ports and airports allowed the state 
to gather intelligence. Coercion and repression were dominant features of the 
government’s approach, a far cry from policing by consent.111  
A criminal justice centred approach was adopted as a result of the Diplock review in 
the 1970s.
112
 Special powers remained available to the security services in Northern 
Ireland, but military numbers continued to decrease from their peak in 1992.
113
 An 
integral part of the government’s counterterrorism strategy was intelligence 
gathering. Informants were given protection even at the cost of civilian lives.
114
 
Political prisoners were deliberately turned into common criminals
115
 and a veiled 
dirty war continued well into the 1990s.
116
 Even after the Good Friday agreement 
and the diminishing army presence, all PSNI officers routinely carry firearms.
117
 
Although less coercive force was used during the hearts and minds campaign in 
Northern Ireland than in Malaya, many interventions were still illegitimate and 
counterproductive.
118
 Although the military was there to support the civil authorities, 
its use of excessive force could be seen as undermining police primacy.
119
 The 
government’s counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland included aspects of the 
war and extended criminal justice models. Although the strategy required a strong 
degree of cooperation from some of the local population (the Unionist), the 
importance of addressing inequality between the communities was belatedly 
recognised.
120
  
Unless ... trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the 
government and the security forces the chance of success is greatly reduced. If 
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the people support the government and the security forces the insurgents 
become isolated and cut off from their supplies, shelter and intelligence.
121
 
Security operations and the penetration of Loyalist groups and the Provisional IRA, 
as well as political and economic reforms, led to the Good Friday agreement.
122
  As 
part of the agreement, and the decommissioning of weapons by the IRA, a number of 
powers such as justice and policing have devolved to Stormont. The British 
government also repealed the Government of Ireland Act 1920.
123
 This has led to 
relative peace in Northern Ireland. However, the unpredictable implementation of 
constitutionalism in Northern Ireland diminished the success of establishing Britain’s 
legitimacy.
124
  
Since the 1970s, the focus in Great Britain turned from domestic to international 
terrorism and circled back to 9/11 and the legislation it has spawned.
125
 However, the 
Terrorism Act 2000 was introduced prior to 9/11 to deal with the rise of jihadi 
terrorism abroad, which suggests that the government was not entirely caught by 
surprise. This Act of Parliament forms the basis for further counterterrorism 
legislation introduced in the years following 9/11. Legislation such as the Terrorism 
Act 2006 was hurriedly introduced to tackle the ‘new’ threat of domestic jihadi 
terrorism.
126
 Referred to as the politics of the last atrocity, it represents a reaction to 
the public outrage about terrorist attacks in the US and the UK.
127
 Until 2003, the 
UK was a safe haven for Islamic extremists and its supporters.
128
 With the risk of 
home-grown jihadi terrorism, new legislation shifted from reactive to proactive 
policing and risk management. Public safety has taken precedence over the gathering 
of evidence.
 129
  
The 1996 Lloyd Report sets out four main principles which contemporary 
counterterrorism legislation should consider. ‘(i) Legislation should be aligned as 
close as possible to criminal law. (ii) A balance between security and liberty is 
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attained, meaning that additional powers should only be introduced when there is 
sufficient need. (iii) Additional powers should have additional safeguards. (iv) 
Legislation should comply with Britain's international law obligations.’130 The report 
led to the Terrorism Act 2000, which replaced the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provision) Act 1973 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974.
131
 Its aim was to 
launch a more unified and permanent regime reflecting a move towards dealing with 
international terrorism.
132
 Both Labour’s 2008 National Security Strategy,133 and the 
coalition’s NSS are committed to the rule of law and to upholding civil rights.134 
In 2003, CONTEST united different elements to tackle terrorism including criminal 
justice and other central government agencies. After the London bombings in 2005, 
there was a shift within CONTEST which widened preventative efforts.    
There is an acknowledgement that the rather blinkered approach to recognising 
causal factors and providing supporting material to justify particular threat 
responses, characterised by the years of the Blair-Bush partnership, was both 
wrong and unhelpful. Secondly, and more importantly, there is the belated 
recognition that: Communications are a vital part of our work on counter-
terrorism, CONTEST depends for its success on partnerships. The partnership 
... depends on openness and trust, both of which depend upon accurate 
communications about the threat and responses.
135
  
The London bombings challenged the notion of the archetypical terrorist.
136
 The line 
between friend and foe blurred. There was a sudden realisation that the foe was no 
longer an outsider but possibly a neighbour, a colleague, or friend. The London 
bombings also seem to have been a catalyst for a substantial shift in government 
responses to terrorism. Recent decades have seen a gradual integration of all aspects 
of counterterrorism, including prevention, protection from attacks, and attack 
preparation, into one strategy, CONTEST. This strategy acknowledges that a one-tier 
approach to terrorism is no longer sufficient, partly because the threat of terrorism 
comes from British communities. That said, CONTEST is still dominated by 
counterterrorism policing, mirroring the extended criminal justice system. War 
model aspects, particularly the use of the military, do not feature in CONTEST. 
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CONTEST is a domestic strategy and does not include military strategies abroad 
such as Afghanistan.  
2.6 The CONTEST strategy 
Unlike previous counterterrorism strategies, CONTEST takes a more holistic 
approach. It unites various aspects related to terrorism and the possible aftermath of a 
terrorist attack. Unlike the ‘war on terror’, the aim of CONTEST is to pre-emptively 
reduce the risk of terrorism,
137
 ‘so that people can go about their normal lives, freely 
and with confidence’.138 Despite changes by the coalition government, CONTEST’s 
structure remains unchanged. Unless stated, any further references to CONTEST and 
Prevent refer to its 2011 version. There is an emphasis on anticipatory risk and the 
proactive countering of terrorism
139
 because the risks of mass casualties are 
unacceptable.
140
 It is therefore necessary to stop terrorists before they achieve their 
objectives. Based on the rule of law, CONTEST widens the traditional boundaries of 
the criminal justice system through, for example, the proliferation of precursor 
criminal offences.
141
 The coalition government has made some changes such as 
repealing the section 44 stop-and-search policy and replacing it with more limited 
powers.
142
 Other measures such as control orders have also been replaced with 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs).
143
 Walker argues that 
some executive measures are rather excessive; nevertheless, they remain an integral 
part of the CONTEST strategy.
144
  
The 2009 version of CONTEST acknowledges that winning over Muslim 
communities is essential to reducing the threat of terrorism.
145
 CONTEST assumes 
that disregarding the rule of law and individual rights may alienate communities 
which are vital to the prevention process, leading to conflict and mistrust with 
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authorities. Upholding human rights has become a central part of CONTEST.
146
 
Although the concept of Prevent is not entirely new, previous UK counterterrorism 
strategies have mainly focused on Pursue, and to a limited extent Protect and 
Prepare.  
The reason for the inclusion of Prevent is that terrorism motivated by fringe 
movements within Islam poses a significant threat to the public because self-starting 
groups and individuals are more difficult to detect through conventional methods.
147
 
Indeed, 'religious extremism has ... become the most powerful motivational and 
ideological basis for groups engaged in terrorist activities'.
148
 As Walker points out, 
the next terrorist may be our neighbour.
149
 Other factors such as conflict and 
instability, aspects of modern technology, a persuasive ideology, and radicalisation 
continue to enable terrorist groups to grow and operate.
150
    
It is intent on inflicting mass casualties without warning, motivated by a 
violent extremist ideology, and exploits modern travel and communications to 
spread through a loose and dangerous global network.
151
  
The government and media reinforce this message, perpetuating the stereotypical 
image of jihadi terrorists.
152
 Over the last decade, policymakers and the media have 
framed jihadi terrorism as a new phenomenon, introducing laws that rely on the 
arguments of the novelty of the threat while ignoring past lessons.
153
 ‘Linguistically, 
the adjective new does not depict phenomena that are unprecedented. Rather, it tends 
to be used in the context of evolutionary change.’154 This matter is often ignored, as 
new laws are rushed through, often ignoring the root causes of terrorism, past 
lessons, and the contribution of the state in creating conditions in which terrorist 
actions by non-state actors occur.
155
 
Although integral aspects of CONTEST are based on the extended criminal justice 
model, CONTEST provides a broader approach to counterterrorism, bringing 
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together counterterrorism policing, prevention, protection, and coordinated responses 
in the event of a terrorist attack. Building on Garnett’s arguments, CONTEST 
focuses its attention on a purely rational level, on the ‘reasonable, conscious, artful 
behaviour motivated by the cold calculated interested; and … at the level that 
examines the participations in a conflict in all their complexity’.156 Within this 
strategy, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare supplement Pursue, addressing problems 
which cannot be tackled by security services or the criminal justice agencies.  
2.6.1 The Prevent policy  
The concept of Prevent is not entirely new. A community-based approach to 
counterterrorism formed a cornerstone of the approach taken in Northern Ireland in 
the later years of the conflict, and was brought back to centre stage after the 7/7 
London bombings.
157
 The Prevent Review has taken Prevent back to its 2003 origins 
by separating the prevention of extremism from preventing extremism leading to 
terrorism. The objectives of the revised Prevent policy are to ‘(i) respond to the 
ideological challenges of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; 
(ii) prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; and (iii) work with sectors and institutions where 
there are risks of radicalization which we need to address’.158 Two key objectives of 
the previous version have been either sidelined or dropped altogether. These are 
‘increasing resilience of communities to violent extremism, and addressing the 
grievances which ideologies exploit’.159  
It falls to the Integration Strategy, published by the DCLG, to tackle extremism, 
while dealing with grievances has been removed from Prevent by the government 
altogether.
160
 There has also been a shift in language. The Prevent Review no longer 
uses the term ‘violent extremism’, stating that it is too broad. Instead, it refers to 
'extremism', with Prevent focusing on extremism which leads to terrorism.
161
 
However, extremism is defined in such broad terms and with reference to ambiguous 
British values that its use becomes as meaningless as violent extremism. At the same 
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time, it allows the government to class as extreme those who oppose its policies.
162
 
The Prevent Review acknowledges that other forms of extremism, such as right-wing 
extremism need tackling, but Prevent focuses on jihadi terrorism because it poses the 
greatest risk to the UK’s national security at the present time.163  
The government envisions an approach where a partnership of local authorities and 
the police takes the lead in close conjunction with central government departments. 
Other agencies are brought in if needed.
164
 The new maxim is ‘communities defeat 
terrorism’.165 Initiatives such as the Radical Middle Way, initiated under the old 
Prevent strategy, brought together authoritative voices to speak to Muslim 
communities in the UK and abroad.
166
 These projects engaged in topics such as 
Islamic theology, terrorism, and citizenship.
167
 Other initiatives included creating 
young peoples' forums across the UK, increasing citizenship education at mosques, 
the promotion of Islamic studies in higher education, and the creation of a Muslim 
board to articulate an understanding of Islam in Britain.
168
  
The revised policy, however, makes clear that the government will no longer engage 
with groups espousing extremism, even non-violent forms such as the Street Project 
in East London.
169
 Rather, the Review shifts preventative efforts to interventions, 
targeting those at risk of radicalisation through the improvement of information 
sharing. Prevent is meant to act as an early warning system,
170
 identifying those 
engaged in extremism through ever increasing involvement of government agencies, 
and private and voluntary sector organisations, such as the Department of Health and 
universities.
171
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The aim is to support mainstream voices and undermine extremist ideologies by 
collaborating with Muslim scholars and other faith groups.
172
 Since its inception, the 
Prevent Review has placed even more emphasis on working with universities to 
tackle extremism on campuses, while closing the gap in Islamic studies.
173
 Trained 
police officers develop contacts with Muslim communities, helping them deal with 
issues of extremism. Other schemes include young Muslim consultative groups 
which create space for individuals to voice their concerns and contribute to policy 
development.
174
 The Prevent policy promotes shared values and a broader debate 
about citizenship rights and responsibilities. It attempts to ‘distil attractive rallying 
points for the potentially disaffected and emphasis[es] that Britishness is no enemy’ 
to Islam.
175
 
Under the Labour government, Prevent work was linked with community cohesion 
and integration. The Review has moved the tackling of non-violent extremism to the 
integration strategy, but acknowledges that the success of Prevent relies on 
community engagement.
176
 The Review challenges those who do not support 
fundamental British values, however ambiguous they may be. Briggs raises a number 
of concerns about how proportionality is ensured, and whether Muslims will be held 
to standards that are not expected of others within wider British society.
177
 Prevent 
has changed from a policy which attempted to work with communities and to some 
extent allowing them to tackle extremism, to a policy which is primarily aimed at 
identifying those at risk of radicalisation and putting formal interventions in place. 
The promulgation of special offences represents a ‘false and extravagant 
presumption about the ability of harsh criminal law to stop terrorism’.178 Such a 
tactic serves political, symbolic, and denunciatory functions.
179
 This, Walker and 
Rehman argue, has led to net-widening, policing and demonising trivial behaviour 
seen as a risk factor, focusing on Muslim communities, and the creation of a 
surveillance state.
180
 The perception of Prevent as another gimmick to gather 
                                                 
172
 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 1) 
173
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 158) 
174
 HM Government, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: A strategy for delivery’ (n 166) 7  
175
 Walker and Rehman (n 170) 
176
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (n 158) 44  
177
 Briggs, ‘Community engagement for counterterrorism’ (n 157) 975  
178
 Kent Roach, ‘The Criminal Law and Terrorism’ in Victor Ramraj and others (eds), Global Anti-
Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2005) 
179
 Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 252  
180
 Walker and Rehman (n 170) 
 35 
intelligence about Muslim communities through local services, Kundnani argues, 
generates a lack of trust in the programme and state authorities.
181
  
2.6.2 The Pursue policy  
Pursue is the criminal justice tier of CONTEST. Counterterrorism policing actions 
often have a direct and indirect effect on the delivery of Prevent, and how 
communities perceive counterterrorism in general. Its purpose  
is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas. 
This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, 
disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever 
possible prosecute those responsible.
182
 
Intelligence is vital to this work stream. ‘Close dialogue between the police, security 
and intelligence agencies is the basis of successful counterterrorism work.’183 
Because of the nature of jihadi terrorism, everyone is treated as a potential suspect, 
particularly individuals within Muslim communities.
184
 Police operations and 
executive actions are often intelligence-led and allow the police and the security 
services to identity, monitor, and disrupt potential terrorist plots. ‘The embedded 
nature of terrorist risk seems to demand the application of all-risk security and 
policing measures, such as stop-and-search powers.’185 These powers are often 
linked to intelligence rather than evidence-gathering. All-risk policing presumes that 
risk could come from anywhere and is not ‘exclusively raised by non-citizens or 
other obvious “outsiders” traditionally considered most in need of scrutiny’.186 There 
is a danger that insufficient intelligence may lead to actions based on information 
which is vague or even haphazard.   
The risk posed by terrorism has led to a more pre-emptive approach; consequently, 
pursuit now includes prevention.
187
 There is the possibility that this approach 
forestalls ‘risks, [and] competes with and even takes precedence over responding to 
wrongs done’.188 Legislation potentially criminalises behaviour which may be 
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construed as potentially dangerous and supportive of terrorism.  Trigger offences, 
such as s. 57 and s. 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, are aimed at preventing more 
serious terror-related activities. This approach ignores broader social and 
environmental factors.
189
 Walker argues that the introduction of pre-emptive laws 
would not be supported outside a time of crisis.
190
 A fine balance needs to be struck 
to avoid abuse of the powers given to police and security services to uphold the lives 
and liberty of citizens.
191
 Anti-terror laws should not be used to victimise, stifle 
freedom of speech, or undermine privacy because of the communities’ and 
individuals’ ethnicity or religious views.192 
Pursue measures include TPIMs, which have replaced control orders;
193
 data mining; 
port controls; and stop-and-search powers.
194
 These measures can be used to gather 
intelligence as an alternative to the criminal justice process, bypassing trial 
proceedings.
195
 Intelligence is not necessarily synonymous with evidence used in 
judicial proceedings. CONTEST argues that non-prosecution options need to be 
available to disrupt plots before they take place, even if this means jeopardising a 
successful prosecution.
196
  
The UK government has rejected even the terminology of the war on terror and 
claims instead that prosecution is – first, second and third – the government’s 
preferred approach when dealing with suspected terrorists.
197
  
By 2015, the government aims to improve the ability to prosecute and deport those 
suspected of terrorist offences. In addition, it is working on improving judicial 
proceedings so that these are better able to handle sensitive and secret material to 
‘serve the interests of both justice and national security’.198 This is because conflict 
between protecting the public and securing convictions sometimes arises, especially 
when terrorism plots are disrupted early in an investigation.  
These measures, as well as laws pertaining to non-disclosure, have been criticised for 
their austerity, disregard of the due process of law, and their potential to discriminate 
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and alienate.
199
 The use of s. 44 stop-and-searches has raised concerns about 
targeting Asian males, increasing racial and ethnic tensions, and creating barriers of 
trust between Muslim communities and the police.
200
 In 2010 the European Court of 
Human Rights declared s.44 stop-and-searches incompatible with the ECHR.
201
   
Pursue attempts to combine effective intelligence gathering with democratic 
accountability.
202
 Responsibility and accountability provide two moral cornerstones 
for public service in a democracy.
203
 Walker notes that the idea that justice can be 
better achieved in the context of executive measures is implausible.
204
 Security and 
human rights are not opposites and should be protected rather than infringed upon, 
even in times of emergency.
205
 Pursue, although the dominant pillar of CONTEST, 
relies on the other three P’s. Particularly, it relies on Prevent in order to stop 
individuals from becoming radicalizing and going down the path of terrorism. 
2.7 Is CONTEST innovative?  
CONTEST is innovative as it goes beyond the boundaries of traditional 
counterterrorism strategies by successfully combining the extended criminal justice 
model with prevention, protection, and preparedness.
206
 CONTEST acknowledges 
that it cannot achieve its objectives without the support of local communities in 
which extremism is rooted. Because the threat has shifted from abroad to British 
communities, gaining local support in the process has become more important. 
CONTEST combines the reactive elements of the extended criminal justice system 
with a preventative element.  
Winning in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive meaning; it is not 
winning relative to one’s adversary. It means gaining relative to one’s own 
value system; and this may be done by bargaining, mutual accommodation, and 
by avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour. … Concepts like deterrence, 
limited war, and disarmament, as well as negotiations, are concerned with the 
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common interest and mutual dependence that can exist between participants in 
a conflict.
207
  
CONTEST acknowledges that military interventions abroad and criminalisation 
alone cannot solve the problems of extremism and terrorism. Prevent attempts to 
deal with the issue of extremism, although there has been an unfortunate return to its 
2003 version which is more aligned with Pursue and is about streamlining the 
gathering of information. The Home Affairs Committee stated that  
prevention - that is, stopping people from supporting or embracing violent 
extremism of whatever kind - is not solely a function of a counter-terrorism 
strategy, but in fact must be regarded as part of a much wider approach to 
attitudes and attitudinal change.
208
  
The Review has separated community cohesion from Prevent, and focuses on 
extremism that leads to terrorism.
209
 Nevertheless, CONTEST remains innovative 
because it continues to include Prevent, a policy which aims to divert people from 
the criminal justice system altogether through target intervention and community 
engagement.
210
 To gain support from Muslim communities, the government needs to 
maintain the ‘moral high ground’ and tackle injustices and grievances both here and 
abroad.
211
 In the long term, Prevent allows local authorities and the police to build 
bridges with communities, and to develop capabilities to protect them from 
extremism.
212
 
2.8 The implications of innovation: Tensions within CONTEST and 
Prevent 
The inclusion of Prevent has caused tensions within the CONTEST strategy. These 
tensions appear at a number of different levels such as the interdepartmental/inter-
institutional level, between Prevent and Pursue, and within Prevent itself. Tensions 
arise between the performance-orientated facets of policy and the facets which 
encourage the breakdown of segment boundaries in pursuit of public service 
improvement.
213
 Tensions also arise between national and local priorities about how 
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much discretion local authorities should be given.
214
 Tensions within CONTEST are 
not limited to inter-institutional antagonisms, and have arisen between policymakers, 
senior management, and frontline staff. ‘The policy delivered … is most often 
immediate and personal’,215 but there are many different stages which are usually 
‘played out in arenas far removed from the daily life of neighbourhood residents’.216 
Policy process is fluid and traverses a set of stages. Any policy must be conceived, 
agendas set, and alternatives excluded, before it can be accepted by senior 
management and implemented by frontline staff.
217
 And there is always the impact of 
the policy to consider. There is no simple top-down effect, and intentions do not 
always have the desired outcomes.
218
  
The role of counterterrorism policing is characterised and 
based around complex and wider ranging special legislation which emphasizes 
intelligence-gathering and pre-emptive intervention in order to combat the 
anticipatory risk of terrorism. Special laws augment policing powers, alter 
criminal justice processes, institute loosely worded criminal offences, and offer 
administrative alternatives to criminal justice, such as detention without trial 
and control orders.
219
  
This style of policing undermines the perception of legitimacy of the police and other 
state authorities due to its lack of transparency, accountability, and, at times, 
disregard of human rights.
220
 Policing style affects community response. For 
example, communities with high social bonding capital, which is prominent in many 
Muslim communities, respond negatively to Pursue-style policing.
221
 Not only does 
this style of policing undermine the perception of legitimacy, it has a negative effect 
on these communities’ relationship with the wider society, affecting integration and 
cohesion work. The lack of community engagement negatively affects 
neighbourhood policing and intelligence operations, and impairs the ability to gather 
local intelligence.
222
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According to a House of Commons Select Committee report, prior to the Review, 
there is logic behind combining Pursue and Prevent into one strategy. However, ‘the 
current breadth of focus of Prevent – from community work to crime prevention – 
sits uncomfortably within a counterterrorism strategy’.223 This recommendation was 
accepted by the Review, which separated community cohesion from 
counterterrorism. Traditional pursuit tactics alone are no longer appropriate when 
dealing with extremism which may be embedded within local communities. The 
support of Muslim communities is vital to the overall success of CONTEST. There is 
pressure from the government to bring about the organisational changes needed to 
integrate Prevent into neighbourhood policing and local authority approaches to 
crime prevention.
224
  
Local crime prevention partnerships have existed for some time.
225
 A similar 
approach is needed if Prevent is to be successful. Social institutions such as the 
police ‘mould and constrain the actions and attitudes of individuals that constitute 
them’.226 Sampson et al. note that the police are often enthusiastic proponents of the 
multi-agency approach, but prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum meetings, 
ignoring the multi-agency framework when it suits them.
227
 Masculine action-
orientated roles, such as chasing criminals, are given priority over prevention. Such 
attitudes may affect inter-agency collaboration efforts, particularly on sensitive 
issues such as counterterrorism.
228
 This is reflected by Sir Norman Bettison: ‘I am 
very clear that if Prevent were left to the Police it would fail … because the police 
have got to undertake the full gamut of the four Ps.’229 The blurring of the boundaries 
between Pursue and Prevent gives the impression that all community work within 
Muslim communities is linked to counterterrorism objectives, and ‘there is always 
the potential for those different responsibilities to be confused’.230  
The aims of Pursue and Prevent represent another source of potential conflict.  
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Given the dependence of democracies upon the mobilization of the masses, 
both at the political and the practical levels, care must be taken to avoid 
alienating the public by counter-terrorism measures that appear 
disproportionate or senseless.
231
 
Public perception is that counterterrorism measures focus almost exclusively on 
Muslim communities, which are often already stigmatised.
232
 Prevent work depends 
on these communities.
233
  
There is a demand that the rules be legitimate, not only in emanating from 
established authorities, but also in the manner of their formulation, in the way 
they are applied, and in their fidelity to agreed-upon institutional purposes ... 
[The] obligation to obey has some relation to the quality of the rules and the 
integrity of their administration.
234
 
Prevent is based on voluntary community participation, which is more reliable than 
coerced cooperation and does not depend on the authorities' effective application of 
incentives or sanctions.
235
 Counterterrorism policing must ensure that police and 
government actions do not undermine Prevent's legitimacy because it depends on 
community engagement and participation.
236
  
Conflicts exist within Prevent. There are politicians and policymakers who believe 
that the state should not engage with those who hold extreme views which oppose 
British values.  
If we leave the field clear to extremists, without engagement at all we 
embolden them and undermine our own objectives. With groups that call for or 
support terrorist acts ... there is no room whatsoever for debate, only vociferous 
opposition. ... Those extremist groups that engage in democracy ... are doing so 
for political tactic.’237 
Blears’ view is shared by many across the political spectrum including Prime 
Minister Cameron.
238
 Others argue that it is precisely these groups that need to be 
engaged because they often offer the best antidotes to Al Qaeda inspired 
propaganda.
239
 This debate further erodes the rights of the already economically 
deprived Muslim communities because the press and the state scrutinise their actions. 
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These communities are the new folk devils, the enemy within,
240
 and at times are 
excluded from mainstream society.  
Collective identities are defined negatively; that is to say against others. We 
recognize ourselves as us because we are different from them. ... Collective 
identities are based not on what their members have in common – they may 
have very little in common except not being the others.
241
 
Patterson argues that most people choose to belong to a certain group: ‘It is a choice 
predicated on the strongly held, intensely conceived belief that the individual has 
absolutely no choice but to belong to that specific group.’242 
Alienating Muslim communities leads to heightened identification with the wider 
Muslim community in Britain and abroad. The plight of Muslim communities in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan becomes the plight of the collective Muslim identity, 
the Ummah.
243
 At the same time it becomes harder for Muslim communities to see 
themselves as British because they are portrayed as outsiders by the media.
244
 
‘Whether responsible Muslims are the same thing as politically or religiously 
moderate Muslims is an on-going tension within Prevent.’245 CONTEST 
homogenises Muslim communities, despite all of the ethnic and religious divisions 
which exist within them.
246
 Greer sees such views as a stumbling block.
247
 These 
perceptions strengthen the collective Muslim identity and lead to the exclusion of 
Muslims, which is at times self-imposed, from the mainstream.
248
 Media coverage 
and the occasional encounter with the police serve as constant reminders of Muslim 
identity, leading to marginalisation, the loss of trust in public institutions, and an 
unwillingness to engage with the police and authorities.
249
 This reinforces the false 
                                                 
240
 Liz Fekete, ‘Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State’ (2004) 46 Race & Class 3 
241
 Eric Hobsbawn, ‘Identify Politics and the Left’ (1996) 217 New Left Review 38, 41  
242
 Orlando Patterson, ‘Implications of Ethnic Identification’ in Charles Fried and Ann Dummett 
(eds), Minorities: community and identity  : report of the Dahlem Workshop on Minorities  : 
Community and Identity, Berlin 1982, Nov 28-Dec 3 (Springer-Verlag 1983) 28  
243
 Derek McGee, The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights (Open 
University Press 2008) 
244
 Timothy Ash, ‘What Young British Muslims Say Can Be Shocking - Some of It is Also True’ (the 
Guardian, 2006) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/aug/10/comment.race> 
accessed 25 January 2010 
245
 Paul Thomas, Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism - Failing to Prevent (Bloomsbury 
2012) 79 
246
 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (n 1) 
247
 Steven Greer, ‘Human Rights and the Struggle Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 2 
European Human Rights Law Review 163, 169 
248
 Thiel (n 199) 
249
 Briggs and others (n 165) 31  
 43 
notion that one’s identity must come first because collective identities are social 
constructions.
250
  
Despite its importance, Prevent’s budget is meagre compared to the other three Ps. 
However, funds are needed to protect the national infrastructure and to conduct 
difficult and lengthy investigations.  
In the overall scheme of public spending and even within CONTEST itself, 
Prevent is relatively small beer. Nevertheless it is enormously sensitive and 
important politically, and this is why it deserves close attention ... .
251
  
Kundnani believes that Prevent is simply another tool used to alienate Muslim 
communities. He views it as an ideological tool, used to win the hearts and minds of 
these communities with the help of pro-government Muslim organisations, rather 
than a tool to prevent extremism.
252
 ‘The push for Britishness causes alienation. We 
become the other. We need to be studied, managed, and contained. Every conference 
we go to on Prevent frames things this way.’253 Some studies find merit in this 
view.
254
 However, Kundnani’s sample size is inadequate to objectively cover both 
sides of the argument. He focuses on dissenting voices and overgeneralises his 
findings. Despite its flaws, Prevent is a step forward because it aims to tackle 
extremism. Issues with community identities remain unaddressed, while local 
authorities’ knowledge of their local communities is patchy at best.255 Community 
engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy. Sustaining an 
effective response is impossible without the trust and partnership of the affected 
Muslim communities.
256
 Although budget cuts were predictable, with the coalition 
government consequently reshaping a number of aspects within Prevent, local 
authority and community partnerships remain essential tenets of the UK’s 
counterterrorism strategy.  
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2.9 Conclusion 
Successful strategies must go beyond military and/or criminal justice solutions and 
include legal, political, economic, and ideological dimensions. Such strategies 
address the complexity of the problem and acknowledge that casting terrorists as the 
personification of evil is often counterproductive.
257
 Garnett argues that any strategy 
should have two-tiers, one to deal with the rational level of the actors and the other to 
deal with the actors in all their complexities.
258
 Neither the war nor the extended 
criminal justice model has been successful in stopping radicalisation, and there 
remains the ever-present threat of terrorism. The ‘war on terror’ has particularly 
alienated Muslim communities worldwide, increasing the potential for terrorist 
recruitment. Many of these movements, Burke argues, are ‘rooted in social, 
economic and political contingencies’.259 There must be an acknowledgement that 
war and criminal justice approaches are simply not enough to defeat terrorism. Any 
terrorist organisation and its associated ideology which has anchored itself in society, 
claiming to correct prevailing grievances, will not just wither away because of harsh 
criminal measures or reforms. Ignoring real or perceived grievances achieves little. 
Rather, institutional responses should place a high priority on communication in 
order to counteract prevailing extremist ideologies so that the state is able to fulfil 
one of its primary functions, namely that of generating a reasonable degree of 
security.
260
 
CONTEST attempts to combine the reactive aspects of the criminal justice model 
with prevention, within criminal justice itself and beyond. It is innovative precisely 
because it draws together all aspects related to counterterrorism, streamlining these 
aspects into one policy. Unlike the ‘war on terror’, which focuses on risk elimination, 
CONTEST focuses on managing down the risk. CONTEST is about ‘promoting the 
values on which this society depends, whichever government is in power, and there 
is more about that than counter-terrorism … it can so easily get lost in the wash’.261  
The inclusion of Prevent has led to tensions between the different organisations 
involved. ‘Coordination across government … is very difficult to achieve’,262 and a 
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number of tensions relating to policy process, organisations, communities, and 
authorities have been identified.  
A fundamental flaw of Prevent was that it never maintained a clean separation 
between counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism, and that as a 
consequence, it became to be regarded as an instrument for ‘spying’ on Muslim 
communities.
263
 
The coalition government has attempted to remove this flaw by separating 
community cohesion from counterterrorism prevention. Only time will tell if this will 
be successful. Several studies suggest that there are tensions between the delivery of 
Pursue and Prevent and the impact they have on Muslim communities. These studies 
suggest that certain actions taken within Pursue and Prevent undermine the 
confidence of Muslim communities and their perception of legitimacy.
264
 Other 
studies suggest that the opposite is true and that Prevent has increased levels of trust 
towards the police in Muslim communities.
265
 Further research is needed to examine 
the impact of national and local tensions on Prevent delivery. Despite these tensions, 
CONTEST should be seen as a leap forward because it is much more holistic than 
previous approaches. The Prevent Review shows that the coalition government 
remains committed to the ideas of Prevent, acknowledging it as a long-term solution, 
rather than a short-term fix.   
 
 
                                                 
263
 Peter Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America (Bipartisan Policy Center 2011) 22  
264
 Suraj Lakhani, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and 
Communities’ (2012) 51 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 190 
265
 Martin Innes and others, ‘Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of 
Chief Police Officers’ (UPSI 2011) 
 46  
Chapter 3: Key concepts and tensions which affect 
CONTEST and Prevent 
3.1 Introduction 
There are key concepts which underpin and affect CONTEST, and in particular 
Prevent and Pursue. Terrorism, policing, prevention, and communities are examined 
in this chapter. Most articles and books about terrorism start by defining it; this 
chapter is no different. The chapter then examines how social, political, and legal 
constructions of terrorism have shaped British counterterrorism legislation and 
policy. CONTEST policy plays an important role in re-enforcing the social 
construction of terrorism, and acts as an agent to legitimise the government’s 
response to jihadi terrorism. The legal construction is important because it provides 
CONTEST with a framework in which the police and other agencies can act to 
combat terrorism. This chapter argues that terrorism’s framework is not abstract, and 
that it is the law through its agents which has a real impact on the ‘lived realities’ of 
Muslim communities in the UK. The second concept is policing which is vital to 
Pursue. Police and policing are not synonymous. Policing is much broader, and this 
chapter examines its different aspects. How communities are policed affects their 
perceptions of legitimacy and procedural fairness, and influences the trust placed in 
government authorities. Prevent relies on the help of local Muslim communities to 
tackle violent extremism. This chapter argues that because of low levels of trust in 
the police and other state authorities, it becomes much harder to successfully deliver 
Prevent. This chapter then examines the concept of prevention and what it is. There 
are various approaches to prevention. Currently, the police and CONTEST rely 
mainly on secondary prevention, which targets at-risk groups and individuals. This 
can be problematic because it singles out communities and essentially labels them as 
the ‘other’. It is also important to look at the concept of communities. This 
discussion focuses on the construction of Muslim communities in Britain and the 
effects that CONTEST has on them. Finally, the chapter discusses the tensions which 
arise between policing, prevention, and communities, and how these affect Prevent 
and Pursue.  
3.2 Terrorism and extremism: Political, legal, and social constructions 
People assume an intuitive understanding of what terrorism is. However, many lack a 
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concrete, precise, and explanatory definition of the term 'terrorism'.
1
 Although 
terrorism, just like crime, may appear to be a natural class of human action and 
behaviour, this is an artificial categorisation. Terrorism, as crime, is a social, 
political, and legal construction. Therefore, the concept of terrorism is constructed 
from the cultural, social, and political context. If the context changes so does its 
definition. This means that terrorism is a value-laden concept with multiple meanings 
based on the dominant social, cultural, and political values of society.
2
 The concept 
of terrorism is shaped by public perceptions, its representation in the media, and 
government policy, all of which reinforce or reshape cultural norms and perceptions, 
which in turn influence social culture and the perceived risks to its norms and values. 
To better understand the tensions within CONTEST, and between Prevent, Pursue, 
and Muslim communities, it is imperative to establish how the UK government 
frames terrorism and why this is important.  
The phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ crops up in most 
debates about terrorism.
3
 It highlights the banality of the concept, relying on the 
perception and construction of the context and the individual’s relationship with it 
rather than the actual event in question. 
Alexander the Great … asked him: ‘How dare you molest the sea?’ ‘How dare 
you molest the whole world?’ The pirate replied, ‘Because I do it with a little 
ship only, I am called a thief; you doing it with a great navy are called an 
emperor.’4 
St Augustine’s tale illustrates the dichotomy which exists while accentuating that it is 
ultimately the more powerful who are able to brand the actions of the less powerful 
as criminal or terrorist. Through a hegemonic process, the media feeds the dominant 
frame of what terrorism is to the public, who tacitly agree to the categorisation, 
acting as if it actually exists.
5
 Such frames create a new reality, a reality which is 
constructed rather than natural, and a reality which can be reshaped. Thus, 
differentiating between criminal and terrorist behaviour is an artificial differentiation 
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determined by a certain degree of perspectivation.
6
 Searle sees such objects as 
ontologically subjective though epistemologically objective.
7
 To some degree a line 
can be drawn between the social, political, and legal construction of any given 
subject. To assume, however, that these are completely auto-poetic and can be 
divorced from each other is a false assumption because each influences, and is 
influenced by, the other.  
Social construction does not just refer to things, kinds, and facts but also to our 
beliefs about them. Acknowledging that terrorism is a social construction allows one 
to expose the way in which social forces shape beliefs about this concept and about 
the type of people who engage in this type of behaviour.
8
  
A frame gives to an object its place in space and separates it at the same time from 
its environment. … A frame thus gives structure to both an object and the way the 
object is perceived.
9
  
Where the frames are placed is critical because their boundaries define and shape 
what is and is not acceptable. Further, these frames can become powerful symbols to 
identify with and share for social purposes.
10
 Because of their manufactured nature, 
frames are subject to change over time and context. ‘Reality’ is shaped by man’s 
conception of certain actions, objects, and theories which give meaning to, and 
formulate, our experiences.
11
 These social constructions and frames draw on the 
Durkheimian notion of the collective conscience and the assumptions that all 
members of society share common morals, values, and, more importantly, cultural 
knowledge.
12
 There is the additional assumption that differences can be reconciled 
through legitimate and institutional means. ‘Consensual views of society represent 
society as if there were no major cultural or economic breaks, no major conflicts of 
interest between classes and groups.’13 These frames generally reinforce social rule 
and the ‘elite consensus’. The elite generally dominate the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and 
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are therefore in the position of shaping and reshaping political and social realities as 
they perceive them. Freedom of opinion often gives way to the hidden forces of the 
‘free market’, which can be as powerful as the hand of the state.14 The role of the 
media is critical in shaping social realities.
15
 Koch writes that journalists in need of 
sources often rely on official sources and therefore function as tools to legitimise the 
views of the ‘elite consensus’.16 To a certain extent, the role of the media has been 
challenged by the Internet, which empowers the less affluent and powerless within 
society.
17
 The Internet has also allowed those engaged in terrorism and criminal 
activities to publish and disseminate their message to the public.
18
 An in-depth 
examination is, however, outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice to say, both the 
media and Internet have the power to disseminate, distribute, and shape frames on a 
national and international scale. The symbols which are created inspire and give 
meaning to activities whether individual or collective. These activities can then be 
utilised as rallying points by government, the media, and social and community 
groups and/or individuals, giving meaning to new or established frames.
19
  
The dichotomy of the freedom fighter shows that there is no consensual view and 
that obtaining one is nearly impossible. To quote Tucker: ‘Above the gates of hell is 
the warning that all that enter should abandon hope. Less dire but to the same effect 
is the warning given to those who try to define terrorism.’20 Counterterrorism 
policies are based on the social and legal constructions of terrorism, which, as 
mentioned, contain a certain amount of bias towards the dominant social culture. 
Glossing over this and imposing a one-size-fits-all approach may cause tension when 
implementing such policies. By relying on certain frames and symbols, it is possible 
to construct terrorism and make it appear black and white. Such frames were 
frequently used by the Bush administration, promoting an ‘us versus them’ approach 
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and creating the misconception that there are no grey areas.
21
 Such constructed 
‘realities’ can reinforce the government’s message, providing a convenient excuse to 
blame ‘undesirable’ groups in a time of crisis,22 such as the marginalised, ethnic 
minorities, youths, or immigrants. In the case of terrorism, there is a danger that the 
‘usual suspects’, Asians and particularly Muslim youths, are labelled extremists or 
even terrorists because of their ethnicity and faith.
23
 
The qualities of terrorism are determined by cultural, social, and political context and 
a perception about the identity of the perpetrators. Although the notion of terrorism 
appears black and white to many, the term remains highly subjective and has 
aggressive connotations.
24
 The connotations constitute a ‘value judgment about the 
perpetrator of the alleged act and about the circumstances of their actions’.25 
To‘identify someone as a terrorist is to render judgment on them, not simply to make 
a discovery’.26 This social and political construction has a real impact on people’s 
perceptions about certain individuals, religions, and communities, and influences 
their ‘lived reality’.27 Labelling a certain action or actor as terrorist carries strong 
normative overtones; the construction of such a reality is also an intensely political 
contest.
28
 These social and political forces also impact the legal construction of the 
same concept. The rule of law has the power to influence and shape the lived reality 
of individuals and communities who are perceived to be involved in terrorist-related 
activities. Communities and individuals experience this through the intrusion of state 
agencies into their communal and private spheres.    
The social and legal aspects are hard to divorce from each other. Although they 
influence each other, they are also auto-poetic. As Smart points out, the power of the 
law depends on the capacity of the legal discourse to construct itself and generate 
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‘truths’ which are impervious to critical scrutiny from other perspectives.29 This 
holds true with social and political constructions also. Although the law may be able 
to solve legal matters, it is not well placed to deal with the issues which arise in the 
social, cultural, political, or economic spheres. A contested legal construction, for 
example, may create more problems within the social and political realm than it 
solves. This does not, however, influence the drip effect of public opinion into a 
legal construction and the reinforcement of social constructions through the law, 
particularly as the law and policy affect real communities and individuals.  
3.3 Shaping terrorism through law and policy  
Framing terrorism, like crime, is therefore a process whereby perceptions are 
constructed, and criminal laws are enacted and then administered by the state.  
As well as the specific legal controversies, there is a more deep-seated political 
problem inherent in the task of defining ‘terrorism’. Powerful polities have 
long sought to exercise hegemonic control over the depiction of emergencies.
30
 
The law is a tool used by polities to qualify and categorise certain behaviour as acts 
of terrorism or crime, and to affect behaviour in relation to these definitions.
31
 In 
some sense, this process strengthens the legitimacy and authority of the state, 
allowing it to establish official policies in the name of the common good.
32
 The 
framing of terrorism is linked with the imperative of legitimising the authority of the 
state, and this ‘construction is typically adopted discursively by the state to represent 
threats against its sovereignty’.33 Legislation frames the issues, whereas government 
policies ensure that these frames are interpreted, shaped, and administered. These 
issues are different but interrelated. As St Paul asserted two thousand years ago: ‘I 
had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, 
Thou shalt not covet.’34 Although the concept of terrorism may already exist as a 
social concept, it is the law which enables the government to develop policies and 
react to the perceived threats against society and the state. The law formalises and 
institutionalises terrorism and crime, thereby shaping and associating certain types of 
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behaviour with them.
35
 Figure 3.1, illustrates the intricacies of how terrorism and 
extremism is shaped and framed by society, the media, and government institutions. 
 
Once legally defined, the consequences become real. Special powers are bestowed 
upon government agencies such as the police and other criminal justice 
professionals. Stigmatisation and the use of these powers affect the lives of those at 
the receiving end of the new policies.
36
 Rather than separating legal and social 
constructionism, it is important to acknowledge that the legal construction of any 
given concept harnesses social forces, which in turn help shape the legal construction 
and public policy. In a sense, the law reinforces and legitimises the public’s 
perception of terrorism. As Figure 3.1 shows, government agendas, policy, and the 
law are influenced by public opinion and the dominant social culture. Policy and 
legislation reinforced through social perceptions and by the media gradually 
shape/reshape public perceptions of issues through the ‘marketplace of ideas’, which 
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Framing and shaping terrorism and extremism 
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generally rely on an ‘elite consensus’.37 
This thesis is particularly interested in how British legislation and policy shapes 
terrorism. How terrorism is framed differs from country to country. The official 
definition is outlined in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which states:  
(1) Terrorism means the use or threat of action where … (b) the use of threat is 
designed to influence the government or an international organization or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made 
for the purpose of advancing political, religious, racial or ideological cause. (2) 
Actions falls within this subsection if it – (a) involves serious violence against 
a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, 
other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to 
the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed 
seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system. 
This broad definition is subject to legal interpretation and underpins the CONTEST 
strategy. Interpretation takes place within a particular legal context and in relation to 
the criminal law, which is also a product of political and social engineering and has 
relevance to law enforcement.
38
 The Act acknowledges the commonly held belief 
that terrorism is ‘the deliberate creation of fear, usually through the use (or threat of 
use) of symbolic acts of violence, to influence the political behaviour of target 
groups’.39 Political motivation is the dividing line between criminality and terrorism.  
This line, however, is vague.
40
 Walker writes that 
the core is violence, and terrorism involves violence of a kind which causes 
terror. … The second aspect is purpose – that a political end is in sight and that 
can be facilitated through instilling terror.
41
 
With such a broad definition capturing such a wide range of political activities, the 
immediate danger is that ‘new security measures will find wider application against 
ordinary criminals who pose a far less serious threat’.42 Because of the perceived 
nature of terrorism, numerous other Acts qualify other terrorist-related behaviour as 
criminal, providing the criminal justice agencies with powers to tackle it. This, as 
Reiner points out, also shapes practices of punishment with precursory offences often 
carrying ‘draconian’ sentences.43  
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Nevertheless, the definition is vague. Acts of civil disobedience, for example, could 
technically qualify as acts of terrorism. There should, however, be a clear difference 
between these two very different acts. Violent actions by student protesters in the 
winter of 2010 could be considered acts of terrorism under the provided definition, 
although no one would describe them as such; rather, they are seen as criminal 
actions by both the media and politicians alike.
44
 Paradoxically, although certain 
actions fall within the official definition of terrorism, they may not be perceived as 
such. Government policy refines and further qualifies when certain behaviour is 
linked to terrorism or criminality.  
The definition found in the Terrorism Act 2000 lists numerous terrorist offences and    
provides enhanced powers to the police, security services, and other government 
agencies. It also provides the legal framework for CONTEST. Moreover, the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and CONTEST shape the threat of terrorism 
because these documents further determine context and what threat is included in the 
national strategy. One notable example is the reshaping of the CBRN threat in the 
coalition government’s NSS, which has been replaced with the threat of 
cyberterrorism.
45
  CONTEST, for example, remains relatively silent on the issues of 
Irish terrorism. The coalition government acknowledges a resurgence of Irish 
terrorism in its NSS but glosses over this in CONTEST, which remains solely 
focused on jihadi terrorism.
46
 Dominant societal perceptions about jihadi terrorism 
are reflected in CONTEST and Prevent. This suggests that terrorism has not only 
fundamentally changed in the last decade or so but that a new form has emerged. 
This new form of terrorism is cast as international or jihadi terrorism motivated by 
radical versions of Islam.
47
 According to Furedi, such perceptions are commonplace 
not only amongst policymakers but also among the public.
48
 The CONTEST agenda 
relies on the perception that the current scale of religiously motivated terrorism is 
unprecedented in militancy and activism, and is indicative of the perception that 
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communities and their respective faiths, currently Islam, are at a critical juncture.
49
 
CONTEST, and particularly Prevent, assumes that Muslim communities provide 
violent extremists with the fertile ground needed to spread their seeds. Hence, 
Prevent aims to work with these communities to combat the spread of such 
ideologies and discontent. Rhetoric within CONTEST portrays terrorists as criminals 
who are ‘intent on inflicting mass causalities without warning, motivated by a violent 
extremist ideology’. Such rhetoric is based on selective interpretations of Islam.50 
The impression CONTEST gives, therefore, is still one of them versus us, with very 
little middle ground.  
We will also continue to challenge views which fall short of supporting 
violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared 
values and jeopardize community cohesion.
51
  
According to Stohl, such views are misconceived because they reinforce the 
stereotypical image of a terrorist.
52
 
In sum, the context and frames given to specific actions shape the definition of 
terrorism. These frames are in turn shaped by cultural and social norms which feed 
into public opinion, government agendas, policy, and the rule of law. At the same 
time, these frames rely on powerful symbols such as 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings, 
confirming, shaping, and reinforcing the stereotypical image of a terrorist – the jihadi 
terrorist. These stereotypes become difficult to challenge because CONTEST and the 
associated discourses perpetuate the notion that Islam, and by implication Muslim 
communities in the UK,
53
 are linked to extremism and terrorism. This may have a 
negative impact on these communities and may even lead to individuals internalising 
these labels and identifying with extremism according to expectation. The way in 
which the general public perceives these communities is also affected. As Becker 
points out, deviance, in this case terrorism, is not a product of bad behaviour per se; 
rather, deviant behaviour is shaped by society. This means the rules are not 
universally shared, and change with time and context.
54
 Labelling has less to do with 
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culture than the enforcement of a hegemonic discourse.
55
 Terrorism – or deviance – 
is, as Simmons argues, literally in the eye of the beholder, and this is often 
forgotten.
56
 The artificial line between terrorism and criminality is drawn because it 
goes beyond the accepted norms of social and political agitation within society and 
its symbolic nature.
57
  
3.4 The CONTEST frame – terrorism 
CONTEST provides a narrow summary of the history of ‘international terrorism’58 
and is influential in constructing narratives around terrorism. The term ‘international 
terrorism’ gives the impression that those engaged in this type of activity operate on 
an international scale. The boundaries between local and international have become 
diffused and conceal the fact that many terrorist-related activities in Britain, such as 
the 7/7 bombing, are carried out by locals. Using international as a prefix distances 
oneself from national and local problems and shifts the blame. This may result in 
ignorance of unresolved perceived and real grievances linked to cultural and social 
issues within British society. The term is political and deflects attention away from 
Islam while ignoring the fact that the terrorism addressed by CONTEST is fuelled by 
radical versions of Islam, something which is acknowledged in Prevent.
59
 For these 
reasons, this thesis refers to international terrorism as jihadi terrorism. A speech of 
the Home Secretary made numerous references to jihadi terrorism, Al Qaeda, and 
extremism, yet the link to Islam was only implicit.
60
 Most people reading CONTEST 
or listening to the Home Secretary would have understood the implicit message, 
relying on existing values, attitudes, and old frames.
61
  
Frames serve multiple functions for different actors. Political leaders can 
respond to events and communicate policy priorities simply and effectively by 
adopting pre-dominate cultural frames to streamline and simplify their 
message.
62
 
The message is clear despite its concealment in politically correct jargon: Islamic and 
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Muslim communities in Britain are linked to terrorism. An additional reason for 
referring to jihadi terrorism is because this thesis focuses on Prevent, which is 
mainly based on Islamic extremism and Muslim communities in Britain.
63
 Though 
not the only threat to Britain’s national security, jihadi terrorism is, according to 
CONTEST, a major threat.
64
  
The roots of the contemporary Islamic movement and its associated ideologies can 
be traced back to the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah in the thirteenth century.
65
 In 
contrast, CONTEST traces its origins only as far as the more modern writings of 
Sayyid Qutb, who it states ‘was greatly influenced by the Indian-born Islamist 
thinker Abul-Ala al Madudi’.66 CONTEST links jihadi terrorism to the rise of jihadi-
inspired violence in Egypt in the 1980s, the rise of the PLO, and the Afghanistan 
conflict in the early 1980s. The 2011 version of CONTEST does not provide any 
such background.
67
 The PLO is a movement based solely on the liberation of 
Palestine and which underwent a ‘radical transformation, socially and institutionally, 
that turned it into an authentic Palestinian national organization’. It is not religiously 
motivated, and hardly fits the label of ‘Islamist terror’ as CONTEST suggests.68 
From the late 1970s onwards, the PLO actually opposed Islamist groups, whom it 
viewed as serious political challengers.
69
 Gunaratna links the emergence of the 
current wave of jihadi terrorism to   
two landmark events – the Islamic revolution in Iran – and the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan – both in 1979, marked the emergence of a 
contemporary wave of Islamist guerrilla and terrorist groups.
70
 
It is these politico-religious groups, especially Islamist groups, who now pose the 
single biggest threat. CONTEST treats Islamism as a monolithic movement which is 
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dedicated to violence and terrorism. ‘Despite the global aspirations of the ideology, 
Islamists have no centre; there is no overall pan-Islamic leadership.’71 The jihadi 
movement is all but monolithic, and the use of violence is not as systematic as 
CONTEST suggests. Some Islamist groups do indeed resort to violence whereas 
others do not. Sayyid Qutb, a prominent Egyptian member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who demanded the return to salafiyya, the revival of religious reforms 
based on the Koran which some argue incorporate certain aspects of Western 
modernity and Marxism,
72
 was tortured and executed under Nasser in 1966, and is 
seen as one of the most influential thinkers of the contemporary movement.
73
 Co-
existence with Western values was seen as undesirable.
74
 The interpretation of his 
works has given the concept of jihad its modern meaning – waging war as an eternal 
armed struggle   
against every obstacle that comes into the way of worshipping God and the 
implementation of the divine authority on earth … and returning this authority 
to God and taking it away from rebellious usurpers.
75
 
Qutb's writings form part of the ideological foundation of Al Qaeda and other radical 
Islamic movements which have adopted his concept, although groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood have been around since the late 1920s.
76
 From the mid-1970s to 
the 1990s, Islamist groups attempted to islamise their own states, focusing on the 
‘near enemy’. Following failed attempts in Egypt to establish an Islamic state, many 
of them migrated and joined the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Many of the Afghan 
veterans returned causing unrest, or engaged in activities in other conflict zones such 
as Algeria, Chechnya, and Bosnia.
77
 According to CONTEST, their activities were 
no longer confined to the Middle East as the bombings of the World Trade Center in 
1993 and the attempted attack on the Eiffel Tower in Paris in 1995 show.
78
 But not 
all saw violence and terror as a means to their stated ends. Over recent years, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has eschewed violence and is even attacked by Al Qaeda for 
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encouraging people to vote rather than taking part in jihad.
79
 Other groups such as 
Hizb al-Tahir, an organisation which goes back to the 1950s,
80
 also encourages non-
violent ways of achieving its goals. Hizb-al-Tahir espouses extremist Islamist 
ideology, which strives towards an Islamic caliphate encompassing not only the 
Muslim world but the entire globe. Its ideological position has led to calls for it to be 
proscribed because it is seen as a gatekeeper to other, violent, terrorist groups.
81
The 
first Afghan conflict provided the backdrop for the formation of further Islamist 
groups such as Al Qaeda. During the Afghan years, Bin Laden established a large 
network with many terrorist groups.
82
 Today, Al Qaeda’s ideology is easily available 
online. In their online magazine Inspire, they openly discuss their ideology, promote 
violent jihad, and praise those who take violent actions in its name.
83
  
The involvement of Western states with autocratic regimes and states with poor 
human rights' records, and Western military interventions in international conflicts, 
is glossed over.
84
 Foreign policy, for example, would appear to be a major factor in 
the radicalisation of the 7/7 bombers. CONTEST avoids the issue of foreign policy, 
but acknowledges the difficulties of the Iraq war which, it states, have led to 
insurgency in the region and abroad.
85
 Fundamentalists and groups such as Al Qaeda 
have exploited conflicts such as Palestine, and the UK’s foreign policy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to spread hatred and garner support for their violent ideologies.
86
 These 
extremist groups draw upon the ‘language of religion, and its objectives are linked to 
a religious cause’.87 The following extract demonstrates how foreign policy, and 
other real and perceived grievances, motivated Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the 
7/7 bombers.   
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Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you 
directly responsible just as I am directly responsible for protecting and 
avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be 
our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture 
of my people we will not stop this fight.
88
 
Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have angered many Muslims, although many other 
groups and ethnicities also opposed the Iraq war,
89
 providing fertile ground for jihadi 
ideologies to take root within British communities. ‘Throughout this period, 
emerging British violent Islamist organizations publicly encouraged participation in 
violent Jihad overseas.’90 The July 2005 bombings bear witness that the threat of 
terrorism is not confined to Al Qaeda as a group. The threat to the UK comes from 
groups which are either affiliated to, or who have no actual connection to, Al 
Qaeda.
91
 They see their world threatened by the new jahilya and have adopted the 
radical jihadist worldview. As freelance operators,
92
 they are willing to cause mass 
casualties through the use of unconventional weapons such as chemical or 
radiological devices. 
Isolated diaspora communities here in Britain retain bonds with relatives left behind 
as well as their grievances. The alienation from mainstream British society can lead 
to the creation of a bond between British Muslims and those who are deprived in 
war-torn areas, sympathising with them and their grievances, and creating a feeling 
of kinship.
93
 How CONTEST frames terrorism is therefore important because its 
work stream affects the target communities, in this case Muslim communities in 
Britain. How it frames these communities is equally important. Islamic and Muslim 
communities are framed monolithically, which is problematic; this is misleading and 
does not capture the broad religious, cultural, or ethical diversity within and between 
Muslim communities in Britain. CONTEST not only determines the qualities of 
terrorism but informs the police and other agencies how to police, prevent, and 
respond to terrorism. This is, as shown later, problematic.   
                                                 
88 BBC (n 84) 
89 Patrick Barkham, ‘Iraq War 10 Years on: Mass Protest that Defined a Generation’, The Guardian 
(15 February 2013) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/15/iraq-war-mass-protest> 
accessed 13 April 2013 
90 HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50) 
27 
91MI 5, ‘International Terrorism’ (2010) <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/international-
terrorism.html> accessed 2 May 2011 
92 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story Of Radical Islam (IB Tauris 2007) 297 
93 HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (n 50) 
 61 
3.5 Policing and the police 
Policing and prevention are closely linked and central to CONTEST and Prevent. 
Understanding these two concepts and how they relate is crucial to understanding the 
tensions between Pursue and Prevent. Although terrorism adds another dimension to 
the tensions between these two work streams, these conflicts are not unique to 
counterterrorism. Rather, conflicts between policing and prevention are projected 
into the counterterrorism arenas and must be confronted in order to successfully 
implement a joint policing and prevention strategy. In 1829, Mayne, quoted by 
Ratcliffe, stated that: ‘The primary objective of an efficient police is the prevention 
of crime: next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. 
To these ends all of the efforts of the police must be directed.’94  
Therefore, the starting point for the debate about policing and prevention must be an 
examination of these concepts and how they are linked. The Oxford English 
Dictionary states that policing is an activity which concerns itself with the 
enforcement of rules and regulations.
95
 A common misconception is that the police, 
an institution, and policing are synonymous; they have therefore become conflated.  
Police refers to a particular kind of social institution while policing implies a 
set of processes with specific social functions. … Policing is arguably a 
necessity in any social order, which may be carried out by a number of 
different processes and institutional arrangements. A state-organized specialist 
police organization of the modern kind is only one example of policing.
96
 
According to Weber, the state lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence.
97
 
‘Whether the modern state’s claim to a monopoly of violence was, in practice, 
realized through the engine of the police or was rather a highly effective, though 
illusory, ideological construction is open to questions.’98 ‘The threat of the 
application of this power is linked to a legitimate office created by the normative-
legal order of the political community.’99 Conflict resolution in the political 
community is limited, and is determined by the system of the normatively anchored 
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powers acquired by the state.
100
 Public policing is one of the defining characteristics 
of state power, and its institutions are synonymous with the modern state. These 
powers are not limited to the police. The state, through the institution of the police, 
lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence. Police officers routinely use their 
powers while enforcing the law and maintaining order. Although activities such as 
investigating crimes, gathering evidence, and preparing cases for the prosecution 
have become staples, they also engage in public order maintenance, crime 
prevention, and traffic regulation.
101
  
However, policing is much broader than the police as an institution and encompasses 
other forms of social control.
102
 
Policing is no longer monopolized by the public police, that is the police 
created by government. Policing is now being widely offered by institutions 
other than the state, most importantly by private companies … and by 
communities on a volunteer basis.
103
 
Although Sir Robert Peel introduced the police as a preventative force for Britain in 
1829, the concept of prevention soon gave way to catching criminals, and the 
targeting of criminal areas and certain social groups.
104
  
The resultant criminal justice infrastructure was built around responding to, 
processing and seeking to know and correct, its objective – the apprehended 
offender. Proactive crime prevention had little place, except as an element of 
lingering general or individual deterrence engendered by the limited prospects 
of apprehension and punishment for those who transgressed the criminal 
law.
105
  
Neocleus asserts that a police force is a state institution used to consolidate social 
power and to administer civil society in general, those who have been socially 
excluded, and the working class.
106
 ‘The prime aim of the police has always been 
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about "law and order" preservation rather than crime conviction. The same is true 
within anti-terrorism work.’107 Police powers are not just passive tools used to 
respond to disorder. According to Neocleus, these powers no longer simply maintain 
or reproduce order but fabricate and shape it.
108
 McLaughlin suggests that a police 
force is a multi-purpose 24-hour order maintenance service.
109
 The traditional image 
of the police as crime fighters is questionable because non-crime-fighting tasks take 
up about seventy per cent of their time. The crime-fighting elements fall comfortably 
into the area of order control and the continuation of the status quo. The idea of the 
‘thin blue line’, however, remains firmly embedded in the mind of the public, the 
media, and even within the occupational self-image and culture of the police. 
Quoting Reiner, Crawford writes that this organisational subculture is action-
orientated and celebrates a macho culture which values crime detection and ‘thief 
taking, while devaluing preventative work as unglamorous’.110 Racial prejudice, 
sexism, and machismo are also common in the police subculture. Such a culture 
results in resistance to engage in certain crime-fighting tasks, and is at times even 
reluctance to delegate other policing tasks to ‘inexperienced’ local authorities or 
volunteer organisations.
111
  
Sir Robert Peel’s notion of preventative policing is only one of the paradigms of 
policing, which Brodeur calls ‘low policing’.112 Manning equates ‘low policing’ with 
criminal policing.
113
 As mentioned above, this idea soon evolved into a more reactive 
approach to crime management. This reactive model is popular and often seen as the 
‘standard model of policing’ today.114 Peel’s idea of preventative policing relied 
more on the notion of deterrence than intervention in social processes to prevent 
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criminality. This, according to Reith, stands in sharp contrast to ‘high policing’.115 
High policing ensures that the distribution of power in a given society is preserved 
by systematically targeting those who threaten the status quo. Its paradigm is actually 
that of political policing.
116
 In short, low policing consists of law enforcement and 
high policing of political surveillance.
117
 According to Brodeur, high policing 
evolved in seventeenth century France and throughout the Napoleonic era. It was, 
however, also common during the Tudor era and is therefore not uniquely French.
118
 
It is described as ‘forceful reactions to conspicuous signs of disorder whether or not 
of a criminal nature.’119  Peel, the champion of preventative policing, is ironically 
credited with the establishment of the forerunner of the Irish police force in 1814 
which was based on the values of high policing.
120
 The English police in contrast 
were localised, unarmed, and accountable.  
The subsequent grudging acceptance of the police was secured on the basis of 
locally negotiated compromise often implying a downgrade of activities that 
might conjure up images of sinister surveillance. … The Peelian legacy 
embodied a tension. While its philosophy lay in the notion of prevention, its 
legitimacy was legalistic, professional and bureaucratic, as institutionalized 
through greater standardization of practice and centralization of command. 
This often pulled policing away from it preventive functions, notably local 
intelligence gathering.
121
  
Both high and low policing stood as alternatives to the military. In recent years, a 
trend to militarise the police has appeared, particularly in the US but also 
internationally.
122
 ‘This is unavoidable given that the foundation of the police and 
military power is the same – the ability to threaten and use force, lethal if necessary, 
to accomplish state objectives.’123 Militarisation of the police influences its 
organisational culture and model as well as the crime solutions it chooses. This issue 
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assumes particular urgency because of the emergence of mass terrorism, ‘which fits, 
… neither the legal category of crime nor the political category of war as an 
aggression perpetrated by an enemy state’.124  
Before turning to prevention, it is important to take a closer look at Brodeur’s 
concept of high policing. High policing is all-absorbent and underpinned by a drive 
to gather intelligence ‘while making parsimonious use of this information in the 
actual prosecution … neutralized only when deemed strictly necessary’.125 Flood 
claims that governments are increasingly turning to crime reduction policies which 
rely on intelligence to manage crime risks.
126
 High policing also blurs the boundaries 
between the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive powers of a state. This is 
particularly noticeable in counterterrorism powers given to criminal justice 
agencies.
127
 The objectives of high policing are the preservation of the state and the 
status quo rather than civil society. Individuals assume that the interests of citizens 
and the state coincide, creating the illusion that high policing is devoted to public 
protection. Crime control can be used by the state to gather information and is used 
to maximise state coercion of those who threaten the established order. Further, high 
policing engages in undercover work and makes use of informants who infiltrate all 
walks of civil society. ‘These features traditionally were combined within a police 
paradigm where the protection of the political status quo was the primary goal.’128  
The police, as an institution, have been tasked with law enforcement and order 
maintenance. Policing, on the other hand, is an activity concerned with the 
enforcement of laws and social norms. The British police model, based on low 
policing, is reactive in nature. Over the last few decades, however, there has been 
renewed interest in prevention and intelligence-based policing. Because it is reactive, 
low policing is inadequate for dealing with terrorism. Therefore, as CONTEST 
indicates, prevention is becoming more important. The relationship between 
prevention and policing is fraught with tensions and conflicts. Some of these tensions 
become clear in the following debate about prevention.   
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3.6 The concept of prevention 
Broadly speaking, the aim of crime prevention is to alter the behaviour or the flow of 
events by pre-emptive measures in such a way that crimes’ harmful impact is 
reduced.
129
 The three most common distinctions are primary, secondary, and tertiary 
prevention.
130
 These distinctions illustrate different approaches, such as corrective 
and punitive preventative measures.
131
 Primary prevention is the most holistic 
approach and focuses on universal education policies and on the general public 
environment in the hope of preventing criminality at an early stage. Primary 
interventions are ‘the ideal objective’.132 Secondary prevention focuses on those 
groups who are at risk of offending. Delinquent groups ‘premised upon 
differentiating logic that focuses upon target groups as a sub-population from those 
who do not occupy the same risk grouping’ are identified in order to focus 
prevention activities.
133
 Finally, tertiary prevention focuses on those who have 
already engaged in criminality. For many decades, the state focus has been on 
tertiary prevention.
134
 It was not until the 1990s that there was a shift to mainly 
secondary prevention. Zedner argues that there has been a shift from focusing on 
post-crimes to pre-crimes. This shifts the ‘temporal perspective to anticipate and 
forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so’.135 The pursuit of 
security is the overarching principle of a pre-crime society along with calculation, 
surveillance, risk, and uncertainty.
136
 Another feature of prevention is the 
pluralisation of the agencies. No longer is prevention limited to the state, police, or 
even state agencies. The private security industry is burgeoning with a host of 
charities and volunteer organisations.
137
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Inspired by Peel’s concept of the police, contemporary policing has seen a shift back 
to crime reduction initiatives focusing on prevention. According to Johnson and 
Shearing, this shift prioritises future governance or security over justice.
138
 This has 
been accompanied by legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, creating 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) which give local authorities and 
the police joint responsibility for community safety. The Police and Justice Act 2006 
brought in further reforms hoping to break down silo working between the different 
agencies involved to ‘install a more consistent joined-up approach’ to crime 
prevention.
139
 This new supportive infrastructure is strongly orientated towards 
harm, loss, fear-reduction, and prevention. This is ‘different from the traditional 
goals of the police – prosecution, punishment and criminal justice’.140  
Risk factors indicate which individuals and families may benefit from secondary or 
risk-focused prevention programmes such as skill training, general parent education, 
pre-school programmes, or a combination thereof.
141
 This type of prevention is 
premised on the idea that minor incivilities such as graffiti, vandalism, and 
drunkenness lead to a rise in crime and the ultimate decline of a neighbourhood if not 
addressed. Wilson and Kelling call this the ‘broken windows theory’.142 The main 
argument is that the cycle of decline can be halted by focusing on order maintenance 
through the policing of incivilities and minor crimes, thereby stopping an escalation 
to more serious criminality.
143
 The idea of zero tolerance towards minor incivilities 
and petty crime has become a mantra used by politicians and the public. As attractive 
as it may sound, zero tolerance oversimplifies the solutions to crime. Because 
secondary prevention focuses on incivilities and intrudes on those individuals at risk, 
it has a net-widening effect. It presupposes that there is a link between incivilities 
and future criminality. The measures under the guise of prevention are precautionary. 
In times of uncertainty, governments often choose to take the precautionary 
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approach.
144
  
Rather than acting in the present to avoid occurrence in the future, pre-emption 
brings the future into the present. It makes present the future consequences of 
an eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its actual 
occurrence.
145
 
As Zedner notes, knowledge has been moved from centre stage and replaced with 
precaution. Precaution is often used as a justification for government action.
146
 
Targeting incivilities and criminalising at-risk individuals and communities serve to 
supplement rather than supplant crime.
147
 Prevention stimulates the development of 
profiling, targeted surveillance, and the categorisation of suspect communities on the 
basis of risk, and could lead to the social exclusion of ethnic and religious groups. In 
the current climate of austerity, there is pressure to target and minimise the burden of 
security on the general public. This means that the freedoms of minorities may be 
infringed in order to create a feeling of greater security for the dominant majority.  
Thus, subjective perceptions (rather than objective risks) become more 
important in informing a process that is increasingly arbitrary as it is based on 
generic factors such as religion, ethnicity or economic factors rather than a 
detailed more nuanced approach.
148
  
Throughout, there have also been other subtle shifts away from the requirements of 
due process and proportionality used as the defining ideals of justice to security and 
‘public perceptions as predominant overarching preoccupations 149  Burney points 
out that the threshold for intervention has also been lowered, and the lines between 
due process and intervention have blurred.
150
 
Community-based interventions frequently lack a clear purpose. Rather than being 
problem-orientated, these programmes are often based on preconceived notions on 
how to tackle crime and/or terrorism. This approach stems from pressure on 
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policymakers and criminal justice practitioners to implement programmes rather than 
spend time and scarce resources on problem-solving.
151
 It further assumes that the 
values and ethics it engenders are not only ‘good for society’ but also essential for 
communities at risk of radicalisation. ‘Off the shelf’ solutions should therefore be 
avoided. Programmes should be tailored to specific problems and localities.
 152
  
Implicitly, community crime prevention seeks to strengthen latent social 
control mechanisms and/or provide people with a stake in their own conformity 
through a diverse array of interventions.
153
 
Community crime prevention is generally not about the community as a collective; 
rather, the community focus is developed to reach out to individuals in households 
who are at risk. ‘The language of the community-based or multi-agency approach 
has permeated police discourse about crime prevention, which increasingly 
emphasizes community involvement.’154 These points show that there are not only 
conflicts between policing and prevention, but also within prevention itself.  
3.7 Legitimacy and the tensions between policing and prevention 
Legitimacy underpins all other concepts. The state relies on citizens' cooperation. 
The withdrawal of cooperation undermines the moral and political authority – the 
legitimacy – of the state.155 The withdrawal of cooperation and the resultant loss of 
legitimacy can, in extreme cases such as Egypt or Tunisia, lead to the fall of a 
government.
156
 The cornerstone for public cooperation and police legitimacy is 
public confidence in local and national authorities.
157
 To state the obvious, effective 
policing and prevention requires citizens' participation.
158
 Increasing residents’ 
willingness to engage with the police and other state agencies is essential to 
maximise perceptions of legitimacy and trust.
159
 The obligation to obey the law is 
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linked ‘to the quality of the rules and the integrity of their administration’.160 It is 
important, therefore, that rules and laws are perceived to be legitimate not only 
because they emanate from established authority, but also because of their 
formulation. This means that policing and prevention activities must conform to 
accepted norms and standards of procedural justice and fairness.  
When these standards are adhered to, most people engage in self-policing and 
conform to the law, perceiving policing and prevention as legitimate.
161
 Police 
corruption, the lack of procedural justice and fairness, and the inability to provide 
effective and equitable policing undermines the individual’s sense of belonging.162 
Trust is withheld from state authorities for sensible and rational reasons if personal 
interests are better served through other arrangements including vigilantism.
163
 
According to Karstedt, quoted by Tankebe, trust is  
mostly not based on individual experience but generated through collective 
perceptions and vicarious experience … Trust in the police and the justice 
system is therefore less dependent on how these agencies act, and more on how 
they are collectively perceived.
164
 
Bad perceptions of the police and other state agencies foster distrust. This has the 
tendency to endorse, and reinforce itself in, the social interactions of individuals and 
communities alike.
165
 The judgement that one has been treated fairly by the police 
enhances people’s willingness to voluntarily accept decisions even if the outcomes 
are not favourable, as well as engage in self-control over their actions. People’s 
deference to law continues over time and shapes their law-abiding behaviour in the 
future.
166
 People confer legitimacy on institutions because these represent certain 
normative and ethical values. A sense of moral alignment is a necessary component 
of legitimacy.
167
 The police must therefore demonstrate a certain moral authority, 
embodying the shared moral values of society and a shared sense of right and 
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wrong.
168
 
This is, however, problematic because it is built on the Durkheimian notion of a 
collective conscience. Viewing society in a monolithic way
169
 glosses over the 
differences within society.
170
 There are also issues of accountability and legitimacy, 
particularly with high policing, as well as with all other forms of policing and 
prevention. Proactive, or high policing, has become increasingly popular;
171
 
intelligence is its lifeblood.
172
 Proactive or covert investigations use ‘informers, 
undercover police officers and surveillance to produce an integrated intelligence led 
approach’.173 High policing increasingly relies on innovative technologies to gather 
an even greater amount of intelligence.
174
 Such methods are considered less 
accountable and transparent because they are associated with a lack of respect for, 
and even the violation of, human rights and procedural justice.
175
 Procedural justice 
is central to perceptions of legitimacy. High policing may change the orientation of 
serving the public to controlling them, which may have detrimental effects on 
perceptions of legitimacy and trust.
176
 It also focuses less on controlling the kind of 
crime and disorder which affects the daily lives of individuals living in communities 
with high rates of crime.
177
 Nevertheless, the task of high policing is preferred over 
the traditional low functions of policing. Skolnick noticed this trend in relation to the 
so-called ‘war on drugs’.178  
High policing is underpinned by secretive and coercive measures, and affects the 
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perception of legitimacy, thereby undermining the trust of the communities.
179
 Low 
policing, on the other hand, relies more on the tactics of persuasion and negotiation, 
and is therefore less damaging to the perception of legitimacy and trust. Such 
measures, according to Tyler, have the potential to increase cooperation with police 
and state agencies.
180
 With the shift towards prevention and high policing, the lines 
between low and high policing have blurred. Brodeur acknowledges that although 
high policing does not match up to the Orwellian notion of a surveillance society, 
there are still issues of accountability.
181
 Though state bureaucracies – in particular 
those devoted to policing in the broader sense – strive to impose and secure 
legitimacy, there is a growing feeling that the nation state as the linchpin for 
governance and good social order has become an increasingly tenuous concept.
182
 
Ideally, Parliament represents the will of the people, something which should be 
reflected in the body of law which governs the police.  
‘Through ongoing processes of political accountability, mandates are allegedly 
refreshed.’183 In recent years, however, the police in liberal democracies have seen a 
crisis of legitimacy.
184
 Failure to tackle crime, changing sources of trust, and the 
burgeoning of private policing have all played their role.
185
 In such situations, 
procedural justice is critical because it is central to creating perceptions of trust and 
legitimacy.
186
 Severe and unusual measures to preserve the status quo must come in 
the context of a perceived or creditable threat if the state is to remain securely 
founded on the legitimacy of popular representation. The state must therefore 
‘continually shape and structure that consent, to which it in turn refers itself to’.187 
This contractual consent between the people and their government has legal and 
political dimensions. Morgan, however, challenges the idea that there is an 
acceptable level of consent in these two dimensions.
188
 Loader and Walker argue that 
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the issue of consent gives rise to a sort of ‘Westphalian’ fatalism where state-based 
police authorities are said to hold an ‘in-the-final-instance’ authority over the 
governance of insecurity.
189
 The issue of legitimacy provides the link between 
policing, prevention, and communities. The police need the consent of communities 
to successfully carry out their duties.  
3.8 Communities and CONTEST 
Understanding ‘communities’ is central to Prevent. CONTEST continually refers to 
Muslim ‘communities’ without qualifying the term.190 These communities are 
represented in a monolithic way, ignoring cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity.  
Prevent relies on Muslim communities to fight violent extremism yet CONTEST 
promotes the myth of a single Muslim community, which Greer argues is a 
stumbling block.
191
 The term ‘community’ evokes sentiments of security, trust, and 
confidence. ‘In short, “community” stands for the kind of world which is not, 
regrettably, available to us.’192 ‘Never was the word “community” used more 
indiscriminately and emptily than in the decades when communities in the 
sociological sense became hard to find in real life.’193 Hobsbawn further believes that 
it is natural for everyone to seek a place of belonging in a world which is forever 
changing.
194
 This, even in the age of globalisation, leads to the creation of virtual 
communal identities and boundaries rather than physical demarcation. These 
boundaries go up on the ‘street corner of every declining neighbourhood of our 
world’.195 Like terrorism, communities are social and political constructions. They 
divide the world into spaces, which leads to exclusion and a vision of ‘us versus 
them’.196 The security which communities have to offer comes at the price of 
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personal freedom and/or autonomy. ‘Security and freedom are two equally precious 
and coveted values which could be better or worse balanced, but hardly ever fully 
reconciled and without friction.’197   
 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics, 2011 Census (2012), ons.gov.uk/census 
Group identification is characteristically constructed across social boundaries in 
interaction with others. ‘Boundaries are permeable, persisting despite the flow of 
personnel across boundaries. During these transactions a balance is struck between 
(internal) group identification and (external) categorization by others.’198 
Identification by others has consequences, and it is this which matters. ‘Since every 
search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity 
politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference.’199 Despite 
the religious and ethnic differences within Muslim communities in Britain, the notion 
of a single Muslim community increasingly permeates the social conscience. In fact, 
Muslims in Britain come from a host of different countries, and ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds. Figure 3.2, on the previous page, shows the diversity which exists 
within their various communities. Over 60 per cent have an Asian/Asian British 
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background which includes Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi heritage. Around 10 
per cent trace their roots to Africa, whereas 6 per cent have a white British 
background. 
As in Christianity, there are many divisions within Islam.
200
 Why is this relevant? 
The topics of terrorism, identity, community, and policing are intrinsically linked. 
The idea that one identity must come first is a fallacy because collective identity is a 
social construction.  
Identity is … as much about difference as about shared belonging … identity 
can help us comprehend the formation of the fateful pronoun we and to reckon 
with the patterns of inclusion and exclusion that it cannot help but create. This 
may be one of the most troubling aspects of all: the fact that the formation of 
every we must leave out or exclude a they, that identities depend on the 
marking of difference.
201
  
The way in which CONTEST has shaped terrorism has led to the redrawing of group 
boundaries, turning Muslim communities into outsiders against whom emergency 
powers may be exercised.
202
 In reality, the balance between liberty and security is a 
trade-off between the liberties of a few for the security of the majority.
203
 In this 
case, it is Muslim communities who represent the minority. Alienating Muslim 
communities through social control and legal measures such as Pursue and Prevent 
leads to a heightened sense of identity, and a move towards identifying not only with 
other British Muslims but with those further afield in places such as Afghanistan and 
Iraq.
204
 This alienation is a by-product of social tensions and plays into the hands of 
those who uphold and support violent extremism because it becomes harder for 
disaffected Muslims to identify themselves as British.
205
 Constant media attention 
and actions taken under the banner of Pursue and Prevent provide continual 
reminders of their Muslim identity, leading to further, at times self-imposed, 
alienation, loss of trust in public institutions, and unwillingness to work with 
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authorities.
206
 
Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam are revealing. A third of those questioned for 
the British Social Attitude survey felt negatively towards Muslims, whereas only a 
quarter felt positive. Only 39 per cent disagreed with the contention that ‘Muslims 
living in Britain really want to fit in’. The majority of respondents were willing to 
limit freedom of speech in order to curb and silence religious extremism.
207
 Oborne, 
cited by Lambert and Githens-Mazer, argues that it has become ‘permissible to 
fabricate malicious falsehoods and therefore foment hatred against Muslims in a way 
which would be regarded as immoral and illegal if perpetrated against any other 
vulnerable sections of society’.208 The notion is that Muslims, either actively or 
tacitly, support extremism and/or terrorism. This notion is gaining traction amongst 
groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party 
(BNP). Such views are, at times, also presented in sections of the mainstream media. 
Groups such as the EDL continue to challenge Britain’s ‘political correctness’ which, 
they argue, panders to the ‘Islamists’.209 The EDL shares characteristics with 
established far-right movements, fusing football violence with extreme political 
views and populism. Protests accompanied by acts of violence are not uncommon.
210
 
Islamist groups which are perceived to have extreme views such as Islam4UK, have 
been banned after announcing their plans to protest in Wootton Bassett against the 
war in Afghanistan.
211
 How the EDL and Islam4UK are dealt with demonstrates the 
selectiveness of counterterrorism legislation and how freedom of expression and 
speech is interpreted differently in each case. The government argue that a key 
reason behind the threat of jihadi terrorism is the lack of social and cultural 
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integration into British society.
212
 Allen argues that Islamophobia has indeed become 
normalised over the last decade or so and is being exploited not only by far-right 
extremists, but even amongst mainstream politicians.
213
 Muslim communities are 
continually accused of not assimilating to Western liberal attitudes and lifestyles.
214
 
Radical Islamic ideologies seamlessly link historic identities and narratives with 
current political and personal experiences. Jihadism mobilises people by relying on 
feelings of fear, injustice, and real or perceived grievances.
215
 Prevent and Pursue do 
not acknowledge these grievances and perceived injustices, and fail to provide a 
mechanism which allows disaffected individuals to address them. Conflict between 
groups, in this case between Muslim communities and British mainstream society, is 
often rooted in perceived differences. Prevent is an attempt to reconcile these groups 
which to some degree have been unwittingly created by government policy. But this 
comes at the expense of Muslim identity and does not create a situation where both 
groups can reach an outcome which is not enormously destructive to the values of 
both sides.
216
  
Kaman et al. argue that powerless groups ‘do not always avoid or yield in conflicts. 
The powerless behave constructively when they do have a chance, but tend to be 
more unconstructive when their position seems hopeless’.217 Threats by an out-group 
such as the police, and the general dislike shown by the rest of society, heighten in-
group solidarity and increase bias against out-group members.
218
 Therefore, how 
marginalised groups are policed affects the groups' perception of procedural justice 
and fairness. This in turn influences the level of trust, and ultimately the perception 
of legitimacy.
219
 As Kundnani points out, Prevent work can too easily become 
perceived as a mode of embedding political policing within local services so as to 
allow intelligence gathering and intrusion which generate a lack of interest in the 
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programme.
220
  
3.9 Tensions between Prevent, Pursue and Muslim communities 
Tensions between policing and prevention affect Pursue and Prevent. The inclusion 
of Prevent has made CONTEST innovative. CONTEST, however, is not immune to 
the issues which affect both policing and prevention generally. A good starting point 
is Pursue. In the past, counterterrorism has been the preserve of the police, falling 
under Brodeur’s concept of high policing. This has had an overriding effect on 
established political conventions, and political and legal processes.
221
 Within the 
CONTEST framework, the police are required to share information with local 
authorities, and volunteer and private sector organisations which are seen as partners 
under the Prevent agenda. The traditional measures of counterterrorism, with the 
police at the forefront, sit uncomfortably in Prevent. Jihadi terrorists and their 
ideologies are no longer confined to other countries; rather, some of these ideologies 
have become embedded in Muslim communities here. To be effective, the police can 
no longer rely exclusively on proactive policing and the support of local 
communities. These pressures have led to organisational changes and practices 
within the police.
222
 Authorities need to engage in an open and transparent process, 
which is based on procedural justice and fairness, in order to increase levels of 
engagement amongst deprived and/or alienated communities.   
A lack of respect for procedural justice and human rights may lead to the withdrawal 
of communities’ trust as well as loss of legitimacy. Walker asks whether the odd 
download from the Internet or scribbled comment could be forgiven or dealt with by 
way of a caution, relying on the ‘belief that the marketplace of ideas will render an 
overwhelming rejection of political violence’.223 Pursuing such individuals harms 
community relations and undermines prevention efforts because counterterrorism 
policing undermines the perception that they have been dealt with fairly. This further 
undermines perceptions of legitimacy and procedural fairness, and ultimately the 
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trust which these communities have in the police and other state authorities.  
The success of Prevent depends on a multi-agency approach which includes the 
police, local authorities, and other stakeholders. It is worth reiterating a point made 
in the previous chapter that although the ‘police are often enthusiastic proponents of 
the multi-agency approach, … they tend to prefer to set the agendas and to dominate 
forum meetings and then ignore the multi-agency framework when it suits their 
needs’.224 The following chapters assess whether the police dominate the multi-
agency approach to terrorism prevention because this could cause problems between 
police and other involved agencies. Further, some agencies often refuse, for 
operational reasons, to disclose relevant information and to account for their actions. 
‘There is also limited accountability to the courts. Much of the executive actions or 
interventions fall short of prosecution and so never darken the doors of the courts.’225 
This sort of policing does not engender trust in the police, and questions over its 
legitimacy and procedural justice arise. Effective policing of communities requires 
the support of the communities.
226
  
Perceptions of trustworthiness and legitimacy are critical if the police and the 
government want the support of communities in general.
227
 ‘The likelihood of 
citizens' compliance is strongly affected by procedural justice tactics.’228 In order for 
Prevent to work, the police and local authorities need to establish relationships of 
trust which foster perceptions of legitimacy within Muslim communities.  
Accountability, and oversight over covert policing practices, are essential to bolster 
perceptions of procedural fairness. A lack of accountability runs contrary to key 
values of liberal democracies because it results in the suspension of citizens' rights in 
an effort to fabricate enhanced security for the majority.
229
 The exact relationship 
between the police, local authorities, other stakeholders, and local Muslim 
communities within the context of CONTEST is examined further in the following 
chapters.  
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The continued use of high policing, with its limited success, undermines procedural 
justice and leads to a collective perception, particularly in Muslim communities, of 
being targeted and treated unfairly. No terrorist-related arrests were made out of the 
101,248 s. 44 stop-and-searches carried out in 2009/10. Further, out of the 1,834 
individuals arrested for terrorist-related offences, only 228 were convicted.
230
 The 
coalition government has changed some of the powers the police currently hold. 
Examples include the reduction in pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to 
fourteen days and the replacement of control orders with a Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Order.
231
 These new prevention orders have already attracted some 
controversy and have been labelled control order ‘lite’.232 In the past, such actions 
have affected perceptions of trust and legitimacy in state agencies. It cannot be 
overemphasised that the continuing support of Muslim communities is essential for 
Prevent to be effective. Suspicion breeds distrust in the authorities. ‘There is the 
assumption that terrorism resonates with Muslim communities and therefore that 
community-based partners can strive to reduce that appeal, can identify sources of 
disaffection, can aid those at risk, and can bolster police legitimacy.’233 Hebert 
refutes such thinking and states that ‘in reality a thousand flowers are abloom in the 
realm of Islamic activism: to approach such diversity with a simple with-us-or-
against-us dichotomy primarily in mind is a hopeless, futile task’.234 
It appears that actions taken under Pursue influence perceptions of trust and 
legitimacy. As such, a loss of trust would also undermine communities’ willingness 
to engage in Prevent programmes. ‘Uncertainty slowly extends profiling to the 
entirety of populations.’235 This is certainly the case with the Prevent policy, which 
to a certain extent is already engaged in profiling, as highlighted in CONTEST. 
Harcourt points out that profiling based on ethnicity and religious affiliation can be 
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arbitrary. These affiliations have little in common except that they fit the picture of 
the stereotypical terrorist.
236
 This can be problematic in two ways. First, this type of 
profiling misses those who do not fit the stereotypical image. Second, it labels entire 
communities, which as the labelling theory suggests, can be counterproductive and 
may lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Further, Crawford notes that in the context of 
terrorism, radicalisation becomes the pre-crime equivalent.
237
 Intelligence is 
‘information that has been processed to provide foresight – a predictive capacity 
about how to act at some point in the future to achieve particular objectives given 
certain conditions’.238 Suspicion becomes actionable intelligence.239 According to 
Lambert and Githens-Mazer, Prevent ‘is as much about government inspired social 
engineering as it is about stopping terrorist attacks’.240 Prevent is a blanket approach 
to promote British values through the guise of a counterterrorism policy which does 
not address root causes. Rather, Prevent provides the minimum means for disaffected 
individuals and communities to engage in a democratic process capable of listening 
to views which society may find offensive or discomforting. ‘The Prevent 
programme is doing the exact opposite.’241 Instead of supporting frank and open 
debates on radical ideologies and the grievances which Muslim communities face, 
such communities are discouraged. Branded as un-British, young Muslims are 
deprived of an opportunity to voice their concerns and opinions, or to respond to 
concerns. The inability to speak to teachers, youth workers, or moderate Islamic 
clerics because of possible repercussions may increase the likelihood of encouraging 
those already committed to violent extremism.
242
  
Rather than providing a platform for airing radical views and a form of self-
governance, the government is expending energy on governing behaviours believed 
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to transcend acceptable moral values and which challenge public propriety.
243
 
Radicalisation is seen as a risk factor which must be dealt with through Prevent 
programmes or the criminal justice system. Prevent is based on the notion that 
radical views are malign and must be related to some form of violent extremism, 
whether overtly or through tacit support. Mills concludes that freedom of speech 
should not be curtailed except in the face of a real and present danger of incitement 
to violence. He further argues that the curtailment of speech not only deprives the 
speaker of his or her right but deprives oneself of potential knowledge and truth. This 
may include the knowledge and ability to challenge false ideologies and notions. The 
ability to challenge these notions puts both parties on a level playing field.
244
 As 
Jacobs points out, ‘public peace is … not kept by the police, it is kept primarily by an 
intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the 
people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.’245 Discouraging 
discussion of these issues removes them from the public sphere and eliminates the 
possibility of determining and challenging grievances. The mantra appears to be ‘out 
of sight, out of mind’. How this affects Muslim communities is addressed in Chapter 
7.    
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that there are a number of tensions which affect policing 
and prevention, and that these tensions have been projected into the area of 
counterterrorism. Evidence suggests that due to the nature of terrorism and its links 
to often deprived and marginalised communities, such tensions have become 
magnified. These tensions are linked to two areas: policy and community impact. 
Policy tensions relate to conflicts within a policy, whereas organisational tensions 
refer to the inter/intra-organisational behaviour linked to the implementation of a 
policy, in this case Prevent. This distinction is carried forward, and tensions in the 
research chapters are categorised into three areas: policy, organisational, and impact. 
However, there may be some overlap between these three areas. This chapter 
highlights policy, organisational, and impact tensions in relation to policing and 
prevention generally, and demonstrates how these have been projected into the area 
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of counterterrorism policing and prevention.  
This chapter suggests that styles of policing affect perceptions of legitimacy and 
procedural justice. Negative perceptions correlate with low levels of trust. Academic 
papers suggest that counterterrorism policing and prevention are often regarded as 
suspicious, and at times as unfairly targeting Muslim communities in the UK. This 
implies that levels of trust amongst such communities may be low, making policing 
and prevention in them more difficult. However, some research carried out on 
Prevent suggests that trust between Muslim communities and the police is actually 
higher than expected.
246
 How levels of trust are affected, and how they affect Prevent 
work, is discussed in Chapter 7.  
The policy and organisational tension highlighted in this chapter centres on the 
multi-agency approach needed to carry out preventative work effectively. Research 
suggests that this may be due to the lack of willingness by the police to cooperate 
and/or share information with other Prevent partners. Other issues highlighted are net 
widening, freedom of speech, and profiling. How much the tensions between 
policing and prevention affect the actual delivery of Prevent is discussed in detail in 
Chapters 5 to 7 which are based on the research findings. It should be remembered 
that these conflicts are not unique to CONTEST, and that the solutions may have to 
be sought in other areas of police and prevention research. Before the research 
findings, the next chapter addresses the data collection methods.   
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the research design and the methodologies 
used to gather the primary data for this thesis. As stated in Chapter One, the purpose 
of the thesis was to identify and explore conflicts and tensions that arose between 
Pursue and Prevent, as well as within Prevent, and consider the implications for 
local Muslim communities and the Prevent agenda. Earlier chapters, which were 
literature-based, provided an insight into some of the possible sites of tensions and 
conflicts. The insight gained through previously published government policy 
documents and academic research,
1
 informed and shaped the research design, 
enabling me to link the research design to the research objectives.
2
 It is important to 
briefly re-state these objectives as outlined in Chapter One. These were to: 
a) Analyse and critique the ideas that inform the Prevent policy (see Chapter 2 
and 3); 
b) analyse and critique the conflicts and tensions that arose within the Prevent 
policy on a national level, as well as its implications on the local delivery of 
Prevent (see Chapter 5); 
c) analyse and critique the tensions and conflicts that arose between 
organizations involved in the local implementation of Prevent, such as the 
police and the local authorities, and consider the implications on the delivery 
process (see Chapter 6); and  
d) analyse and critique what impact counter-terrorism policing and prevention 
have had on local Muslim communities, and how it has shaped community 
perceptions and the willingness of these communities to engage with 
authorities in counter-terrorism policing and the Prevent agenda, while 
considering its wider implications on Prevent and Pursue (see Chapter 7). 
Chapters Two and Three suggest, that potential conflicts and tensions within 
CONTEST, and within Prevent may arise between the different organizations 
involved, and at the intersections of the national and local level. The literature further 
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suggests that there may be tensions between the national/local authorities and 
Muslim communities on whom this policy has had an impact. The research design 
has been shaped by the literature review and is divided into three categories. These 
categories reflect Rose’s argument that differentiates between three levels of the 
policy process namely: policy formation, policy implementation and policy impact.
3
 
This research design and its in-depth qualitative methods, was designed to capture 
the non-static and interrelated nature of the Prevent policy, seeking to examine 
whether Prevent follows this simple top down process or whether the Prevent policy 
‘is being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made.’4 The 
purpose of the research design was to gather empirical data, which would either 
support or disprove the thesis.   
This chapter outlines the reasons for using qualitative methods, while also 
acknowledging that there are limitations. The research design is based on interviews 
with individuals involved in the national formation and delivery of Prevent, as well 
on interviews and focus groups in a case study area. The thesis was able explore 
issues around Prevents’ local delivery and the impact it had on local communities 
rather than focusing on a broader coverage of the subject only.
5
 Further, as with any 
research project there were ethical issues that needed to be considered.
6
 The research 
design and the problems encountered are not original in terms of its structure or set-
up, as it follows a similar pattern to other criminological and terrorism related 
research projects. It is the data obtained through this research that is original. 
According to Innes et al., a limited number of fieldwork-based studies have been 
carried out. These have ‘systematically sought to gather evidence about how Prevent 
interventions are being delivered, perceived and experienced in different areas.’7 
This study fills this gap and aims to add knowledge to the wider policy debate about 
terrorism prevention and particularly the Prevent policy.
8
  
 
                                                 
3
 Richard Rose, ‘Comparing Public Policy: An Overview’ (1973) 1 European Journal of Political 
Research 67, 79  
4
 James Anderson, Public Policy-Making (Praeger 1975) 79  
5
 Sheila Stark and Harry Torrance, ‘Case Study’ in Cathy Lewin and Bridget Somekh (eds), Research 
Methods in the Social Sciences (Sage 2004) 33  
6
 Joseph Maxwell, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (Sage 2005) 6  
7
 Martin Innes and others, ‘Assessing the Effect of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of 
Chief Police Officers’ (UPSI 2011) 
8
 Lyn Richards and Janice Morse, Readme First for a User’s Guide to Qualitative Methods (Sage 
2002) 79  
 86 
4.2 Qualitative research, its qualities and limitations 
Qualitative research offers a number of methods, which involve ‘an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to the subject matter.’9 Qualitative research involves the study 
and collection of a variety of materials such as case studies, personal experiences, 
life stories, in-depth interviews and ethnography. These methods, and the materials 
gathered turn ‘the world into a series of representations, including field notes, 
interviews [and] conversations.’10 Qualitative methods study people in their natural 
settings, attempting to understand or interpret a phenomenon in terms of its wider 
context and the meaning that individuals bring to it.  
This study relies on in-depth individual and group interviews at a national level as 
well as in a case study area. These methods are able to describe routine, problematic 
moments and the meaning individuals ascribed to them, and are suited to policy 
research. This approach is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, a state-centric 
perspective on counter-terrorism has dominated research relying on secondary 
sources, which lack the input of primary data collection and analysis. Smyth argues 
that there is a failure to understand both terrorism and counter-terrorism in terms of 
those experiencing state action and as seen out of the perspective and experience of 
practitioners.
11
 Second, individuals’ perspectives and experiences can produce new 
and alternative ways of viewing and understanding counter-terrorism policy, and as 
such constitute a way by which social policy can be explored.’12  
Further, qualitative methods provided a degree of flexibility enabling the exploration 
of social problems or policy, in this case the Prevent policy, in greater depth. There 
is some uneasiness about studying the implementation of policies in general, as this 
raises the most fundamental questions about the relationship between thoughts and 
actions, namely: ‘how can ideas manifest themselves in a world of behaviour?’13 
This study used qualitative methods to explore the ideas that have informed the 
Prevent policy, the relationship between the policy and its delivery, and the impact 
of this policy on Muslim communities. This study was able to explore to what extent 
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managers and local bureaucrats have reinterpreted and even resisted national policy 
in its implementation when using their own discretion, by employing qualitative 
research methods.
14
 Rather than simply focusing on street level policy alone, this 
thesis examined several levels of the policy processes and the tensions that ensued 
between organizations, and authorities and communities at the different stages of 
Prevent. As mentioned in Chapter Two, ‘the policy delivered … is most often 
immediate and personal,’15 but there are many different stages, which are usually 
‘played out in arenas far removed from the daily life of neighbourhood residents.’16 
This study sought to capture both the national and local aspects of Prevent.  
However, there are limitations to qualitative research. One criticism levelled at 
qualitative research is, that it amounts to anecdotalism. Bryman argues that 
conclusions and explanations based on qualitative research are based on ‘brief 
conversations, snippets from unstructured interviews ... [which] are used to provide 
evidence of a particular contention. There are grounds for disquiet in that the 
representativeness or generality of these fragments is rarely addressed.’17 On a more 
practical level, qualitative research is labour intensive, ‘not only in relation to 
fieldwork, but also in the way in which qualitative data must be analysed and 
reported on.’18 Time and finances have also influenced what could realistically be 
achieved over a three-year period – hence this study is limited to one case study area.  
The issue, Silverman points out, is not about the type of data collected, but about the 
way in which this data is analysed and placed in its wider context. The analysis of 
qualitative data should not be based on a few ‘telling’ examples alone, but should 
also include analysis of the less clear or even contradictory data.
19
 It is important to 
ensure the research findings are based on sufficient number interviews, in order to 
place the anecdotes into their wider context. As Adelman et al note, the knowledge 
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gained through qualitative research is significant in its own right.
20
 This is because, 
as Huberman argues, qualitative analysis can identify mechanisms, going beyond 
sheer associations.  
It is unrelentingly local, and deals well with complex network of events and 
processes in a situation. It can sort out the temporal dimension, showing clearly 
what preceded what, either through direct observation or retrospection. It is 
well equipped to cycle back and forth between variables and processes – 
showing that ‘stories’ are not capricious but include underlying variables, and 
that variables are not disembodied, but have connection over time.
21
 
For this thesis 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews and five focus groups were 
conducted.  A thorough analysis of the data helped to identify tensions and provided 
a rich picture, placing the data collected into the wider context of CONTEST and the 
Prevent policy both nationally and locally. Inferences and comparisons were drawn 
based on existing research literature, adding to the existing knowledge around 
terrorism prevention and associated policies. The second point about generalization 
will be addressed later in the chapter. 
In this thesis, the benefits of qualitative methods outweighed the limitations as they 
provided in-depth accounts of professionals involved in Prevent and of those whom 
the this policy had an impact on. Further, the limitations were overcome by 
comparison with existing research. Quantitative methods are not always able to 
capture the complexity of social problems adequately. The chosen methods on the 
other hand, provide a holistic overview, as these methods allow one to capture these 
complexities through in-depth studies.
22
    
4.3 The research design 
This research design aimed to integrate both the research concepts and research 
logistics, to improve the quality of data generated.
23
 The research concepts and its 
context were discussed in chapters Two and Three and have played a major role in 
designing the research objectives, interview schedules, and participant selection. The 
second aspect is the research logistics or research design. Well-designed research 
helps to generate what King et al call, ‘observable implications,’ which either 
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substantiate or disprove a theory. For Popper, ‘observations … are always 
interpretations of the facts observed; they are interpretations in the light of the 
theory.’24 Research design, which is based on previously established research 
objectives, produces better and more relevant data, improving ‘inferences more than 
the necessary after-the-fact … solution.’25 Knowing what type of data one wants to 
collect and planning ahead enhances the research results precisely because there is a 
link between the research objectives and the research project.
26
 The research design 
attempted to gain an emic perspective; this is an insider’s perspective of events or the 
study of behaviour within a system.
27 This approach ‘seeks experience from within 
… and attempt(s) to capture the meaning and experiences of interacting 
individuals.’28 This study enabled developments that have taken place within Prevent 
to be understood from an insider’s perspective.29 It is the participants’ ideas, 
perceptions and interpretations of events in relations to the Prevent policy that have 
shaped the outcome of this thesis.  
The research was designed to be flexible enough to allow it to evolve, when 
necessary, in a controlled manner rather than an ad hoc way.
30
 Interviews with 
professional and focus groups, with members of local communities, were identified 
as being particularly suitable for this type of research and have been powerful tools 
for assessing causality and exploring the conflicts and tensions that have arisen 
within CONTEST and Prevent. The research was set up along the lines of policy 
formation, policy implementation and policy impact.
31
 Figure 4.1 provides a brief 
overview of those involved in the research. More details about participants and about 
their selection can be found in the subsequent sections.  
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Figure 4.1 
Number of Professional and community participants nationally and in the case 
study area. 
 Professional Interviewees Community members 
Involved Nationally 15 - 
In Case Study area 20 22 
Total                (57) 35 22 
As seen above individuals were allocated into three groups, namely those involved in 
the national policy formation/delivery, those involved in the local delivery, and those 
on whom the Prevent policy had an impact. The interview schedules were designed 
to reflect the different roles and experiences of those involved in the research. Rather 
than viewing these groups in isolation, the nature of the questions allowed the study 
to explore the relationship between the national and the local level, identifying 
conflicts and tensions. In this way Anderson’s assertion that ‘policy is being made as 
it is being administered and administered as it is being made,’32 could be explored. 
The chosen methods allowed direct engagement with individuals involved at the 
various stages of the policy process of Prevent; perceptions and interactions were not 
only collected, but could also be questioned.  
Many researchers treat case studies as more or less synonymous with qualitative 
research;
33
 this is however not necessarily the case.
34
 According to Ying, a case 
study is an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and the 
context are not clearly evident.’35 Case studies are descriptive and illuminate the 
readers understanding of a subject.
36
 A case study can provide invaluable data, and 
help in understanding the context and its subject matter.
37
 The local nature of this 
project provided the study with a snapshot of an instance in action,
38
 providing a rich 
picture from the perspective of the participants. Essentially this thesis involves a case 
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study of the Prevent policy within a wider policy debate about prevention of 
terrorism. Major aspects of this research were based on interviews with professionals 
and community members in one local authority area – the case study area of this 
research. This supplemented the national interviews, providing local context. A case 
study provided rich local context and a deeper understanding of interactions and 
perceptions of those involved or impacted by the Prevent policy in the selected 
location.
39
  
4.4 The methods: Interviews and focus groups 
Essentially interviews are a mode of communication between two or more 
individuals.
40
 They are a ‘powerful way of helping people to make explicit things 
that have hitherto been implicit – to articulate their tacit perceptions, feelings and 
understandings.’41 There are various forms of interviews, ranging from un-structured 
to structured, from a one-to-one to group interviews or discussion. The continuum of 
the interviews depends on the amount of control the researcher exercises over the 
structure and development of the interview.
42
 ‘Semi-structured interviewing is more 
flexible than standardized methods such as structured interviews;’43 and proved 
ideal. The semi-structured approach allowed me to explore and uncover areas of 
reality that have been neglected and would otherwise have remained hidden,
44
 
revealing ‘what is on a person’s mind, … to access the perspective of the person 
being interviewed, … to find out from them the things that we cannot directly 
observe.’45  
The semi-structured approach provided sufficient control over both the structure and 
development of the interview. At the same time it gave me the opportunity to deviate 
from the plan and to follow original thoughts, or to probe answers given, when the 
need arose.
46
 This approach also gave participants the opportunity to introduce and 
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develop issues important to them.
47
 The interview schedules provided the necessary 
outline and direction, listing important questions and topics. The interview questions 
drew on the participants’ knowledge focusing on gathering information about the 
research objectives – the innovativeness of Prevent and the conflicts and tensions 
that arose throughout its formation, delivery and the impact the policy has had on 
communities.
48
 Some of the questions were phrased in such a way as to encourage 
positive or negative responses, which meant that some of the data could be 
quantified.  
A focus group is an example of a group interview where the role of the interviewer 
merges with that of the facilitator.
49
 Using focus groups was appropriate because 
they have the potential of revealing ‘social dynamics which occur between group 
members,’50 and provide a collective community perspective.51 This approach also 
saved time and allowed me to speak to a number of participants simultaneously. Sim 
argues that 
it is difficult, and probably misguided, to attempt to infer an attitudinal 
consensus from focus group data. An apparent conformity of view is an 
emergent property of the group interaction, not a reflection of individual 
participants’ opinions.52 
Rather than gaining individualized accounts about the impact of the Prevent policy, 
focus groups allowed me to gather community perceptions,
53
 giving the participants 
an active voice. This method highlights a minorities’ perspective about the impact of 
counter-terrorism measures and the Prevent policy on Muslim communities in the 
case study area.
54
  
4.5 The case study area  
All of the interviews with local authority, police and voluntary organization staff as 
well as the community groups took place in a case study area in a town in Northern 
England. From the outset, it was decided that the name of the town should remain 
anonymous and was therefore given the pseudonym of Maybury. It is important to 
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briefly state the reasons why. A discussion about the ethical concept of anonymity 
will follow later.
55
 A simple call to the local authority or an Internet search would 
have revealed the identity of most of the participants. Because of the sensitive nature 
of their work, a number of participants only agreed to take part on the condition that 
they would remain anonymous. Lavin and Maynard argue that concerns over a lack 
of confidentiality and anonymity could lead to participants withholding information 
and may chose not to take part in the research.
56
 For the purpose of this study it was 
vital to speak to individuals from the police, the local authority, and volunteer 
organizations involved in Prevent. For these reasons it was decided that the town 
would remain anonymous, to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. This meant that 
the participants’ personal, and any local information was anonymized, making it 
more difficult to identify participants.
57
 However, although individuals were 
anonymized, their roles within their respective organizations were not. By doing this, 
more or less weight could be attached to their comments, depending on their role and 
experiences within counter-terrorism and Prevent, when analysing the data.  
Maybury was selected because the local authorities and police were involved in 
delivering Prevent. There were also some personal considerations that played a role 
in the selection of this town. These were, prior knowledge of the area, a personal 
contact within the local authority and ease of access, which meant that time and 
travelling costs were kept to a minimum. Prior knowledge and a personal contact 
within the council helped me identify the right people quicker.  
In the 1950s many economic migrants moved to Maybury, from South Asia, 
particularly from Muslim communities in Pakistan and India and today Maybury has 
a population of approximately 150,000. Maybury currently has one of the highest 
rates of BME communities in England and Wales. Since the 1980s, Maybury a 
manufacturing town has suffered economic decline and is now amongst some of the 
most deprived areas England. The economic decline has hit BME communities 
disproportionally. Around two thirds of them live in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods of Maybury. Ethnic communities often live segregated from each 
                                                 
55
 Anthony Kelly, ‘In Defence of Anonymity: Rejoining the Criticism’ (2009) 35 British Educational 
Research Journal 431 
56
 Danielle Lavin and Douglas Maynard, ‘Standardization Vs. Rapport: Respondent Laughter and 
Interviewer Reaction During Telephone Survey’ (no date) 66 American Sociological Review 453 
57
 Economic and Social Research Council, ‘Framework for Research Ethics’ (2010) 
<http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/_images/Framework_for_Research_Ethics_tcm8-4586.pdf> 
accessed 15 November 2011 
 94 
other, and there is a notably higher than usual segregation rate between the Asian and 
White communities.  
The local authority of Maybury was initially awarded funding from the Preventing 
Violent Extremism (PVE) pathfinder fund early on,
58
 and continues to receive 
funding ever since. The Prevent Review in 2011 listed Maybury amongst its 25 
priority areas.
59
 Over the last few years, the town has seen a number of high profile 
terrorist related arrests. These arrests and the associated police operations have 
caused tensions between the local authorities and Muslim communities.
60
 Because of 
the focus on Jihadi terrorism, many Muslims in the community felt they were being 
singled out and labelled as criminals by society in general, and especially by the 
media.
61
 The perception that PVE and Prevent targets solely Muslim communities 
persists.  
4.6 National policy formation and delivery: Selection and issues 
A total of fifteen individuals involved in the national formation and implementation 
of Prevent took part in this research. Figure 4.2 provides an overview of all of the 
national interviewees. Due to the nature of Prevent and its affiliation with counter-
terrorism, gaining access to policy makers and professionals was not always easy and 
was time consuming.
62
 Potential candidates were identified through the Internet, 
policy documents and academic conferences. Potential candidates had to, at some 
point, be involved in the formation and/or national implementation of Prevent. After 
the initial contact in person, over the phone or through email, they were sent 
additional information about the project to help them decide whether or not to take 
part.
63
 Everyone contacted, with the exception of two people, eventually agreed to 
take part. Using a technique called snowballing;
64
 many participants recommended 
others who they felt might be able to contribute to the project. Using this method 
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allowed me to engage with participants that would otherwise have been difficult, if 
not impossible, to identify and reach.
65
  
Although anonymity was offered to all of the participants listed in Figure 4.2 on the 
next page, a number of participants waived their right to anonymity. Naming some 
national participant did not compromise the identity of those participants who chose 
to remain anonymous, which meant that they could be named. The majority of the 
participants involved in Prevent nationally are based in London. A considerable 
amount of time was spent travelling to and from London, as meetings were held at 
times and locations convenient for the participants. A number of interviews were 
also held in Leeds, Bradford and Wakefield. Despite the occasional setback, policy 
makers were very open and forthright, offering assistant by sending reports or 
suggesting others who might be able to contribute to this project. Aberbach and 
Rockman’s assertion that elite interviewees prefer to articulate their views and do not 
like closed questions held true.
66
 All of the interviews were recorded, or notes taken, 
and then later transcribed.  
This approach raises two further points. Firstly, the wider issue of anonymity, and 
secondly the issue of generalization. This part of the research is based on interviews 
with individuals who have been involved in Prevent nationally, which means that 
there are generalizations that can be drawn from the content of the interviews. Not 
only are these individuals in a position to say something on the matter, they also have 
a say about the national implementation of Prevent. This makes these findings all the 
more relevant because they shed light on the national context of Prevent through an 
understanding of policy makers and other national figures’ interactions, perceptions 
and reactions.
67
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Figure 4.2 
Details of National professional interviewees conducted in 2011 
Hazel Blears, former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. 
Currently MP for Salford and member of the Security and Intelligence 
Committee (NP1).  
Lord Alex Carlile, former Independent Reviewer of UK Terrorism Legislation 
(NP2). 
Baroness Pauline Neville Jones, former Minister for Security and Counter-
terrorism (NP3). 
Senior Home Office Official, involved with the delivery of Prevent since 2005. 
White Male, late 40’s (NP4). 
Jack Straw, former Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and Secretary of State for 
Justice. Currently MP for Blackburn with Darwen (NP5) 
Sir Norman Bettison, former Head of Prevent at ACPO and former Chief 
Constable (NP6). 
Junior Cabinet Office Official, involved with Prevent since 2009. White male, 
late 30’s (NP7). 
Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government, 
involved with Prevent since 2004. Asian male, late 50’s (NP 8). 
Male Police Officer, seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery unit. White male, 
late 30s (NP9).  
Female Police Officer, seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit. Asian 
female, late 30s (NP10). 
Senior NPIA Official, involved in the delivery of Prevent from its early stages. 
Black male, mid 40s (NP11). 
Junior NPIA Official previously seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery unit. 
Also worked on the Prevent Review equality impact assessment. Asian female 
mid 30s (NP12).  
Police Inspector, previously seconded to HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. Now 
leading the implementation of Prevent in a Midlands Police Force. Asian male, 
mid 50s (NP13). 
Director of a Human Rights and Anti-racism Organization, involved in 
Prevent work nationally. Asian female, mid 50s (NP14).  
Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group, a youth 
worker previously involved in Prevent programmes in the North of England. 
Asian Female, late 20s (NP15).  
Total: 15 interviews with national professionals 
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4.7 Case Study area: Professional selection and issues 
The selection approach in Maybury was similar to the approach described above, 
using the Internet and snowballing.
68
 The criterion for selection was involvement by 
the participant in the delivery of Prevent in Maybury. Directed by a former council 
employee, initial contact was made with the Community Safety Team. After a 
meeting, at the local council, with a seconded police officer, my research proposal 
was submitted to a council committee for further consideration. All police officers 
involved in Prevent were identified through the Internet and then contacted. Once 
access was granted, I was given files, which contained the names and contact details 
of most individuals and organizations that worked on Prevent in Maybury. Potential 
participants on this list were contacted. All approached agreed to take part with the 
exception of the Prevent lead at the National Probation Service, who refused to take 
my calls or answer my emails. Those who agreed to take part often identified others 
with whom they had worked. Snowballing was particular effective, as participants 
introduced me to several others who had previously declined to take part. All in all, a 
total of 20 professionals participated. As outlined above, all individuals in Maybury 
remain anonymous. Figure 4.3 on the next page provides an overview of the 
interviewees and their role within the local authority.   
Semi-structured interviews also proved to be well suited for this part of the research 
as they allowed me to explore the professionals’ experiences, knowledge and 
perceptions of Prevent and their local context. Although following a set agenda, the 
interviews were conducted in a flexible manner. This was advantageous, and on a 
number of occasions, due to time constrains, previous answers and participants 
straying from point, allowing me to reshuffle the questions.
69
 Participants were 
forthcoming and helpful during the interview, provided additional relevant 
documents, studies and reports.  
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  Figure 4.3 
Details of Professional  interviewees in Maybury (2011) 
Local Police Authority Prevent lead, Asian female, mid 40s (LP1). 
Local Police Authority Deputy Director, White female, mid 50s (LP2). 
Community Safety Team Manager at Maybury Council. Used to oversee the 
local delivery of Prevent. White male, mid 30s (LP3). 
Police Superintendent (Area Commander), sits on the Prevent and CONTEST 
board.  White male, early 40s (LP4). 
Police Inspector and Force Prevent Lead (Special Branch), White female, early 
40s (LP5). 
Local authority Chief Executive, Member of the CONTEST board, white male, 
early 60s (LP6). 
Head of Safeguarding, Social Services, sits on the Channel board and is involved 
in the delivery of Channel. White male, early 50s (LP7). 
Community Safety Team member, has been involved with Prevent. Asian 
female, late 20s (LP8).  
Prevent Lead and Policy Officer at Maybury Council, White female, mid 40s 
(LP9).  
Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council, delivered a Prevent programme. 
White female, mid 40s (LP10) 
Police Officer seconded to Maybury Council, coordinated the delivery of 
Prevent. Asian male, mid 30s (LP 11). 
Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant), White male, mid 30s 
(LP12) 
Community Engagement Officer  (Civilian Police Staff), Asian female, mid 20s 
(LP13) 
Police Inspector and lead on the Channel programme, Asian male, early 50s 
(LP14) 
Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council and community volunteer, 
developed and delivered a community Prevent programme. White male, late 
30s (LP 15) 
Local Authority Educational Consultant, Prevent lead in Education. Worked 
with schools to deliver a number of Prevent programmes. White female, mid 
40s (LP16). 
Community Volunteer, lead an interfaith programme funded by Prevent. White 
male, late 50s (LP 17). 
Community Volunteer, lead a number of Prevent funded programmes. Asian 
female, late 50s (LP18). 
Neighbourhood Police Officer in a predominately Muslim area. Joined the police 
3 years ago. White male, late 20s (LP19). 
Neighbourhood Police Officer in a predominately Muslim area. Has been with 
police for many years. White female, early 30s (LP 20). 
Total:  20 interviews with professionals in Maybury  
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4.8 Local Muslim Communities in Maybury: Selection and issues  
The third and final part of the research focused on the Muslim communities in 
Maybury and was carried out using focus groups. Access was negotiated through a 
number of gatekeepers, which proved more difficult than anticipated.
70
 This problem 
is not unique to this project. Other researchers carrying out work on Prevent related 
projects such as Githens-Mather,
71
 and Lakhani faced similar difficulties.
72
 Focus 
groups were used to explore the perceptions of the Muslim communities regarding 
counter-terrorism policing and prevention, and considered the impact of their 
experiences with the police and the local authorities on their willingness to engage in 
Prevent. Lacking contacts within the Muslim communities, I relied on a number of 
gatekeepers to gain access.
73
 The Community Safety Team Manager and applications 
for Prevent funds, a number of potential gatekeepers were identified. Using these 
contacts snowballing was used to find further potential gatekeepers. In the end two 
organizations agree to help setup focus groups within Maybury’s Muslim 
communities. These organizations were well place, due to their close links to the 
various local communities to recruit a cross-section of the Muslim communities in 
Maybury. These gatekeeper organizations, the local Council of Mosques - an 
umbrella organization for all of the mosques in the city, the Community Volunteer 
Service (CVS), a contact at ACPO, and a neighbourhood manager, help to 
negotiating access to the Muslim communities and help recruit focus group 
participants. Participants reflected the cross-section of the community, with some 
having been previously involved in Prevent programmes.     
It is through these contacts within both the Indian and Pakistani communities that 
participants were recruited. The involvement of gatekeepers meant that there was 
limited control over the selection process.
74
 Contacts within the gatekeeper 
organizations distributed flyers, which clearly stated that this project was supported 
by the University of Leeds and funded by the ESRC. Two focus groups, arranged 
without the help of gatekeepers were unsuccessful as no participants showed up. 
Further negotiation between gatekeepers and members of the communities, and 
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offering a reward of £5, attracted a total of 22 participants, spread across five focus 
groups. The initial application to the ethics committee stated that participants would 
not receive any remuneration for participation. However, because no one showed up 
to the first two focus groups, one of my contacts suggested offering a small reward. 
The gatekeeper organizations assured participants that neither the police nor Home 
Office had funded this research project, a misconception that persisted. This latter 
point suggests that the research would have been more successful if the question had 
been hidden in a discussion about crime or public health issues.  
Those who did take part came from a cross-section of the Muslim communities in the 
case study area.
75
 Figure 4.4 on the next page provides a detailed overview of all of 
Focus Groups and its participants. To gain a better understanding of the participants 
understanding and attitudes towards Prevent focus groups were divided into two all-
female groups, one all male group, a mix group and one group consisting of 
community volunteers and religious leaders. Organizing the groups in this way 
allowed me to differentiate between opinions shared by gender and some degree age. 
During the focus groups I provided the topics for the conversations enabling the 
participants to discuss issues surrounding Prevent.
76
 As with the individual 
interviews the focus group interviews were also semi-structure. At times, it was more 
difficult to keep the discussions on topic, because they became discussions between 
participants exploring the issues amongst themselves. This was especially the case in 
the group with the Imams, were it proved difficult to bring the discussion back to the 
relevant topics.  
It is worth pointing out that throughout the course of the research numerous people in 
Maybury expressed their opinions on terrorism, policing, and Prevent, but were 
unwilling to take part in the formal research. Many of those spoken to confirmed the 
sensitivity of the topic, and explained that it was considered a taboo subject within 
their communities.
77
  These conversations do not form part of the data, but allowed 
me to follow certain lines of inquire during the interviews later on.  
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Figure 4.4 
Focus Group participation information 
Focus Group One 
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, late 50s  
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, early 60s 
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member, mid 30s 
Asian Female, Carer for disabled family member and community volunteer, Mid 
40s 
Total: 4 females 
Focus Group Two  
Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens  
Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s  
Asian Male, attending the local college, working part time, early 20s  
Asian Male, working on a vocational course, early 20s  
Asian Male, unemployed, late teens  
Asian Male, unemployed, early 20s,   
Total: 6 Males 
Focus Group Three  
Asian Female, parent of five, not working, mid 40s  
Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s  
Asian Female, parent of one, working part-time, late 20s  
Asian Male, parent of five, Mechanic, mid 40s  
Asian Male, parent of four, not working, late 30s  
Total: 3 Females 
3 Males 
Focus Group Four  
Asian Female, parent of three, mid 30s  
Asian Female, Social Worker, late 20s  
Asian Female, attending the local college, early 20s  
Total: 3 Females 
Focus Group Five  
Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s  
Asian Male, local imam, Chaplin at the local hospital, early 30s  
White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith activities, mid 30s 
Asian Male, Imam at a local mosque, works for the local council of mosques, mid 
30s 
Total: 4 Males 
Total Participation:  22 
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4.9 Ethical Issues 
Issues such as confidentiality, informed consent and privacy are crucial elements 
when conducting interviews.
78
 ‘Informed consent requires complete understanding 
on the part of those participating in the research.’79 The University of Leeds 
guidelines state that all research should be conducted ‘openly and without 
deception.’80 To comply with these guidelines, and those of the British Society of 
Criminology,
81
 all participants were provided with information summarizing the 
purpose of the study prior to agreeing to take part. The purpose of the study was re-
emphasized at the beginning of the event and participants were given a chance to ask 
questions.
82
 On the day, each participant was presented with a consent form, which 
they were asked to sign. Participants were warned verbally and on the consent form 
of the consequences of revealing any criminal activities during the interview or focus 
group. The groups were informed that everything they said would remain anonymous 
and that their details would not be disclosed to a third party. Noakes and Wincup 
argue that informed consent goes further than just the initial consent; rather the 
research is obliged to ensure that the participants understands at all times what they 
are engaging in.
83
 Informed consent was important for two reasons. Firstly, because 
the participant needed to understand all of the implications that participating in this 
project would have. Secondly, it was important that those taking part understood the 
nature of the debate and the context, as this was crucial in obtaining the relevant 
data. Participation was voluntary and individuals were told that they could withdraw 
at any time, if they so wished.
84
  
Israel argues that confidentiality should be offered to every participant.
85
 Ethics 
literature commonly views confidentiality akin to the principle of privacy.
86
 ‘This 
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principle is integral to our societal beliefs that individuals matter and that individuals 
have the right for their affairs to be private.’87 In an information-led society 
upholding privacy is not always straightforward.
88
 This meant that all of the 
information gathered such as addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses as well 
as the interview transcript would have to be stored securely. All of the data gathered 
was held on an encrypted external hard drive, which was password protected. The 
signed consent forms were also kept in a locked draw for the same purpose. This 
allowed me access to the data on demand while preventing unauthorized access, 
complying with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998. Although, the Act 
does not proscribe periods of retention, the data acquired will be retained for a period 
of five years. This period would allow me to re-use relevant data for other projects, 
bearing in mind the confidentiality of the participants as outlined in the consent 
form.
89
 
Confidentiality and anonymity are closely linked. ‘Confidentiality is the process of 
not disclosing to other parties opinions or information gathered in the research 
process,’90 while anonymity is about none disclosure of participants identity.91 
Anonymity is a paramount aspect of qualitative research.
92
 As described above, 
much of the data gathered for this research has been anonymized using pseudonyms, 
this being standard practice in social science research.
93
 As mentioned, throughout 
the research a number of individuals on the national level consented to be named. On 
the national level it was possible to reveal the identity of those participants. This was 
however not possible in the case study area. To ensure complete anonymity of all 
participants in Maybury, all personal and demographic data, which could be used to 
identify participants, were removed. At the same time great care was taken to ensure 
that this anonymity did not damage the data. ‘Some damage to analysis is 
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unavoidable in these circumstances, but it needs to be weighed against the potential 
damage to the sources of data in the absence of such action.’94 The decision to offer 
anonymity is a balancing act, weighing the potential harm to the participants against 
the benefits of making information public.
95
 As Lee points out, the harm to 
participants may range from embarrassment to violence.
96
 In my case the decision to 
offer anonymity to all participants was based on the notion that many would not have 
taken part in the research, had anonymity not been granted. This was confirmed 
during a number of interviews. Whilst anonymity protects the participants’ identity, 
it is still possible to identify the position of participants in their respective 
organization. This is important as it places the remarks made into the wider context 
of the individuals’ position and their knowledge of Prevent. Some of those involved 
in the policy formation and national delivery of Prevent stated that they did not need 
anonymity. As revealing them would not compromise any other participants they 
will be named throughout this thesis.  
4.10 Data analysis 
The data gathered throughout the research were analysed using a process called data 
reduction. How to code data, what to leave out, and which evolving stories to tell, are 
all analytical decisions that are left to the discretion of the researcher. ‘Data 
reduction is a form of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes 
data in such a way that final conclusion can be drawn.’97 Usually the interviews were 
audio-recorded and then transcribed, although on four occasions only notes were 
taken either because the equipment stopped working or because the participant asked 
not to be recorded. Combined the transcripts constitute a 450-page document. Other 
data sources include Freedom of Information request, policy documents and related 
studies. The discussions and conclusions drawn in the next four chapters rely on the 
acquired data. 
In addition to the interview and focus group data, a number of original documents, in 
addition to the policy documents widely available on the Internet such as the Prevent 
policy, were collected. These documents related to the local implementation of 
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Pursue and Prevent. These documents were obtained through Freedom of 
Information requests to the local council, police and the British Transport Police. 
These documents contain information about terrorism related stop-and-searches and 
arrests in the Maybury area, the local council’s local Prevent policy, and some 
information about the nature and content of local Prevent programmes.    
The researcher has an ethical obligation towards the participants, in terms of how the 
data are interpreted. ‘The pattern upon which we base our interpretation can be 
shown to inhere in the original narrative,’98 although the intentions of the original 
narrative may differ in terms of pointing out certain features or in making certain 
connections within larger cultural formations. To ensure rigour when interpreting the 
data, including the documents obtained through Freedom of Information request, a 
number of different approaches to data analysis were taken. In the first instance, the 
transcripts and other relevant documents were read and re-read, searching for and 
identifying patterns, links and relationships.
99
 Once familiar with the data, other tools 
that visualized the data were used to corroborate or identify new patterns. Figure 4.5 
on the next pages, gives three examples of data visualization using, Tag Clouds, 
Word Trees and Phrase Nets. These visualizations were created using a service 
called Many Eyes provided by IBM.
100
 All visualizations created in Many Eyes are 
publicly available on the Internet. To ensure confidentiality and anonymity all data 
was anonymized before it was uploaded. For added security, once the visualizations 
were created and saved all data was deleted from the Many Eyes Website, removing 
them from the public domain.    
This analysis focused on the interactions between the national and local narratives. 
The data were analysed, searching for areas of commonality and/or differences 
between the views and experiences expressed by individuals on the national and 
local level. Tag clouds were able to compare interviews on both the national and 
local level, highlighting areas of commonality but also differences. The analysis also 
focused on the interactions and between the national/local narratives. Initially the 
data were coded in NVivo, however technical difficulties proved distracting and the 
more traditional methods of pen and paper was used.  
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Figure 4.5 
Data analysis through visualization 
 
 
‘A tag cloud is a visualization of word frequencies. Our tag cloud enables you to 
see how frequently words appear in a given text … The size of the word 
corresponds to the quantity associated with that word.’ 
 
 
Tag Cloud 
 
 
 
‘A word tree is a visual search tool for unstructured text, such as a book, article, 
speech or poem. It lets you pick a word or phrase and shows you all the different 
contexts in which the word or phrase appears. The contexts are arranged in a tree-
like branching structure to reveal recurrent themes and phrases.’ 
 
 
Word Tree 
 
 
 
‘A phrase net diagrams the relationships between different words used in a text. It 
uses a simple form of pattern matching to provide multiple views of the concepts 
contained in a book, speech, or poem.’ 
 
 
Phrase Net 
 
Source: IBM Many eyes. 2012 
http://www-958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes/  
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‘Coding is how you define what the data you are analysing are about. It involves 
identifying and recording one or more passages of text or data items … that 
exemplify the same theoretical or descriptive idea.’101 When coding a combination of 
concept-driven and data driven coding was used.  The interview transcribes were 
coded using different colours pens, each representing different topics. Some of the 
predefined codes included ‘policy tensions’, ‘organizational tensions’, ‘impact of 
Prevent’ and ‘impact of media perceptions’. Throughout the detailed analysis 
supplementary codes were added as new patterns and themes emerged, such as 
‘political apathy’, and ‘perceived and/or real impact of Prevent.’ Notations were 
made on the transcripts, and also recorded on MS Word document with the relevant 
page numbers to keep track of the themes and ideas expressed within the data.  
This, combined with the above-mentioned visual text based analysis and word 
searches, allowed for the coding of the data. The data were evaluated in terms of 
evidence that might support or disprove the idea of tension and conflicts within 
Prevent. The data were then further interrogated to explore how the tensions and 
conflicts manifested themselves and what implications there were on the wider 
Prevent agenda. ‘The meanings emerging from the data have to be tested for their 
plausibility sturdiness, their conformability,’102 and conclusions drawn need to be 
credible and withstand other possible explanations. In this case qualitative data 
analysis helped in understanding internal patterns and provided support for 
theoretical ideas about social processes and cultural behaviour that can be taken far 
beyond the data itself.  
4.11 Data generalization and comparison 
Whilst the findings that emerged from those involved in the national formation and 
delivery are more easily generalizable, the findings from the case study area are not 
necessarily as easily generalizable, as they rely on single case study area, which 
limits the generalizability of the research findings. However, the findings are highly 
contextual and provided a local dimension of the Prevent policy process and its 
impact, understanding people’s interactions, perceptions and re-actions in terms of 
the local context and its relationship to national counter-terrorism and prevention.
103
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Generalizing these findings across wider society proved more difficult,
104
 although 
there were a number of solutions. It is possible, Skolnick argues, to compare similar 
case studies; thus placing the single case study into its wider context, while 
highlighting similarities and differences.
105
 This meant that certain inferences and 
generalizations could be drawn.
106
  
Because this research partially relied on a case study area in Maybury, generalizing 
the findings was more difficult. To overcome this problem, the emerging patterns, 
and conflicts were compared with other research and academic literature to examine 
whether any general patterns and trends could be identified to allow broader 
generalization of the findings. A number of studies were of particular interest, as 
they also focused on the delivery of Prevent and included case studies. A study by 
Thomas examined some of the tensions within Prevent.
107
 Innes et al took a similar 
approach to this subject matter, examining the effects of Prevent and counter-
terrorism policing on Muslim communities,
108
 while Spalek et al carried out similar 
research through using case studies to study the impact of Prevent on 
communities.
109
 Lakhani focused on perceptions of the Prevent policy from 
grassroots and communities, again using case studies.
110
 These various studies 
covered parts of London, Surrey, the Midlands, the North West and East, Greater 
Manchester and Cardiff. The results of these studies have been published and certain 
inferences and generalization were drawn. The findings of this thesis were compared 
to these studies of Prevent, drawing on commonalities and/or differences allowing 
for some generalization and broader conclusions.
111
  
There is, however, an inherent danger of over generalizing research findings.
112
 
Kundnani’s study about practitioners’ perceptions of Prevent shows how easy it is to 
over-generalize research findings.
113
 His study relies on data gathered in 16 cities 
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throughout England and Wales. Despite this, his sample size was much too small to 
be representative of all those involved in Prevent in those localities, let alone to 
generalize the findings across the UK. In Maybury, over 50 people were involved in 
the delivery of Prevent and their opinions varied, depending on the individuals’ role, 
and ethnicity. Inherently, this is an issue of selection, but also about analysis and data 
comparison, allowing for broader inferences to be drawn. Kundnani’s study 
highlights some mistakes, which have been avoided in this study by way of 
comparison with the above-mentioned studies, other corroborating data and 
academic literature. The results of the data analysis will be discussed in the following 
three chapters that follow. There, the patterns and trends that have emerged from this 
research will be discussed in terms of their wider context and will be linked to other 
academic research, available information such as policy documents, and social 
theory.  
4.12 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify and explore conflicts and tensions that 
arose between Pursue and Prevent, as well as within Prevent itself, and consider the 
implications for local Muslim communities and the Prevent agenda. The purpose of 
this chapter was to reflect upon the how’s and why’s of the research design and the 
related fieldwork. The outcome of the data generated during the fieldwork links the 
research design with the purpose of the thesis. Much of the success of this project 
was dependant on speaking to professionals involved nationally, locally and with 
members of those communities affected by Prevent. Using a qualitative approach, 
the data generated revealed the immediate and personal effects of the Prevent policy, 
while also exploring the aspects of this policy that are mostly played out in ‘far 
removed from the daily life of neighbourhood residents.’114 That said, throughout the 
fieldwork there were minor problems and setbacks all related to negotiating access to 
professionals and to the Muslim communities in Maybury. This process proved more 
time consuming than first anticipated. Other researchers have noted that it is not 
always easy to obtain access to BME communities, particularly when sensitive issues 
are discussed.
115
 A way of increasing participation amongst the Muslim communities 
could have been a higher financial reward. A late interviewee, the local police 
Prevent lead suggested that approaching a senior manager first, thereby opening the 
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door to all of the perspective interviewees within those organizations, might have 
been better. That said, the approach taken proved to be successful and I was able to 
speak to everyone with only one exception. The three tier set up, reflecting Rose’s 
argument,
116
 allowed me to contrast and compare the perceptions and attitudes of 
national and local professionals and the affected communities. As the next few 
chapters will show, the findings of this thesis suggest that the Prevent policy is 
indeed ‘being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being 
made.’117  
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Chapter 5: The national implementation of Prevent 
5.1 Introduction 
The Communities and Local Government Select Committee has stated that ‘the 
current breadth of focus of Prevent – from community work to crime prevention – 
sits uncomfortably within a counterterrorism strategy’.1 The Committee implies that 
there is uneasiness between the traditional counterterrorism aspects of CONTEST 
and Prevent. Possible conflicts and tensions exist within CONTEST and within 
Prevent itself. Interview, focus group, and Freedom of Information request data is 
analysed and disseminated in terms of these conflicts and tensions. Many of the 
issues dealt with in this and the following chapters are interrelated and presented 
from three different perspectives, namely national policy level, local professional 
delivery, and the community. This, the first of the three chapters, focuses on the 
national level and is based on the experiences, opinions, and perceptions shared by 
fifteen interviewees, which include national policymakers, politicians, civil servants, 
senior police officers, and human rights and anti-racism activists, all of whom are 
involved in Prevent work nationally.  
This chapter starts by revisiting the subject of CONTEST’s innovation, and 
exploring the possible consequences of Prevent’s inclusion in terms of the conflicts 
and tensions this gave rise to. The tensions have been categorised into two broad 
areas, namely policy and organisational tensions. Although separate, there are areas 
of overlap. The data suggest that tensions have arisen around the purpose and scope 
of Prevent, around who should lead Prevent, and around how it is funded. Other 
tensions, the findings suggest, centre on the negative perception of counterterrorism 
policing and Prevent, whom to engage with, how to communicate the purpose of 
Prevent to the media and the wider public, and evaluation.  
5.2 Understanding CONTEST and Prevent’s innovations 
The issue of innovation shows that CONTEST has turned away in part from the 
traditional models of counterterrorism. The strategy’s aim is to manage down the risk 
of terrorism to the UK.
2
 A former Secretary of State at the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) believes that ‘because it was 
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innovative some things worked and some things didn’t work so well, [nobody] had 
attempted to enter this territory’.3 This chapter explores why those interviewed 
perceive CONTEST and Prevent as innovative and what consequences arise in terms 
of conflicts and tensions because of these innovations. Lord Carlile, the former 
independent reviewer of the terrorism legislation, has anticipated problems with 
Prevent's onset but does not specify them. Prevent, he states, ‘is an art not science, 
and so there were bound to be mistakes, and there have been mistakes. ... I think that 
it was very carefully thought out. Everyone knew that there would be problems with 
it’.4  
5.2.1 CONTEST’s innovativeness  
Two broad areas of innovation emerge from the interview data; first, CONTEST 
brings together for the first time in a consolidated and comprehensive form the 
different aspects of counterterrorism. The coalition government remains committed 
to the 2009 CONTEST framework, although some changes have been made, stating 
that ‘our counterterrorism strategy will continue to be organised around four work 
streams’.5 According to the 2009 CONTEST strategy document, its framework 
reflects the importance of tackling the root causes of instability and terrorism. 
CONTEST provides the framework which brings different departments and 
government agencies together to work on counterterrorism issues such as policing, 
prevention, protection, and emergency planning. ‘CONTEST was extremely 
innovative, the framework of the four P’s, which is much broader obviously, than 
just Prevent,’6 says Baroness Neville-Jones, a former Minister for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism. A former Secretary of State for CLG believes that CONTEST 
provides a legislative and community response in an attempt to prevent individuals 
getting involved in terrorism. It is ‘tremendously innovative and groundbreaking’.7  
Second, CONTEST broadens the scope of counterterrorism policy to include 
prevention, which according to Lord Carlile is the ‘first time that the government had 
gone down this sort of conceptual line towards preventing this particular form of 
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criminal activity’.8 CONTEST applies prevention to counterterrorism in a strategic 
way. The need for prevention is widely accepted now, even by the government.
9
 Sir 
David Omand, the architect of CONTEST, argues that it is important that the 
CONTEST policy goes beyond the police and the security services to avoid new 
generations falling prey to violent extremist ideology. After the London bombings, 
‘the whole country realised, perhaps for the first time, that we had home-grown, 
domestic terrorism in our midst’.10 Sir Norman Bettison, the Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire and the ACPO Prevent lead, states that initially CONTEST and Prevent 
were not innovative because Prevent was only an extension of Pursue.  Prior to 
2007, Prevent was  
interpreted as getting to somebody before they actually pulled the trigger or 
pressed the detonator. So Prevent was actually a very close relation to Pursue 
... the way that it was first envisaged didn’t take us as far as we’ve taken 
Prevent since then.
11
 
Prevent, in its early stages, was probably seen as oversimplistic, focusing on a 
combination of diplomacy and, where necessary, military intervention.
12
 Since its 
inception in 2003,
13
 changes relating to Prevent brought about CONTEST, which 
was made more imperative by the 2005 London bombings, and have made 
CONTEST innovative.
14
   
A senior civil servant at the DCLG believes that the London bombings marked a 
turning point in political and public opinion. ‘Prevent was a reaction to the calamity 
of innocent human beings killed by home-grown terrorists.’15 The government 
needed to be seen to be doing something.
16
 Since 2001, the perceived threat to the 
UK has shifted from international terrorism to home-grown terrorism driven by 
individuals inspired by jihadi ideology and living in British communities. This is 
reflected in the boarder scope of Prevent after 7/7.
17
 From the 1970s onward, British 
counterterrorism strategy was dominated by the criminal justice agencies and the 
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security services,
18
 and lacked a preventative dimension.
19
 In the later years of the 
Northern Ireland conflict, the government took a more community-centred approach. 
However, this was never as organised and transparent as CONTEST, a Home Office 
official concludes.
20
 Peace in Northern Ireland became possible after the political 
reforms which led to the Good Friday Agreement. These political reforms formed the 
main preventative policy.   
5.2.2 Prevent’s innovativeness  
Prevent is innovative because it occupies the ‘space somewhere in the middle, 
between extremism and violent extremism’.21 Thus, individuals and communities are 
given a space where honest engagement can take place which was not part of the 
security and intelligence world, and where they can share the responsibility of 
preventing extremism and terrorism.
22
 This space allows local authorities and 
Muslim communities to work together to increase community resilience against 
extremism, ideally without intervention from the police or the security services. 
Increased trust leads to better engagement and information sharing by 
communities.
23
 The majority of the interviewees see this approach as innovative 
(thirteen of the fifteen national participants). Research suggests that many Muslim 
communities are increasingly taking the lead in challenging violent extremism, 
working in partnership with the police and local authorities,
24
 although negative 
perceptions of Prevent have had a negative effect on community participation and 
engagement with the police and Prevent programmes.  
After 2007, CONTEST, and particularly Prevent, went beyond the traditional 
boundaries of counterterrorism. The general perception was that the terrorist threat 
no longer came predominantly from abroad, but also from within British 
communities.
25
 Whereas the Irish conflict was ingrained in local culture, home-
grown jihadi terrorism, with its associated ideologies, appeared as a fairly new 
phenomenon.  
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Young men and women were driven by a variety of forces, from history that 
set the framework of the state in which they lived, to the circumstances that 
conditioned the way they felt, thought and acted.
26
 
The historical and cultural dimensions inherent in the Irish conflict are largely absent 
within home-grown jihadi terrorism. A senior official within the DCLG, himself a 
Muslim, also questions jihadi terrorists’ ‘Islam and their religious reality’.27 
Choudhury argues that  
the appeal of extremist groups reflects, in part the failure of traditional 
religious institutions ... to connect with young people and address their 
questions and concerns. ... The most vulnerable are those who are religious 
novices exploring their faith for the first time.
28
  
These differences are important because the belief of jihadi extremists is often 
shallow, suggesting susceptibility to preventative attempts.  
All the interviewees agree that aspects of CONTEST and Prevent are innovative. In 
their short lifespan, CONTEST and Prevent have constantly evolved. This has led to 
tensions when defining the scope of the policy because it has not settled, as well as 
tensions when communicating its purpose to both practitioners and the public. A 
human rights and anti-racism activist highlights this tension. She sees Prevent simply 
as a response to the riots in the North of England in early 2001 and 9/11. She regards 
Prevent as a policy which represents institutional racism and fosters negative 
community relationships.
29
 All national participants agree that CONTEST, or parts 
thereof, are innovative while acknowledging the policy and organisational conflicts 
and tensions it has created. The Home Affairs Select Committee agrees.
30
  
5.3 Policy Tensions: The aims and scope of Prevent 
Policy and organisational tensions overlap. There are tensions regarding the aim and 
scope of the Prevent policy. These tensions also affect the organisational set-up, 
which drives this policy, and issues around evaluation, engagement, and perceptions. 
On the face of it, all interviewees agree that the key aims and objectives of Prevent 
                                                                                                                                          
25
 Clive Walker, ‘“Know Thine Enemy as Thyself”: Discerning Friend from Foe Under Anti-
Terrorism Laws’ (2008) 32 Melbourne Law Review 275 
26
 Peter Taylor, The Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (Bloomsbury Publishing 1998) 6 
27
 Senior Official at the Department of Communities and Local Government (NP8) interview (n 15) 
28
 Tufyal Choudhury, ‘The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalization’ (Department of 
Communities and Local Government, 2007) 
<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628.pdf> accessed 28 March 
2012 
29
 Director of a Human Rights and Anti-Racism Organizations (Asian Female), NP 14), ‘Name 
Anonymized. Worked on Prevent Nationally and Was Provided Evidence to Parliamentary Select 
Committees About a Need to Review Prevent.’ (2011) 
 
116 
are as stated ‘on the tin, to prevent people being radicalised and becoming terrorists 
and also to ensure that communities do not feel under the sort of pressure which may 
lead to ... individuals being radicalised’.31  
The earlier Prevent strategy focused on community cohesion,
32
 whereas the Prevent 
Review shifted the focus to information gathering and sharing.
33
 The data reflect this 
division about the basic aims and objectives of Prevent. Lord Carlile maintains that 
the ‘key aims and objectives remain ... both prior and after the Prevent Review’.34 
However, close reading of both policy documents suggests that there has been a shift 
away from community cohesion, ushering in some significant changes. Both versions 
of Prevent state that it aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting 
terrorism. However, the methods for achieving this aim have changed. Under the 
Labour government, Prevent had five main objectives.
35
 The Prevent Review reduced 
these to three. Notably, the two objectives absent in the Review are ‘increasing the 
resilience of communities to violent extremism, and to address the grievances which 
ideologies exploit’.36 Under the Labour government, the DCLG was a major player 
within Prevent,  
ensuring that communities are at the centre of our response to violent 
extremism ... Prevent is closely coordinated with work in three other policy 
areas: community cohesion, community empowerment, and race and 
equality.
37
 
The Prevent Review diminished the role of the DCLG within Prevent.  
Whereas Prevent is part of CONTEST, a counter-terrorism strategy, and deals 
with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism – and 
extremist organizations in particular – primarily through other means.38 
The role of cohesion was devolved to the DCLG, separating it from the more 
counterterrorism-focused Prevent. ‘There was a demarcation between engaging with 
a certain community on the normal engagement basis, and then we’re going to have 
Prevent as a method of counterterrorism.’39 DCLG's recently published integration 
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strategy tackles extremism as part of a wider approach to integration and community 
cohesion,
40
 whereas Prevent focuses exclusively on extremism which leads to 
terrorism.
41
 This separation between community cohesion and Prevent is a policy 
rather than an organisational decision, and has had implications for the organisations 
involved in delivering Prevent.   
Identifying individuals vulnerable to extremism through the collaboration of various 
local and national governments and NGOs remains central to Prevent. The Review 
shifts the focus from community integration and cohesion to collaboration and 
safeguarding, and extends its reach to the higher education and health care sectors to 
identify those posing a risk to security and to provide relevant support.
42
 As a policy, 
Prevent does not appear to be designed as a surveillance programme, although 
elements of Prevent may intentionally or unintentionally generate information as a 
by-product which can then be shared between the various departments and agencies. 
There has been a significant shift within the Prevent Review from ‘building the 
resilience of local communities to the extremist message’,43 to the safeguarding of 
the public through more specialist programmes such as Channel. 
According to Sir Norman Bettison, the fundamental aim of Prevent should be  
to build engagement and trusting relationships, so that we can have 
conversations about the risk and how to deal with it, but we also can have 
conversations, whites-of-the-eye conversations, when there might have been a 
clumsy operation, that is being misunderstood within the community.
44
 
This view is supported by a police officer seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery 
Unit who states that Prevent should help communities to break the cycle of ‘hate 
breeds hate’, reducing the potential of violence while increasing integration and 
cohesion.
45
 Lord Carlile claims that there is only one major difference between 
Prevent under Labour and the Prevent Review:   
There’s been a phrase floating around for years: violent extremism — the 
meaning of which is very unclear. It has been recognized in the new strategy 
that there is no distinction to be drawn, for this purpose between extremism 
and violent extremism. That’s what I think is the major change.46 
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Arguably, there are other major differences between the two Prevent policies. 
Broadening the term ‘violent extremism’ to ‘extremism’ allows the government to 
pass on the responsibility of cohesion and integration to the DCLG because this 
broader focus does not fit with the coalition government’s Prevent aims and 
objectives.  
All participants agree that understanding extremism, what it is, what its causes are, 
and how it links to political violence is fundamental to a successful Prevent strategy. 
When asked in further detail about this, the only commonality that emerges is the 
belief that in the context of the current terrorism threat, jihadi ideologies often, but 
not always, bridge the gap between extremism and political violence. The lack of a 
clear definition and understanding is acknowledged by Blears, a former Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government.
47
 Lord Carlile states that  
it is often said that British foreign policy, now unused stop-and-search powers, 
the power to stop people at the ports that these radicalises. ... I think that the 
causes of extremism are proselyting, and proselytisation of extremism by a 
small number of very powerful voices, who use word of mouth and Internet ... 
to radicalise young people.
48
 
There was a perception amongst the frontline staff interviewed that British foreign 
policy plays a key role in the radicalisation process, a view that is supported by 
Brighton.
49
 Focus group data suggest that foreign policy, although disliked, is less of 
an issue for communities in Maybury.
50
 A DCLG official states that although foreign 
policy plays a role, it is not the only reason for extremism.
51
 The line between 
extremism and violent extremism, according to Sir Norman Bettison, is ‘the 
distinction ... where someone crosses the line between hatred to actually seeking, or 
being willing, to do something about it, that has the potential to do harm to people or 
property’.52 The lack of a common notion about extremism and its links to terrorism 
causes tensions because it is unclear how Prevent aims to achieve its objectives. This 
policy is not settled in terms of its long-term intentions. In part, this is due to its 
innovative nature: it has not been established long enough.  
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5.4 Policy tensions: Community cohesion and counterterrorism 
prevention 
Under the Labour government, the Prevent policy was seen as a way to promote 
engagement and to challenge violent extremism.
53
 The policy states that ‘Prevent [is] 
closely coordinated with work in three other policy areas: community cohesion, 
community empowerment, and race and equality’.54 Hindle argues, however, that 
those involved in the delivery of Prevent felt that they were not given sufficient 
autonomy or resources needed to effectively prevent extremism.  ‘Dissatisfaction 
arising from this doesn’t mean current practices are entirely wrong but that such 
views on both sides, in retrospect were naïve.’55 The Review shifted the balance from 
community cohesion and integration to an approach based on Channel. The Channel 
framework has information gathering and sharing at its heart, and is aimed at 
implementing targeted interventions. The current Home Secretary, Theresa May, 
expresses the view that the Labour policy was flawed because it 
confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with 
Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist 
ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and trying to reach those at risk of 
radicalization, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist 
organizations that Prevent should have been confronting.
56
 
Implicit within the policy were tensions between how to best prevent individuals 
from becoming radicalised and how to deal with extremism in general. The tensions 
were about whether broader community cohesion, with Channel attached, or a more 
targeted Channel-like approach was more appropriate for the Prevent policy. The 
former was based on secondary prevention because it targeted specific communities, 
but it also focused more broadly on universal education policies and on the general 
public environment in the hope of preventing criminality at an early stage.
57
 The 
latter focused on secondary prevention and therefore on individuals and groups at 
risk of radicalisation.
58
 That said, Labour’s retired Prevent policy had some aspects 
of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, while the Review also has aspects of 
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primary and tertiary prevention.
59
 Disagreement between the interviewees centres on 
whether Prevent should have a primary (a view supported by nine of the fifteen 
national participants) and/or secondary preventative focus (a view shared by six 
national participants). This raises the question of whether Prevent criminalised social 
policy by criminalising behaviour which is seen as a precursor to terrorism-related 
activities, as spoken of by Zedner.
60
 Alternatively, did Prevent socialise 
counterterrorism policy through the inclusion of integration and community cohesion 
into counterterrorism policies?   
Early on, Prevent was a holistic preventative strategy which included a ‘more broad-
brush community cohesion approach’.61 The more individualised aspect of this 
strategy was the Channel project, a secondary prevention approach. Under the 
Labour government, many Prevent programmes focused on secondary prevention 
because they targeted specific communities. However, these programmes generally 
had a broad focus.
62
 This broad-brush approach taken by the early policy was 
criticised by many of its participants. Lord Carlile insists that Prevent was less 
effective as a community cohesion strategy.
63
 According to a senior Home Office 
official, Prevent, particularly after the Review, became about counterterrorism and 
not community cohesion. Extremist groups which only posed a threat to community 
cohesion were considered significantly different from extremist groups engaged in or 
planning acts of terrorism, and hence should not be covered by Prevent.
64
 The focus 
of Prevent shifted to identifying, and intervening, when individuals or groups engage 
in extremism leading to terrorism, rather than extremism per se.
65
 According to the 
government, work on integration and extremism will not stop; but how much money 
will be spent remains to be seen because the government’s integration strategy has 
only recently been published.
66
 Because both approaches targeted Muslim 
communities, these continued to feel stigmatised and excluded.
67
 Cantle, giving 
evidence to a House of Commons select committee, stated:  
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I think the Prevent agenda has had a great deal of difficulty with the Muslim 
communities ... precisely because it has been seen as a part of the counter-
terrorism strategy, because it has associated the Muslim communities – with 
terror. The Prevent agenda really should be separate.
68
 
A former DCLG minister disagreed and was worried 
that this is a dishonest approach because the integration strategy will not 
recognise that one of the reasons you’re doing integration is because you face a 
threat. And I think unless you are clear about that in your mind, that you’re 
doing this work, yes, generally, because it’s a good thing to do, but also 
because it has to reduce the threat to the national security of the country.
69
 
Links between Prevent and integration remain. However, the Review makes it clear 
that any community cohesion projects need to focus on extremism leading to 
terrorism. ‘Prevent must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration 
projects, which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the 
Government will not securitize its strategy. This is a mistake in the past.’70  
In contrast, Sir Norman Bettison sees Prevent as the intersection of Pursue and 
community cohesion. ‘In the middle, interlocking with both those circles, is the 
circle that I call neighbourhood policing. So neighbourhood policing has got to 
straddle both community engagement and Pursue.’71 It is this approach, straddling 
community cohesion and prevention that has made CONTEST particularly 
innovative, according to a police officer from the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit. ‘Not 
just in terms of reducing the likelihood of reducing terrorist attacks, I think it has 
been useful in ... producing more cohesion in communities.’72 He continued to argue 
that Prevent needed to include engagement and cohesion in order to build the trust of 
communities, linking Pursue with Prevent.  
Under Labour, Prevent securitised community cohesion in terms of engaging with 
communities because of terrorism concerns. According to Lachman, ‘the sooner 
local authorities move away from the entire security agenda, the better it is in terms 
of restoring the confidence and trust of the communities that it works with.’73 A 
senior official at the NPIA stated that  
the old strategy, there’s a lot more community participation within that. I think 
some of the confusion was what sits in cohesion and what sits in Prevent. I 
don’t think that conversation was healthy because what it ended up doing was 
creating a massive schism which made the new Prevent strategy much more, 
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let’s do this ... at the community and let’s sit cohesion so far away that where 
on earth do you get into Prevent work? So this sort of underlying community 
cohesion work that was Prevent-connected in the old strategy allowed 
communities to build a sort of resilience and become stronger against the 
grooming and the extremism because they’re complex communities with a lot 
of complex issues.
74
  
Yet some of the community cohesion work done by local authorities, under the 
banner of Prevent, has little in common with the Prevent objectives.
75
 Such concerns 
were raised in the Review. ‘We won’t kid anyone, that the links with Pursue are very 
close because what do I do with the information I get?’76 Baroness Neville-Jones 
argues for a split between Home Office counterterrorism work and community 
cohesion. It has become clear that integration is being tainted by the activities of the 
police and intelligence.
77
 Bad perceptions and distrust have a tendency to reinforce 
themselves in the social interactions of individuals and communities alike.
78
 ‘When 
you haven’t got that basis of trust, actually that pushes us further apart,’ Sir Norman 
Bettison states.  Baroness Neville Jones admits that 
on the local level, community policing is precisely, actually, a combination of 
the trust engendered by the people feeling that the police are actually fair-
minded, on their side and looking after them and protecting them on the one 
hand.  But the police can’t do that effectively unless they actually receive 
information from a … community about where the dangers lie.79  
According to Hough et al., the police and authorities must demonstrate a certain 
moral authority embodying the shared moral values of society and a shared sense of 
right and wrong in order to gain the public’s trust.80 
Twelve of the fifteen participants agree that community cohesion and integration 
need to be separated from the hard-core aspects of Prevent, while continuing to 
acknowledge the importance of community cohesion work. The consensus amongst 
these twelve participants is that Prevent needs to be more problem focused. Lord 
Carlile states: ‘I think the right balance is struck by the new Prevent Review which 
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passes communities and local governments the responsibilities of community 
cohesion work.’81 According to Sir Norman Bettison, some local authorities want to 
maintain the focus on community cohesion. Although community cohesion is a 
necessary part of Prevent, ‘it is not a sufficient part, it doesn’t do enough’.82 As 
aforementioned, he further believes that police-led Prevent would fail. Prevent, as 
recognised by a number of the interviewees, should be based on the Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnership Model (CDRP), which is already in place, bringing 
the police and local authorities together to reduce crime. Throughout its evolution, 
Prevent has shifted its focus to narrower secondary prevention and identifying 
individuals at risk of radicalisation. It has increasingly been driven by the logic of 
pre-emption, allowing for earlier interventions and relying on an ever-increasing 
array of partnerships including the Health Service and the Department of Education. 
Prevent has criminalised some aspects of community cohesion policy while 
socialising aspects of counterterrorism. Tensions remain, as policymakers and 
politicians disagree about how to best prevent terrorism, and about the merits of 
including community cohesion into a wider terrorism prevention strategy.  
5.5 Policy tensions: Reactions to allegations of spying and targeting 
Muslim communities 
The tensions are twofold. The first set is about whether Prevent is concerned with 
prevention, surveillance, or a combination of the two. The second set of tensions is 
about whether Prevent is concerned with preventing extremism or encouraging 
extreme reactions. Often, the media has framed Prevent as a policy that uses various 
forms of surveillance to target predominantly Muslim communities.
83
 This 
perception has influenced how communities see Prevent.
84
 Consequently, Muslim 
communities feel increasingly alienated from wider society and government.
85
 When 
writing about Prevent in the media, the term spying has been used, which implies 
that sinister and clandestine methods are used to gather information. Certain aspects 
of Prevent are about gathering information and encouraging individuals to share 
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information with the police, which can be used against individuals.
86
 This begs the 
question whether Prevent is a viable policy without aspects of surveillance.  
Critics say that Prevent is a top down approach which only engages with the ‘usual 
suspects’, such as imams and other male community leaders, who pedal mainstream 
Islamic and populist values and ideologies to their Muslim communities. Those 
rejecting such ideologies are seen as ‘suspect’ and possible targets of Prevent.87 A 
director of a human rights and anti-racism group believes that Prevent is 
intentionally designed to target Muslim communities and is based on prejudicial 
perceptions, which are not challenged by the government or the media. She further 
argues that Prevent is a by-product of the race relations policies, which present an 
alternative way for the government to marginalise Muslim communities in the UK.
88
 
The community cohesion agenda introduced by New Labour also initially influenced 
Prevent and is seen by some academics as the new framework for governing race 
relations.
89
 Prevent attempts to integrate Muslim communities. However, Kundnani 
argues that Prevent, in fact, alienates Muslim communities from mainstream society. 
In his view, Prevent is an ideological tool used to win the hearts and minds of the 
Muslim communities with the help of pro-government Muslim organisations.
90
 
Although this view is not commonly shared amongst those interviewed (only two of 
the fifteen interviewees supported such views), Hickman et al. argue that public 
policies represent ‘a prevalent discourse of Britishness and of a unified nation in the 
face of the threat, with us and our people and values diametrically opposed to ... 
Muslim extremists’.91 In his Munich speech in early 2011 just prior to the launch of 
the Review, Prime Minister Cameron emphasised this point, restating the importance 
of integration over multiculturalism in the fight against terrorism.
92
 The Review’s 
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definition of extremism also appears to confirm such claims, defining extremism as 
the opposite of British values.
93
  
5.5.1 Surveillance, spying, or prevention? 
There appears to be a conflict between what the policy documents state in respect to 
gathering intelligence, and comments from a number of interviewees who deny that 
intelligence gathering takes place under Prevent. A senior civil servant at the DCLG 
claims that under the Labour government there was  
no intention of intelligence gathering under the guise of Prevent, let’s be clear 
about that. ... We have no spies or relation to that. I think that when it came to 
the actual implementation of the policy, the practitioners may have gone 
beyond their limit. ... I think it may have been misunderstood or 
misrepresented.
94
 
This is a common response to the allegations of Prevent being used as a vehicle for 
gathering overt or covert intelligence. Only two of the fifteen national participants 
believe that Prevent is deliberately designed for surveillance purposes, 
acknowledging though that intelligence might be obtained inadvertently and shared 
with partner agencies. However, this is perceived as a by-product of Prevent work 
rather than a direct objective of Prevent.
95
 The director of a human rights and anti-
racism organisation believes that because Prevent has been securitised, it is simply a 
guise for the gathering of intelligence.
96
 Hidden within the 2009 version of Prevent is 
a reference to two supporting objectives aimed at ‘supporting intelligence, analysis 
and information; and to improve our strategic communication.’97 Kundnani’s report 
is often cited in support of the view that Prevent has been used to spy on Muslim 
communities.
98
 These perceptions have antagonised Muslim and Hindu communities 
alike.
99
 Nevertheless, the consensus amongst thirteen of the fifteen national 
participants is that Prevent’s aim has never been about surveillance or spying. This 
perception, they argue, stems from overzealous council workers and the media who 
have given Prevent a bad name. ‘As a consequence of this, the public believe that 
Prevent is about spying and some Muslim communities think it is about spying on 
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them in particular.’100 This has been reinforced by events such as Project Champion, 
which attempted to use Prevent funds to set up CCTV cameras around two mainly 
Muslim communities in Birmingham. In the aftermath, this incident has been cited as 
proof that Prevent is about spying on Muslim communities.
101
 
Sir Norman Bettison acknowledges that there have been some ‘clumsy operations’ 
which have negatively affected the public’s perceptions of Prevent. It is unclear, 
however, whether ‘clumsy’ refers to operations which have received negative public 
attention or to those which were poorly executed. He cites the example of Project 
Champion, which could be an example of both because it was unfortunate that the 
media found out about it, and because it should never have been carried out in the 
first place. He further states that there have been a number of misunderstood 
consequences of Prevent.  
People misunderstand what we’re trying to achieve, as unfairly targeting ... 
Muslim communities. Actually 10 per cent of the people that we’ve intervened 
with on our Channel scheme have been young people with right-wing 
tendencies. So it isn’t exclusively about the Al Qaeda inspired threat. So 
people have felt targeted which is a pity, but I have the belief, a genuine belief, 
that the more we work with communities and the more that we show ourselves 
to be transparent and to be honourable, the more the suspicion will recede.
102
  
 A senior NPIA official argues that 
I think there was a sort of fear that [Prevent] was ... a spying tool, but actually 
... I think that very rarely really happened. I think the relationship we’d built 
with the community support officers of Prevent, ... didn’t really create an 
environment where they would then go to a CT person. ... It wasn’t clever 
enough in many ways. The people they were engaging with, were already very 
engaged people so really there was, I don’t think, as much information shared 
as possibly.
103
  
Perceptions matter, and the perception that Prevent is used as a surveillance tool may 
have damaged the relationship between communities and authorities, even if those 
already engaged with Prevent know that it is not about surveillance. All of the 
interviewees recognise that accusations of spying have tarnished Prevent’s reputation 
and perpetuated a negative perception.  
A consequence is that the public thinks that Prevent is about spying, and some 
Muslim communities think it’s about spying on them particularly. So that’s one 
of the unintended consequences … it’s perceived that Prevent is a bad thing.104 
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Interviewees acknowledge the importance of maximising communities’ willingness 
to engage with authorities, an engagement based on a perception of legitimacy and 
trust rather than coercion.
105
 The obligation to obey the law is linked ‘to the quality 
of the rules and the integrity of their administration’.106 The perception of spying has 
undermined communities’ trust in authorities.   
5.5.2 Legitimacy, trust, and engagement 
It is important that the police and local authorities are more sensitive when engaging 
affected communities.
107
 A DCLG official points out that the aim of Prevent is to 
engage with Muslim communities to build their trust and resilience against violent 
extremism so that they might be willing to share information freely.
108
 This 
information is central for the success of Prevent and Pursue.
109
  
We know quite a lot about Prevent but the way it links into the other elements 
of CONTEST, which are very much more intelligence-based and stuff … we 
don’t really know where a lot of that information goes.110  
It is because of a lack of trust and transparency that people generally regard Prevent 
as a spying operation used by an intrusive government.  
Negative perceptions of the police and other state agencies foster distrust which, 
according to Luhman, endorses and reinforces itself in the social interactions of 
individuals and communities alike.
111
  
Well there clearly ... there are points at which ... Pursue and Prevent would 
clash.  The police do have to conduct operations.  If they are going to go in and 
pick up some terrorists they have do it in a way and at a time of day when 
they’re likely to get their birds, simple.  Has it always been handled with the 
greatest skill?  No. Is the resentment that may have been stirred up deliberately 
exploited by people who see it in their interests and as a weapon to exploit it? 
Absolutely ... So you’ve got fault on both sides and there certainly has been 
exploitation of anxious communities.
112
 
Legitimacy is conferred on institutions because they respect certain normative and 
ethical values.
113
 On the flip side, this can mean that the perception of legitimacy can 
be withdrawn when the police fail to respect community values and subcultures.
114
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On the local level, community policing is precisely, actually, a combination of 
the trust engendered by the people feeling that the police are actually fair-
minded, on their side and looking after them and protecting them on the one 
hand. But the police can’t do that effectively unless they actually receive 
information from a community about where the danger lies.
115
  
According to Sir Norman Bettison, trust is the basic principle which underpins 
Prevent, and the fundamental aim must be to build trusting relationships with 
communities so that Prevent’s purpose can be understood and supported by the 
affected communities.
116
 
Having the trust of communities is imperative for the success of both Prevent and 
Pursue. Prevent, as Sir Norman Bettison argues, is that all-important link between 
community cohesion and Pursue.
117
 Summing up the purpose of Prevent, he says 
that: ‘The central ethos of the Prevent strand is safeguarding – not spying or 
demonising, but simply seeking to protect the vulnerable.’118 However, neither the 
government nor the media have been successful in communicating this simple 
message, and Muslim communities continue to feel that they are being antagonised 
and spied on. The ensuing tensions highlight issues about how Prevent’s purpose is 
communicated to the wider public, including its need for information sharing and 
surveillance, without which this policy is not viable, while maintaining or generating 
high levels of trust within the affected communities. Bad communication has led to 
extreme reactions. Some argue that Muslim communities have developed a siege 
mentality, rather than preventing extremism.
119
 
5.6 Policy tensions: Prevent’s target population and engagement with 
Muslim communities 
Close examination of Prevent policy documents reveal the targeting of primarily 
Muslim communities because they are seen as the source of the jihadi ideologies in 
the UK.   
Because the greatest threat at present is from terrorists who claim to act in the 
name of Islam, much Prevent activity takes place in and with Muslim 
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communities. But the principles of our Prevent work apply equally to other 
communities who may be the focus of attention from violent extremism.
120
 
The Prevent Review concludes that although ‘Prevent should address all forms of 
terrorism ... as a whole, the priority will be to focus on terrorism associated with Al 
Qaida’.121 Initially, target areas and communities were selected according to 
demographic data.
122
 Under the Review, these are selected through a more 
intelligence-led approach, though the areas remain largely the same.
123
 Although 
some of the Channel referrals have included individuals who hold right-wing 
views,
124
 a Home Office official confirms that Prevent should focus on jihadi 
extremist groups because these are the perceived source of the threat. Groups such as 
the English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP), although 
extreme, do not merit counterterrorism interventions. According to the same official, 
the Home Office and government ministers perceive the EDL as a nuisance and 
public order problem rather than as a problem of political violence. Prevent’s main 
concerns lie with groups which sympathise with extreme jihadi ideologies such as 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
125
 In principle, Prevent remains focused on Muslim communities, 
although this may change in the future if there is a shift in the terrorist threat. This 
focus has caused tensions between Prevent and the target communities.
126
  
The Prevent policy implies a certain level of engagement between the authorities and 
Muslim communities. A junior official at the NPIA argues that Prevent is a  
massive opportunity for Muslim communities to have a say in what happens 
within Muslim communities, in terms of radicalisation, vulnerable young 
people going down the route of radicalisation. ... It is in some ways a huge 
opportunity to lead on that particular area rather than have a strategy that is 
done at the community.
127
 
Those working on Prevent present it as an opportunity for communities to engage 
authorities rather than the state helping affected communities to address deeply 
rooted problems related to extremism and terrorism. Successive governments have 
stated that Prevent is key to building communities’ resilience to extremism and 
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terrorism, and communities are key to Prevent.
128
 The Review argues that 
preventative work should include communities because they are often in a better 
position than the government to challenge and disprove claims made by terrorist 
groups and their associated ideology.
129
 ‘It was really important that we didn’t 
simple have a group of older men speaking for the Muslim community, because the 
people I met said that these people do not represent me in a modern world.’130 
Strengthening communities and building the confidence of women and young people 
within these communities is seen as key to the long-term success of Prevent.
131
 
According to Maher and Frampton, however, Prevent has failed to break the 
stranglehold of key gatekeeper groups, and councils continue to engage with them.
132
 
The desire for the government to work with affected communities is fairly 
uncontroversial, but it leaves a fundamental question unanswered: is Prevent about 
community empowerment to solve the problem of extremism, or about overt 
surveillance and the gathering of intelligence – or both?   
There has certainly been a shift from the earlier version of Prevent, which was 
delivered within a community cohesion framework, to the Prevent Review which 
focuses more on information gathering and cooperation amongst involved agencies. 
All interviewees at the local and national level deny that Prevent is about overt or 
covert surveillance. What is not denied is that certain aspects of Prevent are about 
gathering information, through overt means, about activities in Muslim communities. 
A police officer seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit states that Prevent 
work is about information sharing, ‘and some perceive information sharing as being 
spying. It is not. It’s about looking after individuals. If you look after individuals 
they don’t become terrorists’.133  
Prevent work is not confined to those Muslim communities and groups who support 
the government position, and at times includes groups who are perceived as holding 
extremist views. This caused tensions amongst politicians and policymakers when 
devising Prevent.
134
 The government’s view was to promote core British values.  
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We should properly judge these organizations: do they believe in universal 
human rights – including for women and people of other faiths?  Do they 
believe in equality of all before the law?  Do they believe in democracy and the 
right of people to elect their own government?  Do they encourage integration 
or separation?  These are the sorts of questions we need to ask.  Fail these tests 
and the presumption should be not to engage with organizations – so, no public 
money, no sharing of platforms with ministers at home.
135
 
Essentially, the Prime Minister argues that the assimilation of different cultures to 
British values, as ambiguous as they may be, should be government policy. 
Assimilation requires the acceptance of minority groups by the majority, otherwise 
‘assimilation is hardly a viable political or cultural option’.136 Racism, xenophobia, 
and Islamophobia reinforce the tendency of minority groups to retain their cultural 
and ethnic heritage.
137
 This, Soria argues, has ‘inevitable repercussions on the 
essence of the new Prevent, which seems to explicitly mirror the Prime Minister’s 
hard-line stance.’138 Despite Muslim communities rejecting terrorism, they 
are increasingly, in political discourse, being asked questions about their 
patriotism and stance on British values.  These are deliberate attempts that 
provide a nuance for discrimination and prejudice.
139
    
The Prevent Review has adopted a hard-line approach; authorities no longer engage 
with groups which espouse extremist views, even if these are non-violent.
140
 A Home 
Office official states that there is no need to work with extremist groups because 
there are sufficient alternative resources available.
141
 Such a view is shared by only a 
third of the participants, although similar views are espoused by think tanks on the 
Right such as Policy Exchange.
142
 A number of interviewees share similar opinions. 
A former DCLG minister states:  
I took a very strong stance about not engaging with people who, you know, 
weren’t prepared to sign up to our values of democracy, equal rights for 
women, and freedom and liberty or, you know, the basic British values. So I 
took a very strong view on that.
143
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Some within the Labour Party disagree, the most prominent being the former Home 
Secretary Jack Straw who was also interviewed for this research.
144
 The idea of the 
centrality of British values is not new to the Conservative Party. The community 
cohesion agenda emerged as a government discourse following the riots in Burnley 
and Bradford in 2001, and was the ‘new’ framework governing race relations policy 
in the UK.
145
 There was a  
veiled attempt to control those non-white communities designated a risk to 
Britishness because of their resistance to even more intrusive control. 
Moreover those targeted were expected to feel a sense of gratitude for 
receiving such attention.
146
  
Baroness Neville-Jones supports the hard-line approach that groups who espouse 
extremist ideology are a catalyst for future violence. ‘It is hard to see many people 
who have aspired to violence who don’t have extremist views.’147 According to 
Jackson, the assumption that there is a generic process, which leads from extremism 
to terrorism, is flawed. Individuals rarely follow a linear path from moderate to 
radical.   
Rather, everyone holds a variety of views at different times and places in their 
lives, on different subjects, which are usually a mix of “moderate”, “radical” or 
in the case of the many millions of conspiracy theorists, downright “loony”! 
Moreover, people’s viewpoints are continuously being revised through 
interaction with others and are always in a state of evolution.
148
 
The Prevent policy, nevertheless, embodies the notion that Islamism is related to 
terrorism.  
While such views appear to be more common amongst the public, only a third of the 
participants hold such hard-line views. Other politicians and practitioners, such as 
the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, argue that an open and more tolerable society 
towards ethnic minorities and other faith groups is needed.
149
 Both NPIA officials 
agree that groups such as Street and Active Way have done very good grass roots 
work, diverting individuals away from violent extremism.
150
 This is disputed by 
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numerous organisations.
151
 After the publication of the Review, and despite the 
effective work of groups such as Street, engagement with such groups was stopped 
because they were deemed to hold extreme views which were perceived to be 
opposed to the core ‘British values’ outlined in Prevent.152 Not all interviewees 
agreed.  
I think the very grass roots organisations that work with youth is a big mistake 
not to support them. ... They’re labelling them as ex-extremist groups or groups 
that are slightly dodgy and we are not going to fund them anymore, that is a 
huge mistake, because actually when you look at the portfolio of the work that 
they have done ... Organisations like that have a huge contribution to make.
153
 
A Home Office official, who argues that there should be no engagement with 
extremist groups at any level, did not share these sentiments. There are, he admits, 
certain circumstances where working with extremist groups may be beneficial, but 
this would certainly not work as a national strategy.
154
 Others, such as Lambert, point 
out that it is important to work with these extremist groups because they often have 
the best antidotes to violent extremism.
155
 Tensions remain between policymakers, 
politicians, civil servants, and researchers about whom to work with to effectively 
tackle extremism.  
5.7 Organisational tensions: An overview 
The police are central to Prevent. However, success relies on collaboration between 
different government agencies, an unnamed Cabinet Official states.
156
 Tensions arise 
between the performance-orientated facets of policy, and the facets of policy which 
encourage the breakdown of segment boundaries in pursuit of public service 
improvement.
157
 Within organisations exist different purposes, objectives, interests, 
and cultures. These distinct identities have been shaped by interactions within and 
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across these organisations.
158
 Institutions such as the police and the Home Office 
‘mould and constrain the actions and attitudes of individuals that constitute them’.159 
Generally, the policy process is not fluid and goes through different stages that are 
influenced by departmental culture, leading to potential tension between the different 
departments, policymakers, senior management, and frontline staff; Prevent is not an 
exception.
160
 The police, Sampson et al. note, are often enthusiastic proponents of 
the multi-agency approach, but usually prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum 
meetings, ignoring the multi-agency framework when it suits them.
161
 Organisational 
cultures create invisible boundaries between formal and informal groups.
162
 ‘This ... 
often leads to the creation of barriers that inhibit cross-functional collaboration and 
the implementation’163 of government-wide initiatives such as Prevent. These 
different organisational cultures may impact collaborative efforts in sensitive areas 
such as counterterrorism because organisational identities are reflected in the norms, 
values, mindset, and ethos of the organisations involved.
164
  
Prevention is a form of policing and is much broader than the service provided by 
the police.
165
 The concept of policing ‘lies between the fuzzy and rather nebulous 
concept of social control and the narrower definition of police work’.166 Despite the 
broad range of activities encompassed by policing, the public tends to have an 
‘intuitive notion of what the police are’.167 Rather, effective policing is carried out 
by numerous agencies working alongside the police.
168
 Aspects of policing and 
prevention within the CONTEST framework are devolved from the police to other 
agencies. According to Lord Carlile, it was inevitable that tensions and conflicts 
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would arise because the various departments have different roles and functions.
169
 A 
former DCLG minister states that 
you’re looking at different perspectives, mechanisms for operating across 
government, which I think are particularly poor, the way that we organise 
government is still in silos and it’s very departmentalised and if you think 
about Prevent, it should be involving virtually every government 
department.
170
  
A Home Office official points out that similar tensions and conflicts persist across all 
government departments, particularly when delivering cross-departmental 
projects.
171
 Lord Carlile states that there are also tensions between the Home Office, 
the Foreign Office, the Department of Health (DoH), and the Department of 
Education (DoE). Part of the Review focuses on integrating the latter two 
departments into the institutional structure of Prevent more effectively. The DoH has 
never been engaged in counterterrorism prevention.
172
 A police officer seconded to 
the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit confirms that there are tensions between the 
Department of Education and local authorities. Summing up these tensions, he states, 
‘I wouldn’t say that there are any particular conflicts or tensions, but there is the 
everyday stuff about working together’.173  
5.8 Organisational tensions: Should the police drive Prevent? 
The Home Office designed Prevent and is ultimately responsible for its delivery. The 
Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, a department of the Home Office, is the 
lead department and coordinates Pursue and Prevent efforts. Although other 
government departments and agencies have their own Prevent teams, overall control 
remains with the OSCT, which works in partnership with them and liaises ‘with local 
authorities on Prevent delivery and funding issues; [and] cooperate[s] with 
community groups of all kinds with Prevent interest.’174 Nevertheless, Prevent’s 
success is still tied to the collaborative efforts of the OSCT and its local and national 
partners. Since 2003, there has been pressure from the government and Parliament to 
improve Prevent’s integration into the CONTEST framework, neighbourhood 
policing, and local authorities’ approaches to crime prevention.175  
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Despite participants disagreeing on who should ultimately drive Prevent, there is a 
general consensus that the police are still the driving force behind this policy. 
Baroness Neville-Jones states that 
if the police don’t drive it actually, you don’t have the motor. I think they are 
the motor. ... They should be the motor because I don’t think that the motor 
will come from local authorities and it shouldn’t come from the security 
services. ... I don’t object to the police lead but I wouldn’t want to see it as 
being police dominated.
176
  
The interview data reveal that most interviewees see the police as the most qualified 
organisation to do Prevent work (ten out of fifteen), while some portray local 
authorities as incompetent or unwilling to take the lead (four out of ten).
177
 The 
general perception remains that the police should continue as the lead agency.
178
  
The Prevent Review acknowledges that  
the role of policing has been important in the development of Prevent to date. 
Prevent is not, however, a police programme and it must not become one: it 
depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of Government. Some 
changes to the police role in Prevent are essential to enhance confidence in the 
programme.
179
  
Sir Norman Bettison, giving evidence to the Communities and Local Government 
Select Committee, argues that he was  
very clear that if Prevent were left to the Police it would fail ... because the 
police have got to undertake the full gamut of the four Ps ... There is always the 
potential for those different responsibilities to get confused.
180
  
Thirteen of the fifteen participants agree that the police, despite being seen as the 
most qualified organisation, should not dominate Prevent. A former Inspector with 
HMIC states that  
Prevent is about community policing, it’s the only pillar of the 
counterterrorism strategy, which should be led by the local authorities and we 
should be playing a supporting part, so should probation, so should social 
services, so should education, everyone should be playing a supporting part. 
But it worked completely opposite, everything is usually police-led.
181
 
According to a police officer seconded to ACPO, the police, rather than being the 
lead agency, should be an equal partner and not ‘the loudest voice at the table. ... 
Prevent is about not getting the police involved, not making [individuals] into 
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criminals. It’s about dealing with them before they become criminals’.182 Despite 
this, police forces continue to fulfil Prevent coordination and engagement roles.
183
 
A police officer seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit highlights that police 
organisational and cultural barriers exist within the police service.  
Prevent has been an uphill battle, it’s been an uphill battle within the 
organisation itself as well as outside the organisation ... First introducing it 
within the police service getting them to acknowledge it ... that we need to do 
something about this, around preventative work. But then again it’s been the 
same uphill battle with partners outside, health, education, and again with the 
community because people are seeing Prevent linked to religion. ... We need to 
understand this, throughout the police service, throughout the outside 
organisations; Prevent is about safeguarding individuals from becoming 
radicalised.
184
  
Police culture is action-orientated and celebrates a macho culture which values crime 
detection and ‘thief taking, while devaluing preventative work as unglamorous’.185 
The ACPO officer further highlights tensions between the police and other Prevent 
partners such as the Departments of Education and Health. Negative attitudes 
towards Prevent, which was seen as a waste of time and money, are highlighted in 
informal conversations with police officers from three different forces. Although the 
police remain the driving force behind Prevent, there are problems motivating police 
officers and other partners to engage in Prevent work. Such attitudes may be 
counterproductive and have a negative impact on inter-agency collaboration.
186
  
5.9 Organisational tensions: Funding as a source of inter-
organisational tensions 
The allocation of funds represents another source of organisational tensions. 
Compared to CONTEST’s overall budget, the funding allocated to Prevent is 
meagre. How Prevent funding has been allocated in the past has been controversial 
and politically sensitive.
187
 Many interviewees raise concerns about this. A senior 
official at the NPIA points out that ‘in terms ... of joined up work around this, it was 
hampered … where the funding is really going to come from’.188 Tension over the 
use of Prevent funds extends beyond organisational tension. Project Champion, and 
other examples collected and published in a Policy Exchange report, illustrate this 
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point.
189
 Numerous media stories claim that Prevent funds are channelled into 
extremist anti-democratic Islamic groups,
190
 claims acted upon in the Review. 
Initially, grants were allocated to local authorities; these funds were not ring-fenced. 
Sir Norman Bettison argues that ‘money got in the way. The money was made 
available for Prevent and therefore it got distorted into activities that were a priority 
for the different councils’.191 This was in part possible because the objectives within 
Prevent were vague, allowing councils to spend Prevent funds on community 
cohesion and integration projects, which were often only loosely connected to 
counterterrorism.
192
 
The Labour government spent considerably more money on Prevent than the 
coalition government. In 2008/9, the Labour government allocated £140 million to 
Prevent.
193
 These funds were allocated according to demographics – ethnicity played 
a major role – and councils with a population of more than 2,000 Muslims received 
money.
194
 Groups such as the Institute of Race Relations and the Quilliam 
Foundation criticised this approach.
195
 The Review reallocates funds to twenty-five 
priority areas, which it claims are based on a process which aggregates information 
‘and policing indicators of terrorist activity to understand areas where Prevent work 
needs to be prioritised’.196 That said, the councils receiving Prevent funding remain 
largely the same. A former DCLG minister argues that the Prevent Review is a cover 
for budget cuts.
197
 Annual government spending on Prevent in 2010/11 shrunk to 
around £21 million,
198
 and £9.1 million in 2011/12.
199
 Over the same period 
(2011/12), DCLG’s annual accounts show that an additional £1.5 million, 
approximately, was spent on cohesion and integration. Additional money from the 
neighbourhood and localism budgets may have also gone towards integration and 
cohesion projects, though how much is unclear. It is unclear how much has been 
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spent on tackling extremism because this comes out of the three different budgets 
just mentioned, though the total is unlikely to exceed £2 million. Therefore, the total 
spent on Prevent could be around £11 million, which is significantly less than the 
amount spent on Prevent by the Labour government.
200
 Although Prevent funding 
has been cut, this is only in part due to the government’s austerity measures, a Home 
Office official has said.
201
  
Shortly after the publication of the Review, a former DCLG minister raised concerns 
about the separation of integration from Prevent.  
I think there will be much less funding, certainly from the communities 
department going into this work. ... The integration strategy will be quite 
minimal in terms of where it operates, what it does and what resources there 
are to do it. I am afraid that the Home Office end of Prevent will all be about 
security.
202
  
The Prime Minister’s views are that 
Prevent programmes must not assume control or allocate funding to integration 
projects, which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the 
government will not securitize its integration strategy.
203
  
The new integration strategy does not specify expenditure for tackling extremism, 
though it is significantly less than what was previously spent on Prevent. A Home 
Office official states that Prevent does not require the amount of funds needed for 
Pursue or Protect because it works with people, and requires very little expensive 
equipment or the funds needed for complex police investigations.
204
 With fewer 
funds and a shift towards localism, some services provided by local authorities are 
due to be replaced by services from voluntary and third sector organisations, with 
only some money coming from local authority grants.
205
 There is a perception 
amongst politicians and policymakers that with the devolution of integration to the 
DCLG, and more responsibility going to local councils, less money needs to come 
from the Home Office for Prevent and community cohesion projects.
206
  
The Review addresses two specific funding issues. The first concerns funding about 
projects based on their effectiveness and relationship to the counterterrorism 
objectives of Prevent. The second is a concern about funding ‘anti-democratic’ and 
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extremist groups.
207
 A Cabinet Office official states that due to a lack of effective 
oversight of Prevent programmes, many projects previously had a community 
cohesion or integration focus, rather than a counterterrorism one.
208
 In the early 
stages of Prevent, projects were set up and funded after consultations with 
communities ‘so we actually didn’t end up doing hard-core Prevent ... work. It was 
more around ... building capacity and resilience in communities’.209 Collaboration 
between the police and local authorities on how to spend Prevent money was partly 
what made Prevent innovative. According to a senior NPIA official, Labour’s 
Prevent policy produced some great projects such as the Street project in East 
London and the Active Change project, but many of these will not continue because 
they are perceived as not truly Prevent. ‘I think a lot of innovation has come from 
that and a lot of hope as well.’210 Baroness Neville-Jones, on the other hand, argues 
that due to a lack of guidance, ‘not only did you get some things ... which we regard 
as objectionable but you got an awful lot of money just wasted’.211 On the second 
point, criticisms were levelled at Prevent because it funded a number of 
organisations, such as Street, which were deemed extremist because of their religious 
and political views.
212
 As David Cameron made clear, even before the publication of 
the Review, such groups would not receive government money under his 
stewardship, whether through Prevent or from the DCLG.
213
  
Conservative, and even several Labour, politicians find it unacceptable to fund 
organisations which hold anti-democratic values.
214
 A senior NPIA official believes 
that doing so is a mistake ‘because actually when you look at the portfolio of the 
work that they have done ... Organisations like that have a huge contribution to 
make.’215 The NPIA official acknowledges that, at times, Prevent funds were used at 
events as platforms to promote non-violent extremism, rather than doing grass-roots 
preventative work. This is where he believes the line should be drawn. The issue of 
funding is critical and links to the question of Prevent’s aims. With less expenditure 
on community cohesion, the Prevent policy becomes ‘harder’ because it focuses 
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more on information sharing and Channel. The level of funding, and how it is spent, 
therefore has a direct impact on the direction of Prevent.    
5.10 Organisational tensions: National/local tensions  
Local authorities and the police carry out much of the Prevent agenda, working with 
affected communities.
216
 The Prevent policy, however, is driven by a set of national 
objectives as set out by central government. ‘The number one national objective is to 
have no terrorism and local activities are directed towards this.’217 The Review 
reaffirms the position taken by the Labour government that local communities are 
often in a better position than the government to tackle issues of extremism, and to 
challenge and even disrupt claims made by terrorist groups.
218
 According to the 
interview data, tensions arise because there is disagreement on how much freedom 
local authorities should be given, and whether central government objectives or local 
concerns should be prioritised throughout local Prevent delivery. 
According to Lord Carlile, Prevent and counterterrorism work is not about 
addressing local issues. Although local councils can be very skilful in bringing 
people together, Prevent is about achieving national rather than local objectives.   
There should be a clear national strategy so that we don’t have idiosyncratic 
local authorities going off on a frolic of their own ... which is not consistent 
with the national strategy. And for any local authority, for any volunteer 
organisation that is in doubt as to how they can play their part in national 
counterterrorism strategy, well there’s plenty of advice available. ... I think 
they should be given reasonable freedom. ... They would be very wise to obtain 
advice from central government if they think they are going to do something 
eccentric. I don’t think they should have the freedom to deal with extremists. It 
is unnecessary now.
219
 
The argument advanced by Lord Carlile suggests that there are reservations about 
certain local authorities, while recognising that they have an important part to play in 
achieving the national objectives of Prevent, but within certain parameters. Such a 
view is supported by eleven of the fifteen participants, although there is 
disagreement about how restrictive these parameters should be, with some arguing 
that local authorities should be given greater scope.
220
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Other interviewees and the Prevent Review support this view, arguing that ‘the 
Government’s commitment to localism will support the Prevent strategy’.221 
According to the Review, communities and local authorities continue to have a role 
within Prevent, but because of national security concerns, central government 
departments rather than local authorities should develop the policy. A senior Home 
Office Official acknowledges that there are tensions between the national and local 
level, particularly about the decision not to include far-right extremism, despite local 
authorities’ claims that it was a catalyst for community tensions. He further states 
that local leaders are often blinded by their local problems and do not grasp the 
whole picture because they are not privy to all the available intelligence.
222
 It is 
essential, he argues, that some local authorities are told what to do. Within Prevent, 
local discretion takes over unless there are wider national security concerns which 
cannot be dealt with at a local level. 
Sir Norman Bettison takes the opposite position, and states that Prevent is actually a 
comfortable bedfellow with neighbourhood policing. ‘You can’t have a Prevent 
strategy unless you’ve got a neighbourhood-policing infrastructure.’223 He believes 
that a national set of objectives are needed, but ‘how these are fulfilled and 
implemented needs to have a nuanced local understanding and feel’.224 Jones 
suggests that there is unwillingness within the police service to devolve crime-
fighting tasks to inexperienced local authorities.
225
 The interview data, however, 
suggest that the police are the strongest supporters of a multi-agency approach within 
Prevent, and want to include local authorities in Prevent work. A police officer 
seconded to the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit argues that the Prevent policy provides 
the guidelines. ‘The national strategies should just be basic guidelines to steer you in 
the right direction. But with Prevent, if you’ve got that national support, what more 
do you need?’226 Being new to the world of counterterrorism, local authorities should 
be able to access appropriate materials and guidance from central government 
departments, where needed.
227
 A civil servant at the DCLG argues that local 
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authorities should be given as much autonomy as possible, adapting Prevent to the 
needs of local communities, 
because that is where the local people live, that’s where the real issues happen 
and that is were real solutions will come from. However, if local authorities feel 
they need help from the centre that option should be given.
228
 
The former Home Secretary Jack Straw asserts that there is a very close day-to-day 
working relationship between the police, including the CTU, and the local authorities 
in regard to Prevent.
229
 
Successive governments have made it clear that communities are central to Prevent. 
Local knowledge is needed to set up appropriate programmes and target those 
vulnerable to extremism. If central government departments drive Prevent, one must 
assume that they possess some knowledge about target communities. Yet, a senior 
DCLG official states that amongst the central government departments there is 
‘absolutely zero knowledge’230 about local communities. This creates tensions 
between national and local authorities because both the local authorities and the 
police believe that it is important to include far-right extremism within the Prevent 
policy because this is seen as a catalyst for fermenting jihadi extremism.
231
 A lack of 
understanding of local issues also creates tensions. Other interviewees do not 
mention this lack of local knowledge or its associated tensions. However, academic 
literature suggests that a lack of community knowledge, in the form of external 
consultants carrying out community-mapping exercises, deprives both national and 
local authorities of crucial local knowledge.
232
  
At the local level, Prevent is organised along similar lines to the Crime Safety 
Partnerships (CSP). The Review envisages a local framework where ‘locally, Prevent 
work is accountable to the elected councillors and the new police and crime 
commissioners’.233 Local Prevent partners are familiar with this framework because it 
is often the same people who previously worked on local CSPs. 
You have all the range of partners, all of the emergency services, education, 
health, social services and youth services. ... They all have a part to play in that 
the solution is a joint decision, never a local authority making unilateral 
decisions.
234
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This supportive infrastructure is strongly orientated towards objectives similar to 
those of Prevent, such as crime prevention and harm reduction.
235
 As one of the police 
officers from the ACPO Prevent Delivery Unit states, decision making should be 
driven by partnerships instead of the police or local authority alone.
236
 This is because 
of the various skills and knowledge each partner organisation brings to the table. 
According to some interviewees, some local authorities have been overzealous, and 
have gone beyond the set boundaries of Prevent.
237
 A partnership approach, however, 
is vital to Prevent because it allows local authorities and the police to carry out work 
at the grass roots level of communities.
238
  
Despite the local infrastructure, tensions remain between national and local authorities 
regarding information sharing. ‘The nature of the work and the sensitivity became so 
confidential, in parts, that people weren’t sharing information properly’,239 and they 
were particularly unwilling to share such information with local authorities. 
Information sharing between agencies and departments has improved. ‘It is a lot better 
now than it was’ when Prevent was first launched.240 Some police forces are still 
reluctant to share information with their partners and the wider community. The 
Home Office claims that maximal information is shared with its local partners. Some 
of this information is shared through counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLP),
241
 
which provides those vetted within the local authorities and the police with 
intelligence about extremism in their communities. Many local authorities’ chief 
executives have received security clearance so that relevant intelligence can be 
shared.
242
 This is the case in Maybury. Some information is also shared with 
Independent Advisory Groups, community representatives who meet with the police 
‘to form a two way dialogue and provide opportunity to give feedback, advice and 
input into community perspectives on a range of local policing issues.’243 There are 
issues with this process because it relies on gatekeepers within the Muslim 
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communities, which according to a junior NPIA official are comprised of the  
usual sort of suspects. ... The sharing of information structures are there and 
they are good in terms of the structure and the relationships that they build but 
it’s the quality of what they are actually sharing and understanding, some of 
the community issues of what makes communities vulnerable to extremism.
244
 
Progress has been made, and the government has addressed some of the tensions 
with regard to information sharing, whereas other tensions between central 
government and local authorities remain generally unaddressed. Despite the Review’s 
claims, the shift towards localism has left local authorities with less say about how to 
implement Prevent in their areas. National oversight has been tightened, budgets cut, 
and the issues of extremism and integration have devolved to DCLG with little or no 
funding.  
5.11 Organisational tensions: Evaluation of Prevent 
According to HM Treasury: ‘All policies, programmes and projects should be subject 
to comprehensive but proportionate evaluation, where practicable to do so.’245 The 
Prevent Review acknowledges that the evaluation of preventative programmes is 
challenging because ‘success is often reflected in changing attitudes as much as 
behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure’.246 The aims and objectives of 
Prevent have been in flux over the last few years, change being the norm. As a 
relatively new policy, it has not settled and its aims and objectives are still changing 
– with the Review representing the latest shift. The Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee found that evaluation of Prevent is poor because its 
aims and objectives are unclear.
247
 The Review states that under the Labour 
government there was a lack of evaluation of Prevent programmes.  
The monitoring of Prevent projects has not been robust enough to justify the 
sums of public money spent on them. ... Unless there is evidence that they are 
effective and of value for money, projects will lose their funding.
248
 
According to Chelimsky, the purpose of evaluation is threefold: accountability, 
development, and increased knowledge.
249
 Without a clear purpose, evaluation 
cannot provide the answers to questions it is not designed to resolve and cannot, 
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therefore, reliably inform the policymaking process.
250
 If evaluation is done with a 
clear purpose, the outcome can inform the future development of policy as well as 
add to the knowledge base. Under the Labour government, an evaluation framework 
was in place, known as NI 35,
251
 although the Review claims that evaluation was 
neglected.
252
 The Review features a section on evaluation but fails to answer the 
question of what Prevent is evaluated against.
253
 Are the aims of Prevent to stop 
radicalisation and change hearts and minds, or are they about community cohesion? 
The latter can now be ruled out because community cohesion has been moved to the 
integration strategy by the Review. 
The interviewees agree that monitoring and evaluation for Prevent is difficult and 
underdeveloped. Baroness Neville-Jones states that evaluation of Prevent is very 
difficult, but needs to be done,
254
 a common ‘criticism being that it lacked a focus on 
outcomes and failed to provide a clear picture at national level of how Prevent 
money is being spent and whether it is providing value for money’.255 This goes back 
to the point made by Chelmisky: evaluation makes policy more accountable. The 
idea is that Prevent is sustainable over time. ‘The requirement to deliver Prevent 
quickly, combined with generous funding allocation, led to limited quality 
control.’256 A senior Home Office official states that more risk-based models need to 
be developed. He adds that it is better to try prevention and fail because it sends out 
the message that we are doing something.
257
  Prevent, the Home Office official says, 
is about doing something to reassure communities. De Graaf supports this position, 
arguing that the message communicated to the public is closely linked to levels of 
violence and radicalisation.
258
 ‘Consequently, public perceptions of government 
performance in addressing the threat and securing citizens can provide one measure 
of effectiveness of counterterrorism and terrorism prevention efforts.’259 
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Evaluation is important to improve any policy, and its importance is highlighted in 
the Review. Lord Carlile suggests that a PDA-type system, where participants are 
asked questions before and after the programme to provide a sense of how effective 
it has been, might be part of an evaluation solution.
260
 Such a solution may be part of 
a wider framework, but it is not a comprehensive solution for evaluating Prevent 
programmes. A junior official at the NPIA agrees, stating that more scrutiny and 
evaluation is needed because it is just not there.
261
 Lord Carlile argues that despite 
difficulties with assessing Prevent and Channel, there are ways and means to get a 
better picture of what is going on nationally.
262
 Accessing preventative 
counterterrorism projects, academics and professionals agree, is difficult.
263
  
If Prevent is about reducing extremism that leads to violence, this implies the need 
for understanding extremism and how it is linked to terrorism. The Review suggests 
that the Labour government’s use of the term ‘violent extremism’ was too broad and 
replaced it with ‘extremism’.264 This seems absurd because violent extremism, 
although problematic, actually has a much narrower focus than extremism per se. 
The Review argues that Prevent focuses on extremism leading to terrorism, whereas 
the integration strategy focuses on all other forms of extremism. Where the line is 
drawn between extremism and extremism leading to terrorism is not entirely clear, 
but the policy document suggests that the difference is that extremist Islamic 
ideology drives the latter.  
Good-quality evaluations can play important roles in setting and delivering on 
government priorities and objectives, demonstrating accountability, and 
providing defensible evidence to independent scrutiny processes. They also 
contribute valuable knowledge to the policy evidence base, feeding into future 
policy development and occupying a crucial role in the policy cycle. … 
 
Not evaluating, or evaluating poorly, will mean that policy makers will not be 
able to provide meaningful evidence in support of any claims they might wish 
to make about a policy’s effectiveness. Any such claims will be effectively 
unfounded.
265
 
This suggests that Prevent’s success, at least in part, relies on the understanding of 
the problem, and that evaluation is an essential part for future development of this 
policy.   
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5.12 Conclusion 
CONTEST and Prevent are innovative compared to previous counterterrorism 
strategies in terms of what they are trying to achieve – the prevention of terrorism. 
The majority of interviewees agree that Prevent, although innovative, is problematic 
and creates tensions on policy and organisational levels around issues such as how it 
should be set up to prevent individuals becoming radicalised; how and whom to 
engage with; how to tackle issues of extremism; and how to evaluate the policy 
project’s outcomes. As Prevent is relatively new, its scope has been constantly 
changing. Although there is a consensus amongst interviewees that prevention is 
important, there was no consensus about how to achieve it. More striking, 
interviewees disagree on the causes of extremism, and where and how extremism is 
linked to political violence. Withers comments that ‘there remains only a partial 
understanding of both the ideological dimension of the threat and the motivation of 
terrorists’, thereby supporting this argument.266 Prevent remains an uncomfortable 
bedfellow within the CONTEST framework, an issue that the Review attempts to 
address.  
Even after the Review, Prevent remains organised around Muslim communities in the 
UK on policy and organisational levels, creating and perpetuating tensions between 
central government, local councils, and Muslim communities. Those interviewed 
maintain that the policy is not designed to target Muslim communities per se, 
although some recognised that this was an inevitable outcome based on the threat 
which jihadi terrorism poses. The Review claims that it does not want to criminalise 
community cohesion, thereby separating work on extremism from Prevent. The 
Review represents a shift from broad secondary to focused secondary prevention and 
the identification of individuals, focusing primarily on those within Muslim 
communities at risk of radicalisation. The new process focuses more on information 
sharing between government agencies and local authorities rather than on community 
involvement and empowerment, and helping affected communities to deal with 
extremism. Whether this new approach will work remains to be seen. With sectarian 
divisions, a growing siege mentality amongst Muslim communities,
267
 and a Prevent 
policy which appears to focus more on surveillance and information sharing rather 
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than community empowerment, the notion of Prevent as a tool to spy on Muslim 
communities may persist in the future.   
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Chapter 6: Prevent and its local professional delivery 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters examined the national Prevent framework, its aims and scope, 
its set-up, and the conflicts and tensions that arise at national level. This chapter 
outlines how the national Prevent policy has been implemented in Maybury, the 
pseudonym given to the case study area in the North of England, between 2007 and 
2012 in terms of its governance and organisational structure, and includes the impact 
of the 2011 Prevent Review.
1
 Maybury’s local authorities have been involved in the 
Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) pilot since 2006, and Prevent since 2007.
2
 In 
2011, the Prevent Review designated Maybury a priority area, and the local 
authorities there continued to receive Prevent funding.
3
 One fifth of the population is 
Muslim with South Asian heritage. This case study relies on the data gathered from 
twenty interviews with local professionals such as senior managers of the local 
authority, senior police officers, front line council staff, police, and voluntary and 
private sector professionals involved in delivering Prevent.  
This chapter is structured similarly to the previous chapter and focuses first on policy 
and organisational tensions which were identified earlier, but examines them from 
the perspective of the local professionals and in the context of Prevent's local 
delivery in Maybury. Initially, this chapter examines policy tensions. The data 
suggest that there are tensions between the local and national levels in terms of the 
direction Prevent is moving towards – from community cohesion to Channel-like 
interventions which focus solely on Muslim communities. A further issue raised is 
the exclusion of far-right extremism by the Prevent Review, something that is 
regarded as important locally, but rejected nationally. The second part of this chapter 
focuses on organisational tensions which include a perception that there is a lack of 
information sharing between the Home Office, the police, and the local authorities in 
Maybury. This chapter argues that this has undermined the trust that Maybury’s 
Muslim communities have in the police and the local authorities. The chapter closes 
by examining pressures associated with the funding and evaluation of Prevent 
projects, and perceptions of success or failure of the Prevent policy in Maybury. 
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6.2 Delivering Prevent in Maybury  
Maybury Council has been delivering Prevent programmes since 2007, and was 
continuing to do so at the time of writing in 2012. The programmes include 
‘Channel’, and a number of community cohesion projects which focus on awareness-
raising and interfaith programmes. These programmes are discussed at length later in 
the chapter. This section highlights how Prevent has evolved in Maybury during 
2007-11. The findings are based on interviews with local professionals, documents 
provided by the council, and documents obtained through a number of Freedom of 
Information requests.
4
 Documents include the local authority’s Prevent delivery 
plan, and its revised version which complies with the requirements of the Prevent 
Review. Overall responsibility for delivering CONTEST, including Prevent, in the 
county lies with the county’s CONTEST board. Members of the board include senior 
managers from the local authorities and police. According to Maybury Council’s 
chief executive officer,
5
 the CONTEST board devolved Prevent’s delivery to local 
authorities’ community safety partnerships through its local councils’ chief 
executives. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Maybury is a mill town in the North of England and has 
one of the highest proportions of BME communities in the UK. The majority of these 
communities are from South Asia with links to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. 
Over the years, there have been a number of incidents in the Maybury area which 
could suggest that pockets of jihadi extremism exist there. At the same time, the data 
does not suggest that extremism is common. In 2009, a number of individuals in the 
Maybury area were arrested on suspicion of terrorism-related offences.
6
  All were 
later released without charge. This incident, more so than any other terrorism-related 
arrest in the area, appears to have affected Maybury’s Muslim communities and has 
led to Maybury’s Council of Mosques disengaging with Prevent. Throughout the 
interviews, local professionals and members from Maybury’s Muslim communities 
refer to this particular incident as a turning point in the relationship between the local 
authorities and Muslim communities in Maybury.  
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6.2.1 Delivering Prevent in Maybury, 2008-2011 
In 2008, Maybury council drew up a Prevent delivery plan which included staffing 
the community safety team to coordinate, implement, monitor, and review the 
delivery of Prevent.
7
 Maybury’s Prevent policy documents provide a very brief 
overview of the national Prevent strategy and sketch out the local socio-economic 
issues faced by the local authorities. Little in-depth detail about how the national 
objectives are to be translated into a local strategy is present. The excerpts below are 
the most substantive two bullet points about how implementation is to be achieved.  
We aim to reflect the national strategy and meet local need through a 
programme that is proportionate, based on best practice and evidence, effective 
and financially sustainable. … Our approach is based on a prevention model of 
community, targeted and specialist interventions.
8
   
Through in-depth interviews and other documents provided, the local Prevent 
programme could be pieced together. Much of the Prevent work in Maybury is 
delivered by the various organisations shown in Figure 6.1. Following a public 
tendering process, the successful programmes are delivered by the police, the local 
council, charities, private sector organisations, and community groups. It is worth 
noting that only seven of the twenty local professionals and providers of Prevent 
programmes had read the full Prevent policy document. During one of the 
interviews, the researcher was asked to summarise Prevent and the Prevent Review 
to save the participant having to read the document. This suggests that information 
about Prevent is either gathered through media representations and/or hearsay from 
colleagues about what Prevent aims to do. As will be shown later, the majority of the 
programmes delivered community cohesion, community engagement, and interfaith 
or awareness-raising related content. Work carried out by these organisations was 
originally overseen and evaluated by the community safety team, and later by the 
council's Prevent lead.  
From 2010 to 2011, a police officer was seconded to the community safety team and 
assigned to coordinate the delivery of Prevent within the council. After a short 
period, this individual became the lead officer for Prevent.
9
 In mid-2011, Maybury 
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council established a dedicated post embedded within the community safety team to 
coordinate and monitor Prevent’s local delivery and to liaise with other Prevent 
partners both nationally and locally.
10
 Figure 6.1 shows the organisational structure 
of Prevent in Maybury.    
 
Figure 6.1 
Prevent organisational structure in Maybury between 2007 and 2011. 
 
Source: Maybury ‘Prevent Implementation Plan’.  Obtained through a FOI request. 
Details anonymised. 
Prevent’s organisational structure draws upon the already established community 
safety partnership (CSP) which was formed as a ‘result of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998, which placed a duty on local services such as the police, council, Fire 
Service, Children’s Services, Housing, and Probation to work together to reduce 
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crime’.11  This multi-agency approach to Prevent is reflected in Figure 6.1. The 
community safety team, a member of the CSP, is central to the delivery of Prevent, 
coordinating and monitoring Prevent activities and the distribution of its funds in 
consultation with other CSP partners such as the police, the probation service, and 
the voluntary and private sectors. Its aims are to embed Prevent’s delivery ‘through 
an effective programme of action across the borough’.12 Between 2008 and 2011, the 
police also received separate funding from the Home Office. This was ring-fenced 
for dedicated Prevent staff such as community engagement officers and a Channel 
inspector.
13
 
Prior to 2008, Maybury council had been involved in delivering the PVE pathfinder 
programme. Between 2008 and 2011, the community safety team invited statutory, 
voluntary, and private sector organisations to bid for and deliver Prevent projects. 
These projects were funded through a non-ring-fenced area grant provided by 
DCLG.
14
 Between 2007 and 2011, the community safety team approved thirty-eight 
programmes which appeared to meet the five Prevent objectives outlined in the 
Prevent policy.
15
 As these funds were not ring-fenced, Maybury Council had 
considerable freedom to allocate them. The council claims that it engaged in a 
‘clearly tasked strategic partnership with the police and other partners to deliver an 
effective programme of action’ in the area,16 working within the national Prevent 
framework. The council further claims that it was able to respond to the needs of the 
local communities, delivering multi-agency interventions appropriate to the level of 
threat within the locality. As documented by the media, the lack of national oversight 
allowed local authorities across the UK to exploit these funds for loosely connected 
projects.
17
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6.2.2 The 2008 Prevent delivery plan 
The purpose of the 2008 Prevent delivery plan was to ‘ensure that in conjunction 
with local partnerships ... the delivery of a jointly agreed programme of action’ was 
driven forward.
18
 The plan stated that    
there will be effective collaboration with the [police] and the [Counter-
Terrorism] hub and Government Offices in the use of intelligence to inform 
different Prevent strategies and interventions.
19
  
This delivery plan centred on the five objectives outlined in the 2009 CONTEST 
strategy. These were 
to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream 
voices; disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places 
where they operate;  support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or 
have already been recruited by violent extremists; increase resilience of 
communities to violent extremism; and address grievances which ideologues are 
exploiting.
20
 
Other objectives included developing Prevent-related intelligence analysis and 
research, and improving strategic communications. Where appropriate, Prevent 
programmes included joint interventions to identify vulnerable individuals and 
provide support, disrupt individuals promoting violent extremism, work with 
institutions where individuals could be promoting violent extremism, and work with 
communities vulnerable to violent extremism. 
From 2008 to the end of 2010, central government measured Prevent and the 
progress of local authorities through national indicator 35 (NI 35). The purpose of 
this national assessment framework was to evaluate Prevent’s effectiveness. The 
indicator was based on four main criteria. These were: 
Understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities; knowledge and 
understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism and the Prevent 
objectives; development of a risk-based preventing violent extremism action 
plan, in support of the delivery of the Prevent objectives; effective oversight, 
delivery and evaluation of projects and actions.
21
 
After the removal of this indicator in November 2010, the government failed to 
replace the assessment with an alternative framework. Even after the publication of 
the Prevent Review, which bemoans the lack of evaluation and national oversight of 
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local Prevent projects,
22
 the coalition government has not introduced a new 
assessment framework up to the present time.    
In Maybury, the CONTEST steering group was given responsibility to evaluate 
Prevent projects
23
 and assess their local delivery in accordance with NI 35. This task, 
carried out by members of the community safety team, became part of the steering 
group’s responsibilities. They were engaged on a strategic level with neighbourhood 
engagement projects, developing internal and external Prevent community strategies, 
and also with ‘a CT specific group of independent advisors to ensure that 
information from minority communities [helped] to direct [the councils] approaches 
to communication’.24 The role of the CONTEST advisory group, also included in 
Figure 6.1, was to work with the voluntary, community, and faith sectors to develop 
and carry out the CSP’s Prevent communication strategy. The community safety 
team worked closely with its CSP partners, and particularly with the dedicated 
Prevent team from the police and its regional counterterrorism intelligence units, to 
coordinate Prevent activities. 
The data suggest that basing the Prevent delivery on the already established CSP 
framework worked well in Maybury because it drew on the knowledge and skills of 
individuals who had already worked in a multi-agency environment. One of the 
police community engagement officers stated that the majority of individuals 
working on Prevent had had previous experience of community policing and inter-
agency work.
25
 These experiences appear to have improved cooperation and 
information sharing.  
6.2.3 The impact of the Prevent Review on Maybury 
The Prevent Review lists twenty-five priority areas, one of which is Maybury. 
Maybury’s local authorities revised their Prevent delivery plan in 2011 to meet the 
new criteria as outlined in the Prevent Review. These amended objectives are 
reflected in the Maybury Prevent delivery plan and are: challenging extremist 
ideology, supporting individuals, and supporting work with institutions in the 
voluntary and private sector.
26
 Maybury’s revised policy document is much clearer 
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about its aims and objectives, which are analysed below. A clearer distinction is 
made between Prevent work and wider community cohesion and integration work.
27
 
The community safety team manager states that since the Review there have been 
some minor organisational changes but failed to explain what they are.
28
 Apart from 
these changes, the new Prevent delivery plan, as well as the governance and 
organisational structures, remain basically the same. They are built ‘on our 
experience of previous Prevent work within the [council area, aligning] our approach 
to the new strategy’, the document states.29 According to this plan, the county 
CONTEST board still oversees Prevent’s delivery, while delivery within the council 
is devolved to the Prevent forum, which ‘coordinates all the work of the … partners 
on the Prevent agenda’.30 It is unclear who sits on this forum; however, the council’s 
Prevent lead continues to have a prominent role in the delivery of the strategy.   
The Review ushered in significant changes, some of which are reflected in 
Maybury’s Prevent delivery plan. First, the Review changed the way Prevent was 
funded locally. The DCLG area-based grant was replaced with a system whereby a 
designated individual submits project proposals on behalf of the local authorities to 
the Home Office’s OSCT.31 This may explain the lack of a national assessment 
framework. However, there remains a lack of post-project evaluation. Second, the 
local strategy reflects the national shift from a community-orientated towards a 
sector-orientated approach. This means an expansion of institutions engaged in 
delivering Prevent to help the authorities identify vulnerable individuals and 
organisations. Surprisingly, Maybury’s Prevent delivery plans remain relatively quiet 
about who these new partners might be, although the local health and education 
sectors are mentioned. This expansion may have worrying ramifications for Muslim 
communities, and may increase the perception that Prevent is about spying on 
them.
32
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6.2.4 The 2011 Prevent delivery plan 
Local delivery is broken down into three national Prevent objectives and three 
prevention levels; the latter are specialised, targeted, and community interventions.
33
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the local Prevent objectives. The Challenge Ideology objective 
encapsulates central government’s agenda that there ‘should be no ungoverned 
spaces in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenges, and where 
appropriate, by legal intervention’.34 The Review and the local delivery strategy seem 
to suggest that local institutions and places of worship need to be regulated and 
monitored. The community interventions listed in the local delivery plan include the 
development of a local communication plan and the delivery of ACT NOW, an 
awareness-raising programme. The second strand in the local delivery plan, 
Supporting Individuals, is about identifying vulnerable individuals and using 
Channel to implement appropriate interventions. The final objective, Sector and 
Institutions, deals with the engagement with institutions in the private and voluntary 
sectors to monitor and regulate local institutions and public places of worship. 
Community interventions include Internet awareness campaigns and training faith 
leaders.  
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Figure 6.2 
Maybury’s revised Prevent objectives  
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Following the Review, the content of the local Prevent delivery changed 
dramatically. In line with central government’s Prevent policy, most community 
cohesion work moved away from it. Unlike the national Prevent policy, the local 
strategy attempts to highlight that the threat of extremism does not come solely from 
Muslim communities. With this in mind, the strategy refers, albeit fleetingly, to far-
right extremism. This reflects a concern raised by many of those interviewed for this 
study. Unlike the national policy, which ignores far-right extremism, the local 
Prevent policy attempts to be as inclusive as possible within the restraints given by 
central government.  
The document also lists a number of other significant threats and vulnerabilities. 
These include economic deprivation, the use of the Internet to access motivational 
extremist websites, the use of legitimate charitable fundraising to fund extremism, 
the increased profile of far-right extremism, and vulnerabilities within the family 
setting. As there is still confusion about Prevent’s objectives, the revised plan 
acknowledges that more needs to be done to explain its benefits to individuals and 
communities. The document further states that Maybury Council faces the ongoing 
challenge of working in partnership to implement a local strategy to win community 
support and engagement.
35
 
 
6.3 Outlining national/local tensions 
Policy and organisational tensions are not confined to the national level; similar 
themes reoccur at the local professional level. This section outlines the main frictions 
between the Prevent policy and its local implementation. The tensions identified 
concern policy content, particularly about whether Prevent should focus more on 
community cohesion, with Channel attached, or narrow secondary prevention and 
the identification of those engaged or vulnerable to jihadi extremism. The second 
category, organisational tensions, identifies inter and intra organisational tensions 
that affect the local delivery of Prevent. There is some overlap between them.   
6.3.1 Policy tensions 
Since the coalition government assumed power, Maybury’s local professionals have 
become increasingly concerned about the way Prevent is taking shape. Policy 
tensions mainly centre on whether community cohesion and addressing grievances 
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should play a role within the local and national Prevent framework or not.
36
 One 
would have expected a similar debate between local professionals. The data, 
however, show that the majority, seventeen of the twenty participants, believe that 
community cohesion is an essential part of Prevent alongside aspects of safeguarding 
those vulnerable to extremism per se. When interviewed about the changes brought 
in by the Prevent Review, Maybury’s community safety manager stated: ‘We were 
surprised actually when the national strategy came out … We don’t agree with the 
current scenario.’37 This view resonates with the statements made by a number of 
national policymakers such as Sir Norman Bettison, the ACPO Prevent lead, who 
states that ‘the central ethos of [the] Prevent strand is safeguarding – not spying or 
demonising, but simply seeking to protect the vulnerable’.38 (Nine of the fifteen 
national professionals agree with this).   
Although local professionals mainly agree (fifteen of the twenty participants) that the 
New Labour Prevent strategy was flawed and to some degree tainted, there remains a 
sense of ambiguity about the Prevent Review and how it is meant to achieve its stated 
objective. There appears to be considerable tension between the view of the 
government and local professionals in Maybury about the removal of community 
cohesion from Prevent. The view that aspects of community cohesion should remain 
part of Prevent is not only held by local authority officials, but also by front line and 
senior police officers. The area commander, a superintendent with the police, states 
that  
the emphasis ought to be on community cohesion and creating cohesive 
communities by concentrating on those things that fracture communities such as 
the presence of hate crime, low cost housing, poverty, etcetera, etcetera and the 
reason for that is, because these ... create the conditions that may alienate some 
people into extremism.
39
  
Maybury’s chief executive expresses similar views, arguing that Prevent and the 
social cohesion agenda are all part of the same continuum, and that the changes made 
by the Prevent Review are a concern because they focus Prevent entirely on Al 
Qaeda. ‘I think it will turn negative’, the local council's chief executive remarks.40 
Six other local practitioners express similar views and concerns. 
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The obligation to obey the law and to work with the authorities is linked ‘to the 
quality of the rules and the integrity of their administration’.41 The general 
perception amongst local professionals is that isolating Muslim communities 
achieves the opposite (seventeen of the twenty local professionals agree),
42
 fostering 
distrust and reinforcing ethnic stereotypes within the communities, and negatively 
affecting social interactions between affected communities and the local 
authorities.
43
 A police inspector, who is also the police force Prevent lead, expresses 
her concerns about the Prevent Review by stating that Al Qaeda and its affiliated 
ideologies are a significant threat,
44
 but there is no need to keep   
banging on about Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda. People get cheesed. All they 
have to do is make one significant statement that at the moment Al Qaeda 
remains the most significant threat. You don’t have to go all the way through it. 
... It is more of a political statement, to think about one government divorcing 
itself from a strategy. ... In terms of direction, three-quarters of that document is 
about slagging off the previous government, and that might be great for politics 
but it isn’t any good for safeguarding our communities. Well, that’s political, 
I’m sorry [but] that’s not leading agencies and partners in a way forward.45 
This analysis of the Prevent Review resonates with the views of sixteen of the twenty 
local professionals who are concerned that central government, rather than listening 
to their concerns, is more concerned with distancing itself from previous Labour 
policies.
46
 At the same time, few (only five of the twenty participants) have read the 
2009 Prevent policy, or the 2011 Prevent Review. There is broad agreement amongst 
local professionals that community cohesion must form part of any successful 
Prevent strategy in the future. They feel concerned about the negative media 
attention it has attracted, and how it has developed under the coalition government, 
particularly in terms of targeting Muslim communities.  
Our work is around Al Qaeda inspired terrorism … That’s where we’re at. 
However, that’s not to say that we won’t look at the far right, the Irish, and I 
think that’s how we’ve won quite a lot of battles really. It’s the national pressure 
from the national media that people read because that just reinforces everything 
we’re trying to break down.47 
All the local policymakers and front line staff interviewed agree that Prevent should 
be about primary prevention, community engagement, and safeguarding. 
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The support for the inclusion of primary prevention and community engagement not 
only comes from local authorities, who some argue are just protecting their own 
interests, but also from all national and local junior and senior police officers 
interviewed. This national/local policy conflict is about fundamental disagreements 
between local professionals and official government policy. The local professionals 
in Maybury are concerned about the negative side effects that the new Prevent 
policy, a policy that seems to ignore all other forms of extremism except jihadi 
extremism, may have on local Muslim communities in Maybury. Despite the sense 
of ambiguity about the Prevent Review in particular, there remains the resolve that 
something needs to be done about extremism within communities, whether jihadi or 
far-right extremism. These policy tensions run throughout all of the issues discussed 
in the remainder of this chapter. 
6.3.2 Organisational tensions 
The previous chapter identified organisational tensions which include tensions 
between national and local authorities. Thomas and Grindle state that strains between 
bureaucracy and the executive are inevitable as players compete over preferred 
options and use the resources available to them – for example, hierarchy, control 
over information, and access to key decision makers – to achieve their goals. 
‘Decision makers assume that fate or implementation managers will take care of 
carrying out the desired changes and that there is little reason for a specific 
implementation strategy.’48 The Prevent Review emulates a top down approach, but 
is vague about the local governance of Prevent while removing some of the freedoms 
granted to local councils by the Labour government. The Review fails to consider the 
policy process and Anderson’s argument that policy has the tendency to be ‘made as 
it [is] being administered and administered as it [is] being made’.49 The removal of 
NI 35 in November 2010 suggests that local resistance against this assessment 
framework has been successful to some degree. The Review otherwise signifies a 
shift towards centralisation and more national oversight by the government.
50
  
On the other hand, many policymakers, and those involved in the national delivery of 
Prevent, feel that the Labour government accorded too much freedom to local 
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authorities to deliver Prevent within the broad confines of the NI 35 framework.
51
 
Between 2008 and 2011, the media released a number of stories claiming that local 
authorities had misspent Prevent funds on unrelated community cohesion projects.
52
 
The Communities and Local Government Select Committee notes that although 
community cohesion and Prevent are linked, and that extremism appears to be more 
isolated in cohesive communities, there is a need to separate Prevent activities from 
most community cohesion work.
53
 Throughout its lifetime, and particularly after the 
Review, there has been confusion about Prevent’s content and purpose. This 
confusion has affected Prevent’s local delivery. The community safety manager 
stated that: 
I don’t think the actual government agrees with itself on some of these counts. I 
think … Whitehall, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Justice … all have 
different views about what should be done, … [we] have different views about 
what should be done and how it should be run which doesn’t make it any easier 
for us, it has to be said. … However, we will do the best with what we’re given 
and we will deliver what’s been asked of us, but we’ll try to do it in a way that 
we feel [will bring] a good result locally.
54 
 
This statement points to two things: (1) that there remains a perception of ambiguity 
amongst local professionals about what the Prevent objectives are, and how to 
achieve them locally; and (2) it highlights the main organisational tensions, which 
are about access to information and how much freedom local authorities should have 
in dealing with related local problems such as right-wing extremism.
55
 
The Prevent Review denies local authorities this freedom to deal with far-right 
extremism. From 2011 until now, all Prevent projects have had to be submitted to the 
Home Office for approval and funding.
56
 Since the election of the coalition 
government, Maybury’s local authorities have been repeatedly directed by the Home 
Office not to target right-wing extremism under the Prevent umbrella.
57
 Specifically, 
the tension is about how much freedom to give to the local authorities to allow them 
to deal with local issues around extremism per se. Because terrorism is seen as a 
national security issue, the Prevent policy is developed and controlled by central 
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government, which separates community cohesion work from tackling extremism per 
se, with the exception of jihadi extremism.
58
 A few national policymakers, such as 
Lord Carlile, favour this move (five of the fifteen national interviewees share this 
view).
59
 Prior to the Review, local authorities in Maybury were satisfied with the 
amount of freedom granted to them under the Labour government’s Prevent strategy, 
a view which shifted after the coalition government took over. Interviewees perceive 
the coalition government as apathetic towards the concerns of local authorities, and 
determined to target Muslim communities despite their concerns.  
6.4 Policy tensions: Delivering community cohesion or 
counterterrorism prevention in Maybury 
Part of the previous chapter examined the tensions between community cohesion and 
Prevent's focus on counterterrorism.
60
 The coalition government, and groups such as 
the TaxPayers' Alliance, argue that ‘funding projects carried out by community 
groups is a method that is doomed to failure’. 61 They further claim that ‘skilled 
policing and robust intelligence are the most effective ways of tackling violent 
extremism’.62 Such views are supported by several of those interviewed nationally, 
although there are a number of opponents. In Maybury, the commonly held 
perception is that community cohesion is ‘key in allowing discussions to take place 
between people who have different ideas, different philosophies, different thoughts 
on life, and so on and so forth.’63  
6.4.1 Delivering Prevent in Maybury – a community cohesion exercise 
Data indicate that prior to the Prevent Review, Prevent's delivery in Maybury 
focused on community cohesion. This is reflected in the types of programme funded 
by the CSP since 2007. A document obtained through a Freedom of Information 
request shows that between 2007 and 2011, forty-three programmes were 
commissioned and delivered in Maybury alone. Aside from Channel, only three 
programmes were aimed at direct interventions, targeting specific behaviour, groups, 
and individuals.  One of the programmes funded in the period from 2007 to 2009 is 
described as follows:  
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The Youth Offending Team provided appropriate interventions, including spot 
purchasing of specialist services as required, to identify vulnerable young people 
diverting them from extremist influence by building resilience and linking them 
to the appropriate services.
64
  
This programme was not exclusively focused on jihadi extremism. Maybury’s chief 
executive stated that  
we’ve always focused on right-wing extremism as well as Muslim, Al Qaeda 
inspired terrorism. So we had a more even-handed approach, which has actually, 
I think, convinced people that it is violence we’re against, not Muslim radicalism 
or any other sort of radicalism. It’s the violence, whether it be right-wing 
violence or violence that’s Al-Qaeda inspired.65  
Figure 6.3 provides some data about the interventions run in Maybury. Some argue 
that right-wing extremist groups in Maybury, such as the EDL, are stoking jihadi 
extremism and vice versa.
66
 Media reports suggest that the EDL is deliberately 
stirring up trouble nationally,
67
 but also in the Maybury area. There have been a 
number of EDL demonstrations in Maybury, and a member of the EDL was jailed 
for attacking a local politician.
68
 Over recent years, members of the EDL have 
skilfully used the conviction of a number of Asian men in the area as propaganda for 
their cause. Some incidents involved violence.
69
  Tommy Robinson, founder of the 
EDL, tweeted that they would be screening an anti-Islamic film
70
 which has already 
led to riots and civil unrest across the Middle East.
71
  
In 2010/2011, the only other direct intervention programme aside from Channel 
focused solely on working with  
individuals at risk or involved in extreme right-wing activity. The project used 
experienced and qualified mediators and offered a two-stage intervention to 
explore grievances and empower individuals to make positive choices. 
72
  
Other programmes focused on community cohesion and awareness-raising. 
Programmes, many of which were delivered by community engagement officers, 
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included interfaith forums, roadshows, discussion groups, and Internet awareness. 
The programme described below had only tenuous links to Prevent objectives. It was 
designed to  
tackle underachievement of Pakistani boys (Year 9 who are underachieving and 
displaying challenging behaviours at home and in the community) in secular 
(GCSE) education by means of a Pakistani achievement forum/study centre.
73
 
Another programme aimed to establish a forum for mosque committee members and 
scholars to identify workshops needed to improve community leadership.  
Figure 6.3 
Purpose of Prevent funded programmes in Maybury between 2007-11  
   Community cohesion, awareness-
raising or myth-busting 
Direct interventions 
2007/8  6 1 
2008/9  8 1 
2009/10  6 0 
2010/11  20 1 
Total 43* 40 3 
*Channel was not counted in these numbers, but ran alongside the above programmes. 
Source: Data obtained through a FOI request to Maybury Council  
Other programmes such as ACT NOW, an interactive counterterrorism exercise 
which provides communities with an insight into ‘how police officers make 
decisions in the event of a terrorist incident’,74 were run annually. Other 
programmes, such as an animation project, were aimed at ‘primary schoolchildren, to 
explore sensitive issues and vulnerabilities in very simple terms’.75 One cannot fail to 
notice that the majority of these projects had a mostly primary prevention focus. The 
document provided under the Freedom of Information Act reads like a catalogue of 
community cohesion projects, many of which are only vaguely linked to the aims 
and objectives of Prevent. 
The Prevent lead at the local police authority reiterates a point made in a 2006 
Demos report, stating that ‘a lot of work has been around cohesion work activities. 
Doing activities that bring communities back together – that’s one element ... The 
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other element is also massively engaging communities’.76 One of the central 
conclusions of the Demos Report was that  
communities offer important sources of information and intelligence; they are 
our own in-built early warning system. … The police and the security services 
cannot act without the consent of the communities they are there to protect.
77
 
This argument goes back to the issue of policing and government legitimacy, and the 
building of trust between state authorities and communities.
78
 Local professionals see 
Prevent as a tool to engage with vulnerable communities to increase levels of trust 
between communities and the local authorities; this is regarded as one of the central 
arguments for including community cohesion work in Prevent. Such an attitude 
towards Prevent’s perceived purpose demonstrates how local delivery can affect and 
alter the policy in practice.  
6.4.2 Policy tensions between the local authorities and the national Prevent 
policy 
The previous section highlighted a fundamental shift within the Prevent policy which 
took it away from community cohesion. It also highlighted that much of the Prevent 
work in Maybury has been based on community cohesion. The debate about whether 
or not to include community cohesion has been going on for quite some time, even 
prior to the Review. One would therefore have expected a similar debate between 
local authority staff and the police throughout the UK. However, the interview data 
show that this is not the case in Maybury. Rather, the local/national tensions are 
based on a fundamental disagreement, with local professionals believing that 
community cohesion should be a central part of Prevent work there. This relates back 
to a point made in 6.4.1 that local perceptions and skill sets have altered how the 
policy is delivered in Maybury, deviating from the national Prevent policy. This 
disagreement at policy level has affected the organisational set-up and its delivery in 
Maybury. The police area commander states that  
you know some of the governments [have] said, … you’ve got to more or less 
say something isn’t a community cohesion initiative … [and is] purely a Prevent 
initiative to get the funding, and I actually think divorcing Prevent from 
community cohesion is the wrong thing to do.
79
 
Aspects of community cohesion receive negative media attention, and consequently 
the Review removed these aspects from local Prevent implementation. Prior to the 
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Review, Prevent had an integration and cohesion focus. ‘Since the Review, that’s 
changed. The focus is very much now on counterterrorism activity.’80 ‘Security is 
always delivered through consent, never through force. … Sustaining this … over the 
long term will only be possible if the police secure active consent from the 
community.’81  
A report commissioned by Maybury Council, based on focus groups in the 
community, has found that Prevent’s focus on Muslim communities is  
very divisive and has alienated members of communities that the agencies need 
to work with. Specifically, there is a sense that the Prevent agenda is 
stigmatised, and that agencies need to move away from the label and address the 
issues.
82
 
All of the local professionals interviewed agree that focusing entirely on Muslim 
communities, using overt and covert surveillance, only fosters distrust, and 
reinforces itself through the social interactions of individuals and communities 
alike.
83
 They agree that without the trust and support of these communities, it is 
much more difficult to prevent the spread of extremism.
84
  
The police Prevent inspector states that tackling grievances and prevention are 
intrinsically linked.  
It is all right to say we will separate the two, but we can’t work in solo. … We 
don’t see it as a massive issue for us, because locally we think we know the 
issues are local and we do think we can pick it up, but we think it would be 
better if there were some clear guidance from the top.
85
  
The above comment highlights a general feeling amongst local Maybury 
professionals that they know what the local issues are. The local police authority lead 
agrees that the Prevent strategy should be about engaging communities and 
identifying individuals at risk through a partnership approach, and challenging their 
extremist values. At the same time, she believes that Prevent does not go far enough. 
She argues that Prevent has fallen in the usual trap by focusing heavily  
on men in the community … and women have not been involved in [the] degree 
that they should have been. … The kids themselves haven’t been involved. 
Young people can influence other young people. There are good examples of 
how that happened. You have good young people and bad young people but that 
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peer pressure can help … if that’s supported, it does need some support from the 
organisations.
86
 
The idea of being more inclusive and extending the reach of Prevent is seen as 
controversial. Kundnani argues that this only extends the state’s ability to spy on 
Muslim communities.
87
  
The guiding principle behind the local approach in Maybury is encapsulated by a 
comment made by the police Prevent inspector: 
We … almost tried to disengage from the … national view on Prevent and 
deliver it locally which didn’t make it so much around specifically … terrorism 
and more about wider cohesion and integration; and used that almost as a banner 
for delivery so you are better able to engage with people across [Maybury] and 
also pick out individuals you consider to be at risk with the views that they have 
and not work with them and single them out for the police to come crashing 
through the window … but more in a way that they can have forums to discuss 
their view and it can be challenged by their own peers and their own 
communities and residents and people living in [Maybury] so creating that 
dialogue element.
88
 
The Prevent Review makes the coalition government’s intentions clear, separating 
community cohesion from more focused Prevent work. This is not a position shared 
by local professionals in Maybury (none of the participants share this view). One 
interviewee states that 
Unless you deal with the grievance, and that’s where we had some success, you 
cannot divorce the grievance from the reality of what manifests itself in pursue 
terms, and we need that confidence that the government really understands that. 
We’re not convinced that they do.89 
This section demonstrates that tensions between national policy and local 
practitioners have led to alterations to the local Prevent policy in Maybury, deviating 
from the national objectives and adapting it to local needs.   
6.5 Policy tensions: Reactions to the allegations of spying and 
targeting Muslim communities 
A report commissioned by Maybury Council states that the language used around 
Prevent, extremism, and counterterrorism has generally been  
very divisive and has alienated members of communities that the agencies need 
to work with ... For these reasons, local agencies and policymakers, within 
whatever scope is allowed by national policy developments, should make clear 
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that, when they are talking about ‘extremism’, they are focused on problems that 
everybody can recognise.
90
 
After the 2005 London bombings, national politicians refused to engage with actual 
motivation, articulating instead the dangerousness of multiculturalism and the 
disassociation of some Muslim communities from mainstream society.
91
 Muslim 
communities in Britain were seen as the ‘other’, set apart from mainstream British 
society. This implied that multiculturalism, and specifically Islamic culture, was seen 
as responsible for the UK’s security woes. Muslim communities were seen as 
particularly prone to extremism, and an existential threat to the security of Britain 
and its values.
92
 Professionals in Maybury agree that Prevent specifically targeted 
Muslim communities in the area and across the UK. A neighbourhood manager 
comments, ‘It was, to be fair, let’s be real about that. … It reminded me of being 
Irish Catholic in the 1970’s in England. You know … everybody was a suspect and 
that’s how it probably felt.’93 
6.5.1 Prevent targets Muslim communities 
Prevent’s targeting of all Muslim communities on a national scale was originally 
seen as an attempt by the government to conflate issues of counterterrorism and 
community cohesion.
94
 Professionals in Maybury agree that Prevent targeted Muslim 
communities. A member of the community safety team states that:  
Something … needs to be done because there are so many grey lines and so 
many conflicting views because it is such a sensitive area and regardless of what 
[the government said that] it is all extremism, … it is everyone … it’s a violent 
aspect and these are the things that were coming out last year … it is targeting 
the Muslim communities whether you like it or not.
95
 
Fourteen of the twenty local professionals share a similar view. There is a realisation 
amongst professionals in the case study area that Prevent needs to be more inclusive. 
‘They should be targeting all communities’,96 according to the local police authority 
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Prevent lead. As stated before, there is a strong belief in Maybury that Prevent 
should target extremism per se, including far-right extremism. 
Al Qaeda inspired [extremism] is still very much a focus with that being the 
main risk. … But like I [said] until we get over the perception that actually we’re 
only targeting one sector of the community it will always be very difficult. But 
the fact that they’ve removed extremism from it … We [looked] at groups like 
the EDL, that we can’t work with through Prevent funding, [and this] 
exacerbates that myth around targeting Muslim communities.
97
  
Despite the assurances of the council’s Prevent lead that the strategy does not solely 
target Muslim communities, the list of commissioned projects tells a different 
story.
98
 Several projects target both ethnic and white communities; however, the 
majority focus on Maybury’s Muslim communities. The neighbourhood manager of 
a heavily Asian-populated area comments as follows.    
I think there have been community tensions with the Muslim community in 
particular because obviously when Prevent was first launched it was launched 
in, you know, a fanfare of media and news, whatever, and the Muslim 
community felt it was targeting them. It was, to be fair, let’s be real about that.99 
Seventeen of the twenty local professionals interviewed agree; however, only three 
claim that Prevent is being used to covertly gather intelligence. Maybury Council 
was able to use some Prevent money to tackle far-right extremism, and groups which 
support or share views similar to the EDL and BNP, under the New Labour 
government. Even before the publication of the Prevent Review, the coalition 
government made it clear to local officials that Prevent money should no longer be 
used to tackle far-right extremism.
100
  
6.5.2 Responding to the allegations of spying 
Kundnani’s allegation that Prevent is a tool used to spy on Muslim communities 
across the UK is a view also held by many within Maybury’s Muslim 
communities.
101
 A police inspector states that community members ‘say that it’s a 
spying tool used by the police and is also a criticism of Prevent’.102  A member of the 
community safety team denies this, arguing that if Prevent were used for spying it 
wouldn’t work ‘because the interventions aren’t there’.103 Consequently, and despite 
the denials, this perception has led to some individuals within the local Muslim 
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communities disengaging.
104
 One of the neighbourhood police officers acknowledges 
that the police gather information through engagement with the community, but that 
there is nothing sinister or covert about the approach.
105
 The local authority police 
Prevent lead comments:  
Can we come in and talk to them about Prevent? We want them to be the eyes 
and ears in their community and tell us information. One of the things these kids 
said to me, and one of their complaints, ‘How dare they come in here taking my 
kids. They want them to spy in their own communities’. Wrong. No, they put 
them at risk. They put them at harm. What would they tell? It’s really difficult. 
So the real anger about that side of it, how that was managed, and potentially 
there’s negativity towards the police service because of that and a few 
individuals. I don’t know if that’s unintended.106         
According to the police area commander, the ‘conversation about Prevent [used to] 
spy on communities, we don’t pick it up anymore, but having said that Prevent has, I 
think, as a term, been discredited because of all that’.107  
The data suggest that although there are allegations of spying through Prevent 
nationally, such as Project Champion in Birmingham,
108
 there is no suggestion that 
covert intelligence gathering has taken place in Maybury. The purpose of engaging 
with Muslim communities, a police officer seconded to the community safety team 
explains, is to build trust between the communities and the local authorities. ‘We 
have always been really clear with our staff, if your engagement is really good you 
will [gain] intelligence as a by-product, but you are not there to seek it out.’109 Trust 
between the police, local authorities, and communities is based on collective 
perceptions and vicarious experiences. All the local professionals accept 
Rosenbaum’s assertion that citizen participation is required to find those engaged in 
extremism and terrorism.
110
  In Maybury, professionals agree that they want 
communities to be their eyes and ears, but that this can only be achieved through 
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good community policing and engagement, and not through coercion.
111
 To get 
communities’ willingness to engage with the police and local authorities, it is 
essential to maximise perceptions of legitimacy and trust,
112
 because the obligation to 
obey the law is linked ‘to the quality of the rules and integrity of their 
administration’.113  
6.6 Organisational tensions: A multi-agency approach in Maybury 
Contrary to expectation, the multi-agency approach appears to work well in 
Maybury. Rather than having the police direct Prevent,
114
 the different local 
agencies, including the police, cooperate on a multi-agency platform. In Maybury, 
Prevent’s organisational structure is based on the local community safety partnership 
(CSP), with many of the individuals involved having prior experience of working 
with CSPs or on neighbourhood policing teams. A police officer was seconded to 
work as the local council's Prevent lead for a short period to help with its delivery 
and ensure smooth coordination between the different services. However, there were 
tensions when attempting to deliver Prevent programmes to schools and their staff. It 
appears that schools had no interest in participating.  
6.6.1 A multi-agency approach 
Twelve local professionals agree that the CSP is well placed to coordinate Prevent 
activities throughout the town. The council’s Prevent lead states that the very ‘fact 
that the community safety team are a multi-agency team, meant that the right people 
[were] involved from the start’.115 A policy officer and the Prevent lead for the 
council explains that ‘although we had a lead for it, it was just part of the other work 
of the team’.116 Since 1998, the council’s community safety team has been working 
with numerous statutory agencies and voluntary organisations to prevent crime and 
disorder. One of the community engagement officers at the police states that:  
Under the community safety team or partnership we’ve always had police 
involvement in the council, we’ve always had strong partnership working and I 
know for a fact that I was brought into the Prevent side because of the multi-
agency working and that’s where my history has been. The inspector has also 
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been the inspector in community safety. So, there are a lot of links already and I 
think an awful lot of the people I now talk to about Prevent were the same 
people in the same organisations that I talked to about anti-social behaviour, 
child safety, child cruelty, so it’s just a different form of safeguarding. That’s 
where we’re at really, it’s not different to what we used to do but the 
consequences are different, that’s all.117 
A member of the community safety team referred to the multi-agency approach in 
Maybury as  
second to none. It’s been really good and I think that’s why the projects have 
delivered what they have. They may not have achieved in my opinion what they 
should have achieved, but they have delivered projects really well and it is 
around, sort of, the contact with the voluntary groups, the statutory organisations 
in taking the agenda forward.
118
 
The approach of local authorities in Maybury through the already established CSP 
appears to have minimised tensions between the different partners. Neighbourhood 
policing is common practice and has served as a model for setting up Prevent based 
on the 1998 community safety partnership arrangement in Maybury.
119
  
6.6.2 Tensions within the multi-agency approach 
Nonetheless, there are a number of tensions. A minor one, mentioned by one of the 
neighbourhood managers, is funding in relation to cooperation rather than amounts 
received. She states that such a funding regime gets in the way and prevents a better, 
more cooperative work process with various organisations. ‘I know for a fact that 
there were several people who had several good ideas, who, if they had joined forces 
could have had a better idea.’120 Other conflicts are about the inclusion of education 
and schools, and information sharing between local and national partners. 
An education consultant at Maybury Council, whose role it is to engage schools in 
Prevent projects, states that  
in the big scheme of education, [Prevent is] actually not that important, as 
important that we might think it is for safety. As far as schools are concerned it 
is really not even on the radar. I am aware that there is an issue there for 
policing, but actually in the grand scheme of things, in the day-to-day running of 
people’s lives, I doubt very much whether it is high on the agenda.121 
                                                 
117
 Community Engagement Officer (Police Sergeant, LP12) interview (n 25) 
118
 Community Safety Team member (LP8) interview (n 95) 
119
 Home Office, ‘From Neighbourhood to National’ (HMSO 2008) 
120
 Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42) 
121
 Educational Consultant at Maybury Council and Prevent lead in Education (LP16), ‘Name 
Anonymized. Worked with Schools to Deliver a Number of Prevent Programmes. White Female, 
Mid 40s.’ (2011) 
 175 
She further states that because of their semi-autonomous status, schools are able to 
say ‘no, thank you very much, and in fact they did’.122 The education lead admits it is 
difficult to engage schools in the Prevent agenda due to other pressures, and a feeling 
that it was not necessary to engage with it.  
The bottom line for them is, they are asked to do so many things within this very 
short school day, it is unbelievable really, which takes them off their task. You 
know, we ask them to be social workers and to do all sorts of things and at the 
end of the day they have to say well is it statutory? Do I have to do this? 
Because it sometimes gets to that point and we won’t even consider anything 
that they don’t have to do. So yes, there is some conflict there because 
everybody thinks their agenda is as important or more important than anyone 
else’s but at the end of the day it is the school’s choice whether or not they take 
that on board. Prevent was just the same.
 123
 
However, a full timetable and other priorities are not the only reasons for the 
schools’ hesitancy. Many schools, if not most, have never engaged in such a 
sensitive area and feel they lack the necessary skills.  
Staff in schools are very reluctant to let that happen because they are insecure in 
their knowledge and haven’t got the confidence … They’re worried that that can 
of worms is going to lead to something  [that will] get out of control in the 
classroom.
124
  
Lack of skills is an issue which is not only a problem for schools, but across many of 
the sectors involved in the delivery of Prevent.  
The Prevent police inspector and the police officer seconded to the community safety 
team both raise this issue,
125
 the former stating that there are indeed 
serious limitations. The skills per se in the organisation as the council and all the 
different partners, [the] Home Office organisations that work within [Maybury], 
the lack of awareness around Prevent, the lack of the kind of confidence in 
delivering on Prevent – massive issues – and I think that is in itself is a hurdle 
that needs to be kind of, to be passed, to be honest. I think that’s a challenge in 
its own right.
126
 
Although both agree that the work in Maybury is going well, they argue that local 
professionals need to develop relevant skills. In fact, one of the funded projects 
carried out by a neighbourhood manager centred on improving these skills, and was 
seen as a great success by all who took part.
127
 
Another major tension is information sharing. In Maybury, information is shared 
between the different partners based on the protocols of the 1998 Crime and Disorder 
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Act. Eleven local professionals agree that information sharing between local 
partners, though in no way perfect, is reasonably good. A police officer seconded to 
the community safety team agrees that there is room for improvement, but complains 
that 
there isn’t any national guideline on information sharing so reasonably the best 
agreements are made by people that are delivering Prevent. And I think of all, 
it’s got better and I think it’s called for improvement.128 
The Prevent lead at the local police authority believes that information is being 
shared between partners, but that this is not always effective because the information 
is not necessarily captured in one place.
129
 The police area commander notes that 
partners accept the police withhold sensitive information.
130
 However, in Maybury 
the chief executive officer has received the required security clearance and is well 
informed.
131
 A satisfied Prevent police inspector states that ‘it’s getting a lot better. 
There are good examples of where [uniformed] and covert staffs are working 
together really well and they’re learning. What I would say is that work could be 
further developed’.132  
Seventeen of the twenty local professionals interviewed agree with the last statement, 
acknowledging that there have been teething problems. Issues such as local 
information sharing have been resolved over time. In general, the multi-agency 
approach seems to be working well. Greater tension in Maybury relates to what 
information should be shared between national and local organisations. The council’s 
Prevent lead states that   
the issue is that the messages from the Home Office aren’t always clear; we’re 
still sort of working through some of the stuff that they’ve sent out, so the 
information is filtering through slowly as to what their expectations are, what 
they’re going to do for us nationally as a national resource, what we need to be 
doing locally.
133
 
Similar issues are raised in eight of the twenty interviews. One of the claims made by 
the Prevent Review is that the twenty-five priority areas were selected on the basis of 
known intelligence. Prevent programmes are meant to target the individuals and 
groups vulnerable to extremism.
134
 Yet, relevant information is often not shared with 
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local authorities. ‘Identifying individuals that could be at risk in the future is like 
trying to find a needle in a haystack. A lot of what we have to do, although we [have] 
tried our best, has to be generic.’135 The community engagement officers make 
similar claims. The government claims that counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs) 
would enable local authorities to identify vulnerable areas.
136
 ‘There is certain 
information available to the police and the council through the … counter-terrorism 
local profiles, CTLPs. They are perhaps not always as up-to-date as we would 
like.’137 A CTLP copy, seen by the researcher, provides some additional information. 
However, not enough information is available to design projects to tackle specific 
individuals and groups. Without this information, it is extremely difficult for local 
authorities to design anything but generic projects.  
Overall, the multi-agency approach in Maybury works well. Eleven participants 
(although the issue is not raised in six of the interviews) agree that cooperation 
between Maybury Council, the police, and other agencies has been successful, and 
that tensions are resolved over time. ‘Newer’ partners such as schools, however, are 
reluctant to engage with Prevent, and show little interest in taking part. Problems 
acknowledged by many of the professionals include a lack of knowledge and skills 
related to extremism; how to tackle extremism; and a lack of support and information 
sharing from national agencies, which would allow local authorities to design 
specific programmes. 
6.7 Organisational tensions: Funding and evaluation of Prevent  
This section tackles two related issues, Prevent funding and its local evaluation. At 
first glance they may seem an odd pair. However, local professionals in Maybury 
perceive that if Prevent projects had been evaluated better, less money would have 
been wasted. The Communities and Local Government Select Committee has found 
that the evaluation of Prevent has generally been very poor across the board.
138
 
Academics and professionals agree that assessing preventative counterterrorism 
projects can be difficult.
139
 The Prevent Review, which bemoans the lack of 
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evaluation, acknowledges that ‘success is often reflected in changing attitudes as 
much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure’.140  
6.7.1 Prevent funding 
Prior to the Prevent Review, funds were allocated based on the size of the Muslim 
population, and provided to local authorities through a non-ring-fenced area-based 
grant.
141
 The Taxpayer’s Alliance claimed that central government was affording 
local authorities the freedom to spend Prevent funds as they saw fit.
142
 This 2009 
analysis of Prevent was in line with the coalition government's concerns, which 
raised the following three issues: 
The degree to which it is subject to central control and ring-fencing; the type of 
organizations who may receive it; and the relative balance between the three 
areas which currently receive the bulk of the funding (local authorities, policing 
and the FCO for Prevent work overseas).
 143
 
The funding issue links back to the community cohesion debate. The change in focus 
meant that local authorities would receive less funding for Prevent projects. Prior to 
the Prevent Review, approximately £250,000 was allocated to Prevent projects in 
Maybury. Though funding has been halved, the exact amount had not been 
confirmed at the time of the interviews. This ‘makes it difficult, like I say, actually 
because we don’t know what we’ve got or what we’re going to get going forward’,144 
the council’s Prevent lead states in interview. She continues by noting that the 
‘argument for that is, that a lot of it might have been spent on cohesion activities, and 
this is very much focused on that counterterrorism stuff’.145  
Maybury’s chief executive states that prior to the 2010 general election, funding for 
Prevent had been adequate, a view shared by fourteen of the twenty local 
professionals interviewed. National/local tensions had been less about the amount of 
money available, as one would have expected, but more about what that money 
could be spent on. After the election, the concern was more about the short-term 
nature of the funding. During and after the Review, however, the mood amongst the 
local professionals changed. As a local volunteer and neighbourhood manager puts 
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it, the perception is that funding ‘is skewed towards finding potential terrorists and 
should be about undermining the support for extremist views – in both 
communities’.146 As mentioned earlier, the view shared amongst seventeen of the 
twenty local professionals in Maybury is that the strategy needs to tackle extremism 
per se, including far-right extremism. The council’s Prevent lead states that ‘the 
focus is very much now on counterterrorism activity … so much so that we’ve been 
told that … we’re not allowed to give funding to integration activity’.147 A senior 
Home Office official believes that Prevent is not the medium through which local 
authorities should challenge extremism per se, and regards far-right extremists, and 
groups such as the EDL, as no more than a ‘bunch of street thugs’ who pose no 
immediate threat to national security. Prevent funds, he says, should therefore be 
directed towards counterterrorism.
148
 Funding cuts, or the redirection of funds, which 
is a term favoured by the Home Office, is an issue raised in twelve interviews. 
Maybury Council’s chief executive worries that 
it’s not resourced the way it used to be. The cutting of all the funding for 
integration and cohesion … I think has really impacted upon deprived 
communities. So what we’ve got now is the funding for just a Prevent strategy 
based purely on Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism … little funding or attention to the 
right-wing or Irish terrorism and no money for cohesion and integration.  So I 
think that is a danger if we don’t approach it properly.149  
Similar views are held by thirteen of the twenty participants in Maybury. These 
arguments link back to the issue of Prevent's aims and how to achieve them. Most 
front line staff believe that community cohesion is an integral part of Prevent and 
needs to be resourced accordingly.  
The second point, raised by nine interviewees, is the short-term nature of Prevent 
funding (it is worth noting that this is not a problem confined to Prevent alone) and 
the practical consequences. An inspector and the police force Prevent lead explains 
that   
funding …[was] coming in very short term and therefore it is difficult to 
maintain core staff one week to the next. They don’t know if they are going to 
be there. … You will struggle to get good people because if a better offer comes 
in they are going to go.  … What seems to be [happening is that] short term 
funding [was coming in] half way into the year before they actually [knew] if 
they had funding or not, and by the time they set about anything they [were] into 
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that programme again, so you are getting this time lag stuff. Whereas people if 
they knew they were working within a five-year framework or whatever ...
150
 
Amicus argues that short-term funding is a problem across the government sector, 
and that it can have severe ramifications for service provision, and a negative impact 
on staff morale, causing stress and affecting long-term planning.
151
 The Channel 
inspector in Maybury, for example, had waited months to find out whether his post 
would be funded in the future. How many members of staff have been negatively 
affected, and even resigned, due to short-term funding is unclear, but there are those 
who worry about Prevent’s long-term viability considering the short-term funding 
issue and government commitment. The Prevent inspector remarks about concerns 
that the government might have withdrawn Prevent funding completely after the 
London Olympics.
152
 The problem is summed up in the words of one of Maybury’s 
community engagement officers who notes that he would ‘like to see, and this is with 
every programme, once they’ve got a successful programme that it doesn’t need to 
scrabble around for the funding every year’.153 Limited funding also creates tension 
between organisations which all want a slice. A neighbourhood manager argues that 
this hinders cooperation between partners in their search for creative and innovative 
solutions to problems.
154
  
6.7.2 Linking evaluation and funding 
To reiterate, funding is less of an issue than expected in Maybury. Despite being 
concerned about funding cuts, seven participants feel that the allocation of funding 
could be improved through more cooperation, and through a more rigorous bidding 
and evaluation process.
155
 Evaluation, rather than funding, appears to be a main 
concern. Professionals in Maybury feel that the projects carried out are often poorly 
evaluated. However, professionals at national and local levels recognise that 
evaluation of Prevent programmes is difficult because if ‘we [were] measuring it, 
have we stopped terrorists from becoming terrorists? Really difficult to say’.156 
Evaluation is made harder because a large number of the organisations which take 
Prevent money do not advertise their projects as Prevent-funded. Because of 
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Prevent’s tarnished reputation, advertising the source of funding could diminish 
community participation.  
Evaluation in the context of terrorism attempts to answer the issue of how we know 
what works in the fight against terrorism. Numerous factors are taken into 
consideration such as the objectives of the counterterrorism strategy, what terrorists 
want, how to measure success, and the strategy's purpose (i.e. is it about winning 
hearts and minds, or about reducing the levels of fear amongst the public?) 
Extremism is a value-laden concept, and cannot be addressed in a vacuum or raised 
without considering its ethics.
157
   
There is no such thing as effectiveness at any cost – at least not in a democratic 
society where the rule of law is applied. Measuring the effectiveness can, 
therefore, never be a question of simple arithmetic.
158
 
Anyone attempting to evaluate preventative counterterrorism projects must keep 
these considerations in mind, thereby making evaluation more difficult.  
In Maybury, the community safety team was responsible for ensuring that all 
successful project bids met the NI 35 standards before 2010, and that these projects 
were supported and evaluated on a monthly basis by a member of the team.  
We funded about between forty to sixty projects in total … [and] made sure the 
projects were running as we wanted to achieve what we desired, although it was 
quite difficult to quantify in the end on this agenda and, ultimately, writing up 
the evaluation and the feedback.
159
 
The community safety manager comments that national guidelines were 
conveniently ignored and facts made to fit.   
Performance targets for Prevent, and that questionnaire that we had to sell to 
them, was an absolute waste of time. We used our own performance targets. … 
It was ridiculous as you read through, it was almost comical.
160
 
This links to the point made earlier about altering the policy to suit the needs and 
skill sets of local professional staff. At the same time, this does not improve the task 
of evaluating Prevent on a local and national level. The Review bemoans the lack of 
evaluation and the general feeling amongst professionals in Maybury is that the new 
strategy provides no evidence of best practice examples, or any support in terms of 
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evaluation.
161
 The council’s Prevent lead states that central government ‘still [hasn’t] 
communicated any decision to us whether there is going to be a national indicator for 
Prevent or whether locally it’s something we need to decide. …Well there’s nothing 
– nothing’s replaced it’.162   
According to Maybury’s chief executive, a local evaluation process was set up early 
on. After the initial round of bidding, numerous projects were rejected and ‘gradually 
[we] weeded out some of the less effective programmes. I think any programme 
naturally will take … a while to get their feet and find out which of them is an 
effective intervention’.163 A document detailing all bids, proposed projects, and 
evaluations of some of the successful ones, reveals a long list of community cohesion 
projects bidding for Prevent money. Many of these were completely unrelated to 
Prevent and were rejected. Despite this, some projects, which were only vaguely 
connected to Prevent, still received funding. The community safety team manager 
emphasises that an ‘industry’ has grown up around Prevent with private and 
voluntary sectors attempting to get as much money as possible from local authorities 
(a view which is shared by five other participants).
164
 The police officer seconded to 
the community safety team states that: ‘I think there’s certain organisation[s] … 
money-making organisations who charge a lot of money to deliver some very simple 
projects, some very simple outcomes to be honest.’165 The aforementioned document 
reveals that the evaluation of projects is inadequate. In particular, the statistical data 
of one project makes no sense at all.  
HM Treasury guidelines suggest that evaluation should be an integral part of a 
broader policy cycle, and should be designed into each policy.  
Monitoring seeks to check the progress against planned targets and can be 
defined as the formal reporting and evidencing that spent outputs are 
successfully delivered and milestones met. … Evaluation is the assessment of 
the policy effectiveness and efficiency during and after the implementation. It 
seeks to measure the outcomes and impacts in order to assess whether the 
anticipated benefits have been realized.
166
 
When asked about whether or not the funding allocated to Prevent in Maybury is 
adequate, the Prevent police inspector reveals that it was 
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difficult because the biggest cost of doing anything is in the evaluation cost, and 
the management cost of evaluating and programming, and that’s probably where 
our difficult area comes.
167
 
Because of cuts to Prevent, local authorities need to be more ‘clever and strategic 
about how we access the funding, [and] use the funding, and have an audit trail about 
the impact’,168 a neighbourhood manager says. Evaluating Prevent projects is 
difficult because central government has not provided guidelines on how to measure 
success.  
They haven’t told us how they’re going to measure us as yet. They’re talking 
about having some measurements in place but they haven’t. So, the only thing 
we can go off is … either case studies that we’ve done or some feedbacks that 
we’ve had, or some evaluations that have been carried out with the stuff that 
we’ve been doing around Prevent.169 
Consequently, there is a lack of clear methodologies and guidelines on how to 
evaluate projects locally. ‘I think they’ve got to ask what is your method of 
evaluation and monitoring process before they give anybody funding’, a 
neighbourhood manager concludes.
170
  
In the words of the Prevent police inspector, ‘evaluating what works and what 
doesn’t work is probably the hardest area’.171 Although there have been attempts to 
evaluate Prevent projects in Maybury, overall evaluation appears to be poor. The 
community safety manager admits that it is 
very, very difficult to prove that what work you’ve done has ultimately stopped 
someone from taking the next step, should we say, in committing an atrocity in 
some points in the future. … [Success] would be so difficult to quantify.172  
The interview data highlights that there are few clear national guidelines, and fifteen 
local professionals agree that more needs to be done to evaluate successes and 
failures.  
6.8 The perceived successes of Prevent  
Data suggest achievement in two broad areas, namely awareness-raising and 
increasing levels of trust between the local authorities and local Muslim 
communities. It is apparent though, that levels of success are not based on rigorous 
evaluation, but on personal observations and experiences. These perceptions, 
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experiences, and knowledge of local needs and risks appear to have shaped 
Maybury’s Prevent delivery. Innes et al. make similar observations, noting that in 
their case study areas the local delivery of Prevent does not appear to derive ‘from 
evidence-based assessments. Rather they [are] products of system legacies and 
opinion’.173 This assertion also appears to be true in Maybury, although a number of 
police-led Prevent projects such as ACT NOW and Not in My Name have been 
evaluated by a university in the North of England.
174
 The evaluation report was not 
obtained for this research project.  
6.8.1 Perceptions of success 
Despite the difficulties in quantifying Prevent’s success, there have been some 
success stories. A number of professionals believe that the strategy has, at least to 
some degree, been successful in Maybury.
175
 A member of the community safety 
team believes that awareness-raising has been  
fantastic, so around the Internet safety project that [the police have] run … those 
aspects [of] the awareness-raising have been fantastic. … Yes, we have been 
very successful around the cohesion sort of element, the awareness-raising. … 
But it’s about the awareness-raising; it’s not about tackling the underlying 
causes.
176
  
Awareness-raising, Maybury’s Channel inspector believes, has led to an increase in 
people coming forward, which leads to a higher number of Channel referrals.
177
 
Prevent, the police area superintendent believes, creates the   
conditions for people to separate themselves from extremism. And I think, yes 
we are. And I think we are creating conditions of trust, confidence. I think we’re 
creating conditions where people would not want to get involved in extremism, 
not for everybody, but they would want to distance themselves from that sort of 
behaviour because they have seen what has happened. You know, you didn’t get 
the communities clapping their hands when the 7/7 happened, when 9/11 
happened you did.
178
 
It is interesting to note that, particularly amongst the police in Maybury, the 
perception prevails that Prevent has been a success in increasing levels of trust 
between communities and the authorities.  
Part of the success, a police inspector and the force Prevent lead claims, comes from 
‘not ramming it down their neck and it [is] proportionate to each of the areas. … We 
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[feel we are] achieving success, we have people switched on to the agenda.’179 She 
further states that:  
I could tell you that through building trust and confidence, people have come to 
us with concerns about honourable individuals, and I know that they have been 
on the fringe of national operations that CT officers have been looking at, and 
we know that we have diverted them away from that, so that must therefore be a 
success there. The partners felt empowered, or the school or whoever it was felt 
empowered to come, and share with us that person is now not facing a criminal 
charge and hopefully they will have a brighter future.
180
  
An analysis of British crime survey data by Innes et al. suggests that ‘community 
perceptions of the police have been remarkably stable, and largely positive’, and 
concludes that ‘Prevent policing does not appear to be causing widespread damage to 
police and Muslim community relations’.181 Lakhani suggests that there is an 
increase in trust between Prevent partners, community members, and professionals 
who are closely involved in Prevent work.
182
 Similar trends are observed in 
Maybury, although after some terrorist-related arrests in the county,
183
 many groups 
such as the local Council of Mosques have refused to take part in further Prevent-
funded activities.
184
 Interestingly, the 2011/12 BCS suggests that attitudes towards 
the police are more positive amongst Asians, and over 60 per cent of those 
questioned in the county in which Maybury is situated believe that the police and the 
local council are addressing their concerns.
185
 Without further research, it is, 
however, impossible to determine whether the upward trend in perceptions of the 
police is related to Prevent or improved neighbourhood policing as outlined in a 
Home Office paper.
186
 Innes et al. note that across other areas in the UK where 
Prevent has been delivered, feelings of success are mainly based on personal 
experience and gut feeling rather than facts.
187
 Whether these findings hold true in 
Maybury is the subject of the next section.  
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6.8.2 Perception of failure?  
Although many interview participants believe that some aspects of Prevent have 
been unsuccessful, the word failure is used just once. A community volunteer 
categorically states that Prevent has failed. The policy, she says, has 
failed to engage with the real issues that lead to terrorism and refused to engage 
with these difficult issues. Prevent programmes in [Maybury] were all about 
awareness-raising, about what extremism is and how it can be found rather than 
talking about extremism and its causes. It encourages those who hold extreme 
views to go underground.
188
 
Eight participants share similar experiences. Aspects of Prevent are described as 
unsuccessful rather than as failures.   
The police authority Prevent lead, when asked whether she believes if Prevent has 
been successful in Maybury candidly states: ‘Simple answer, no.’189 This view is 
supported by others such as a neighbourhood manager and fellow volunteers who 
deliver Prevent programmes. ‘Limited’, is the short answer of one volunteer. 190 
Another neighbourhood manager, who also delivers a Prevent project, states 
cautiously:  
I don’t think we have. I don’t think nationally or even internationally there’s 
been a willing ability to tackle grievance, because we’ve actually tried to put a 
lid on the voice of that grievance. And so if you hide it away then you don’t 
have to engage with it. … Locally I think we do … we have tried to create 
opportunities where there have been different voices heard. I still think … we’re 
only tinkering at the edges of it. I think there’s a heck of a lot more work to be 
done there.
191
  
Similar views are shared by sixteen of the twenty interviewees.   
Earlier on, most of the programmes procured and delivered in Maybury focused on 
awareness-raising and building community trust.
192
 There are a number of local 
professionals who argue that this entire approach to Prevent was wrong and 
ineffective.  One female officer argues: 
If you see something suspicious — somebody’s house has been emptied, there’s 
a broken window … just report it. Let us know because they might be away on a 
holiday. Generally, I think that kind of approach would’ve been better than 
going out ‘we want you to tell us about terrorists in your community’. It doesn’t 
work like that. I know they didn’t say terrorist in your community, but that’s 
how it equates to the community. 'You want to tell us if there’s a terrorist in our 
                                                 
188
 Community Volunteer (LP 18) interview (n 146) 
189
 Local Police Authority Prevent Lead (LP1) interview (n 76) 
190
 Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council and community volunteer (LP15) interview (n 104) 
191
 Neighbourhood Manager at Maybury Council (LP10) interview (n 42) 
192
 Freedom of Information Request: Programs funded by Prevent in Maybury (n 64) 
 187 
community.' It’s really difficult when you hear somebody talk about another 
community.
193
 
She further criticises Prevent for heavily focusing on ‘men in the community. … 
Men provide the solutions and women [have] not been involved in any degree that 
they should have been.’194 The police Prevent lead states that a further barrier to 
success is the lack of skills per se, and the lack of awareness around Prevent within 
organisations. ‘The lack of … confidence of delivering on Prevent – massive issues – 
and I think that is in itself a hurdle that needs to be … passed to be honest. I think 
that’s a challenge [in its own right].’195  
In summary, certain aspects are seen as successful, some as having limited success, 
and others no success at all. Despite the perception of those who see success in 
certain aspects of Prevent, it is hard to validate these claims, especially in light of the 
common opinion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure success in the first 
place. Whether Prevent has been successful or not remains to be seen. Further in-
depth evaluations of delivered Prevent programmes are still needed to establish a 
conclusive answer. The next chapter attempts to shed some light on the impact of 
Prevent on local Muslim communities in Maybury.  Should the claims concerning 
increased levels of trust hold true, this development would have ramifications which 
go beyond Prevent and could positively affect not only policing in general, but 
counterterrorism policing because of the information volunteered by members of 
local communities.
196
 It would then become possible to gather information and 
intelligence through improved community engagement rather than through 
uniformed and covert surveillance, which may be perceived as spying by Muslim 
communities.
197
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that there are fundamental differences between national 
and local policymakers, and front line staff, about how to implement Prevent. These 
differences relate to how the original policy was formulated and conceived. The data 
above demonstrate that the 2009 Prevent policy was interpreted quite broadly in 
Maybury, at times focusing more on community cohesion and integration than 
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disrupting and challenging extremism. The use of community cohesion and 
integration by local authorities has been identified as a constant source of tension 
between the government, national and local policymakers, and front line staff.
198
 
Maybury’s professionals acknowledge that the boundaries between counterterrorism, 
prevention, and community cohesion are blurred. The ambiguity of the Prevent 
policy, and the belief that broad community cohesion is essential to Prevent’s 
success, perpetuate national and local tensions because professionals in Maybury 
‘exploit’ the policy’s ambiguities by providing projects which focus mainly on 
community cohesion. To some degree, community cohesion is seen as a means to 
increase trust between authorities and communities, and between different 
communities. It is also seen as a way to increase the flow of information.
199
 
Interestingly, all police officers, whether nationally or in Maybury, agree that good 
neighbourhood policing and engagement with Muslim communities is vital. It is 
police officers who were not involved, or who had little knowledge, who said that 
Prevent was a waste of time and money.
200
  
Part of the problem, as noted in 6.1, also stems from the fact that many of the local 
professionals implementing the policy or delivering a Prevent programme have not 
read the policy documents, and/or disagree with aspects of the policy. In particular, 
they disagree with the separation of Prevent and community cohesion, and the 
exclusion of far-right extremism from Prevent.  The data demonstrate that most 
programmes in Maybury relate to precisely the types of activity criticised by the 
media, parliamentary committees, the government, and the Prevent Review. The 
nature of these programmes further suggests that there is: a) a lack of knowledge, 
and relevant skills, to tackle extremism; or b) a commitment by the local authorities 
to tackle extremism through wider community cohesion; or c) both. The data indicate 
the latter, pointing to a lack of skills, something that is acknowledged by a number of 
professionals in Maybury, while also acknowledging the commitment of local 
professionals to a more inclusive approach to Prevent. Local professionals believe 
that this approach leads to greater engagement of communities, ultimately increasing 
the flow of information and decreasing levels of extremism. 
There are also a number of organisational tensions which centre on information 
sharing, funding, and evaluation. This chapter highlights particular issues about 
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information sharing between national and local government agencies. Some local 
professionals argue that the lack of information sharing means that local Prevent 
programmes have to be more generic, and that the programmes are unable to work 
with the communities and individuals who are at risk because these are not 
identified. Channel appears to be an exception because relevant information is shared 
between different organisations. If the coalition government aims to increase more 
targeted Prevent interventions, more information needs to be shared to allow local 
authorities and neighbourhood police teams to put in place specific, rather than 
generic, interventions. Attitudes towards funding are surprising. Local professionals 
argue that it is not the level of funding that is the problem, but rather how it is spent, 
and that competition between different providers limits the ability to generate more 
effective multi-organisation projects. Funding is also linked to evaluation, which is 
acknowledged to be difficult but essential. The Prevent inspector argues that the cost 
of project evaluation can be considerable compared to the cost of project 
implementation. In the future, this may mean either less evaluation or less money for 
Prevent projects because there may not be enough money for both. Overall, the 
evaluation of Prevent projects is poor and needs improvement. As noted earlier, 
perceptions of success are often not based on fact, but on personal experiences and 
gut feelings. This pattern has also been identified in other areas in the UK where 
Prevent is delivered.
201
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Chapter 7: Local communities and Prevent 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter differs somewhat from the previous two because it explores the impact 
of the Prevent policy process on Maybury’s Muslim communities.1 This impact was 
explored through five semi-structured focus groups in Maybury to determine how 
perceptions of Prevent have been formed. Three focus groups were divided by age 
and gender, one was a mixed group, and the final focus group was an all-male group 
which included community leaders, voluntary workers, and imams. The data not only 
suggest that to a large extent negative media discourses of Islam, Muslim 
communities, and Prevent appear to have shaped the public’s perceptions about 
Prevent in Maybury, but also that the media in general has had an important role in 
shaping the perceptions of the local Muslim communities. This chapter argues that 
these perceptions have been reinforced by negative personal and vicarious 
experiences of counterterrorism and Prevent. It is the perceived impact of stop-and-
searches and other terrorism powers, rather than their implementation, which appears 
to have influenced and perpetuated negative perceptions about Prevent. The hostile 
media discourses of Prevent, and local counterterrorism policing activity, appear to 
have led to a degree of alienation from mainstream British society and other local 
communities in Maybury.  
This chapter examines the impact this perceived alienation has had on Muslim 
communities in Maybury, and in particular on the communities’ engagement with 
Prevent and the authorities more generally. It further examines extremism, 
communication, and the issues of trust and legitimacy. After a brief discussion about 
extremism in general, it examines the same issues in the context of Prevent. This 
chapter argues that Prevent is unable to address the issues of extremism because of 
alienation and the government’s unwillingness to address underlying causes. Prevent 
is seen as a tool which propagates British values, values accepted by large sections of 
the Muslim communities throughout the country. Despite this, perceptions that 
Muslim communities oppose these values persist. The policy ignores diversity, and 
limits freedom of expression through informal social and political control. The final 
parts of this chapter examine the impact that communication between the authorities 
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and communities has had on levels of trust in authorities, and communities’ 
willingness to engage with Prevent.  
7.2 Shaping local perceptions of counterterrorism policing and Prevent: 
The influence of the local and national media  
Perceptions about Prevent, and counterterrorism policing more generally, have 
largely been shaped by local and national media representation in print and online. 
The focus group and interview data suggest that such media is the main source of 
information in Maybury. This section examines the role of the media in shaping local 
perceptions of Prevent, rather than what these perceptions are. Other sources of 
information, such as the Internet and personal experiences, appear to have had only a 
limited effect on local perceptions. 
7.2.1 Local and national media as gatekeepers of information: Shaping 
negative perceptions of Prevent 
Media representation of Prevent has generally been negative, and a search in any of 
the major newspapers, including the broadsheets, reveals numerous articles accusing 
Prevent of wasting public money, funding Islamic extremist groups,
2
 and spying on 
Muslim communities.
3
 According to Kundnani’s report, published by the Institute of 
Race Relations, Prevent marginalises Muslim communities. The report also claims 
that Prevent is being used as a spying tool.
4
 Negative headlines about extremism and 
Prevent in general, and their implied connection with Muslim communities, appears 
to reinforce the notion that ‘Islam is profoundly different from, and a serious threat 
to, the West; and that within Britain, Muslims [are] a threat to – us.’5 Both the 2009 
version of Prevent and the 2011 Prevent Review reflect similar views, seeking to 
justify why Prevent should primarily target Muslim communities. Hostile media 
depictions of Muslims and Islam, it is suggested, are based on a long tradition of 
cultural stereotypes and deeply held beliefs of the 'other'.
6
 The media has employed 
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frameworks centring on violence, extremism, and fanaticism,
7
 portrayals that have 
proven resilient over the last fifteen or so years – perhaps because, as Said claims, 
they reflect deeper social and cultural fears, and an anxiety of the ‘other’ which goes 
back to the imperial age.
8
 Ericson et al. note that the media, in general, often serves 
as a gatekeeper, reinforcing ‘discourses of morality, procedure, and hierarchy, 
providing [a] symbolic representation of order in these terms’.9 The negative media 
characterisations of Muslim communities and Prevent emphasise cultural, ethnic, 
and religious differences, serving the hegemonic purpose of inculcating ‘individuals 
with values, beliefs, and the codes of behaviour that will integrate’10 or alienate 
groups who do not meet the status quo as conceived by the institutional structure of 
the larger society. In response to the negative media coverage, the public, including 
Muslim communities, appear to have tacitly accepted the representation that Prevent 
partially funds Islamic extremist groups, wastes public money, and spies on Muslim 
communities. 
A report commissioned by Maybury Council acknowledges that the media plays a 
key role in constructing the public’s understanding of terrorism and, by implication, 
government responses.
11
 The report further states that those interviewed are sceptical 
of the accuracy of media reports, and suspicious of the motives of the media when 
reporting on terrorism or extremism. One interviewee states: ‘The media goes 
overboard and it’s the way that it’s reported … the media promote fear, and the 
language used can make the situation worse.’12 Despite being sceptical of the news 
media, none of the focus groups’ participants question the prevalent negative 
representation of counterterrorism policing and Prevent. Data from the five focus 
groups indicate that, despite being sceptical, participants concede that media 
representations of counterterrorism and Prevent are a major factor in shaping local 
perceptions of counterterrorism and the Prevent policy. Hall et al. reiterate that the 
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media is often the primary, if not the only, source of information beyond individuals’ 
immediate environment.
13
  
 
Figure 7.1 
Local newspaper circulation: on and offline access.  
Number of article headlines (articles) referring to one, or a combination of, the 
following keywords: terrorism, Islam, Muslim, and Prevent, between Dec. 2004 and 
Dec. 2012. 
  Print Online Terrorism, Muslim, Islam 
Headlines (articles) 
Prevent 
Headlines (articles) 
Maybury 
Citizen 
18% 4% Not known Not known 
Maybury 
Telegraph 
25% 49% 91 (772) 0 (15) 
Source: mediauk.com and lexisnexis.co.uk 
 
Although participants were not asked which media outlets they obtain their 
information from, a 2012 Reuters Institute of Journalism study suggests that 
approximately 50 per cent of people in the UK are interested in local news.
14
 Figure 
7.1 shows that about a quarter of the adult population in Maybury read the Maybury 
Telegraph in print, while almost 50 per cent access its website for local news. These 
data suggest that the local media plays a significant role in shaping opinions and 
perceptions about local and national issues. Data obtained from the Nexis database 
suggests that over an eight-year period, the Maybury Telegraph published 772 stories 
with the following keywords: terrorism, Islam, Muslim, and Prevent. Of these, only 
fifteen stories relate to Prevent, indicating that the policy was less of a local issue.
15
 
Therefore, much of the information about Prevent must come from other sources 
such as the national media, social media, the Internet, personal experiences, and 
family and friends. Focus group data suggest that the media is the main source of 
information about Prevent. The implication is that it is the national media's portrayal 
which has largely shaped views about Prevent. Participants of a report commissioned 
by Maybury Council recognise that newspapers have a 
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great deal of power in creating resentment about the allocation of resources – 
and this happens whether it is a right-wing or left-wing paper. The media help 
shape people’s opinions – even if what they say is factually incorrect.16  
This acceptance of media representation is highlighted by one of the participants who 
confirms that something could be perceived as true ‘because it has been in the 
newspapers’.17 Similar comments supporting this view were made in three of the five 
focus groups. Only two focus group participants, both imams, have attempted to 
verify the content of the Prevent policy, downloading it from the Home Office 
website only to glance briefly at the document.
18
 The majority of the participants 
acknowledge the power of the media in shaping their communities’ attitude towards 
counterterrorism policing and Prevent.  
7.2.2 Reinforcing negative perceptions of counterterrorism policing and 
prevent 
Focus group data suggest that part of the issue is the existing negative representation 
of Muslim communities in general, and their exacerbated links with extremism and 
terrorism. The data further indicate that Muslim communities in Maybury feel 
uneasy about how they are being stereotyped by the media. This is a recurring theme 
in all five focus groups. Participants state that ‘Muslims will never get away from 
stereotypes, there is always going to be something or other’,19 and ‘they are not 
looking at us [women] as being like a potential suicide bomber, but with guys it 
tends to happen a lot’.20 
People get upset, but that doesn’t mean that all Muslims are extremists. That’s 
what you get from the media. A lot of Muslims get dissed because what you … 
hear in the media, the same if someone was to target Christians and Jesus. I feel 
that all Christians would feel offended as well and they would speak out.
21
 
Prevent’s negative characterisations reinforce the prevalent beliefs of the participants 
that their communities are seen as troublesome; a view shared in all five focus 
groups.  
I think you just get stereotyped, like a lot of the times people presume that 
people who cover their faces, they’re doing it not by choice, but out of force and 
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they think it’s impinging on their rights … again presuming and not realising 
that we have choices of what we can do.
22
 
One of the imams states that:   
I used to follow the media very closely. But as a Muslim community, we’ve had 
so much exposure in the media that many of us have become very thick-skinned.  
It doesn’t interest me anymore.23  
Malik points out that the media, policymakers, and security experts have accused 
Muslim communities of having links to extremism and/or terrorism, and of holding 
political views contrary to the norms of liberal state democracy and British values, 
and that these Muslim communities should therefore be excluded from consultation 
and engagement.
24
 Even Muslim communities have accused other Muslim 
communities along the same lines.  
It appears that negative media representation of Muslim communities, especially 
when linked to extremism and terrorism, has led to feelings of alienation and an 
attitude of resentment and indifference amongst the residents of Maybury towards 
local authorities and the police in the wider context of counterterrorism. Frustration, 
and a degree of indifference, reinforce negative media representations within 
Maybury’s local communities. The symbolic language and graphic images used by 
the media turn selective events into a view of the world, which influences personal 
and collective perceptions of reality, and in this case Prevent.
25
 General media 
representation, Allen argues, provokes feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and 
alienation amongst Muslim communities in ways which weaken the government’s 
measures to reduce and prevent extremism, and are likely to act as a barrier, 
‘preventing the success of the government’s community cohesion policies and 
programmes’ of which Prevent is a part.26 The focus group participants share these 
feelings, in particular those of alienation and marginalisation. Perceptions, Wuthnow 
et al. state, inspire and give meaning to activities whether individual or collective, 
and can legitimise or delegitimise ‘activities and bring to bear the forces of social 
control’.27 ‘They are targeting us; we wouldn’t want to be involved with something 
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that targets us’, 28  one participant says. This statement epitomises the negative 
perceptions towards Pursue and Prevent which appear to be prevalent amongst the 
participants of all five focus groups. Participants of the five focus groups claim that 
these negative perceptions, frustrations, and feelings of indifference towards the 
issues of terrorism and Prevent have led to disinterest and inaction amongst Muslim 
communities in Maybury and the withdrawal of cooperation of a number of local 
organisations.  
7.3 The impact of ‘stop and search’ and local counterterrorism activities  
Between 2006 and 2011, few S. 43 and S. 44 ‘stop-and-searches’ were carried out in 
Maybury. A Freedom of Information request shows that the local police force used 
S. 43 and S. 44 only fifteen times during this period, making no arrests.
29
 During the 
same period, the British Transport Police carried out 11,255 S. 43 and S. 44 stop-
and-searches in the north-west of England. The majority of these occurred prior to 
2009. No British Transport Police officers are based at Maybury’s small train station, 
which suggests that few, if any, of the aforementioned stop-and-searches occurred in 
Maybury.
30
 It is important to note, however, that the regional counterterrorism unit 
carried out a number of terrorism-related arrests in the Maybury area. Whether any 
stop-and-searches occurred at the same time is unclear because the counterterrorism 
unit refused to provide any details in response to an FOI request. The use of these S. 
43 and S. 44 stop-and-searches was controversial, and its practice has now been 
stopped.
31
 Parmar argues that such stop-and-searches were often counterproductive, 
creating barriers, and straining relations, between local communities and the police.
 
32
        
All participants are aware of these powers granted to the police, and although none 
of the participants had been stopped and searched, a number of them know someone 
who had. Many stop-and-searches occurred in the London area, or at the airport. One 
of the participants states: ‘I know with my brother-in-law, they stopped him because 
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he was driving a nice car and they followed him from his house … and it is all those 
kind of things. … They have these stereotypes.’33 Another participant claims that her 
son and his friends had been stopped because of their Muslim apparel. ‘They didn’t 
do anything wrong, they just had beards.’34 Some of these experiences appear to be 
routine PACE, rather than S. 43 and S. 44, stop-and-searches. It appears that the 
perceived use of counterterrorism stop-and-search, rather than its actual use, 
generated resentment towards the police, an attitude reflected in all five focus groups. 
One of the participants states that he saw the police pull over ‘kids in a car, 
youngsters getting stopped by the police, an Asian bloke. What for? He wasn’t 
speeding or underage’.35 Although there is agreement amongst participants of all five 
focus groups that the police were treating Muslims unfairly when making decisions 
about who to stop, participants of Focus Groups Two and Three feel much stronger 
than the others about this subject (these two groups consisted of males and females 
under thirty). This study confirms Parmar’s findings that negative perceptions about 
stop-and-search are not confined to the London area, but also occur in areas such as 
Maybury.
36
 It appears that these negative perceptions are often influenced by the 
experiences of others outside their personal sphere, experiences which also have the 
capacity to trigger social perceptions.
37
 At least one participant within each of the 
five focus groups shared such a vicarious experience.     
Perceptions about stop-and-search and other counter-terrorism activities, it appears, 
may have created barriers between the authorities and Maybury’s Muslim 
communities. Over the last few years, there have been a number of high profile 
terrorism arrests in Maybury. Front line staff repeatedly state that an incident in 2009 
created barriers between the police, the local authority, and Maybury’s Muslim 
communities (see Chapter 6). A neighbourhood manager admits that ‘people were 
very angry about that convoy being stopped. And again people were feeling they’d 
been victimised and, you know, targeted’.38 As a direct result of this counterterrorism 
operation, the local Council of Mosques and affiliated organisations refused to 
provide services to, and engage with, the Prevent programme. Since then, the police 
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believe that their efforts to increase community engagement have broken down some 
of these barriers.
39
 However, contrary to the belief of front line staff, this incident 
appears to have been less of a barrier for local Muslim communities, and was only 
mentioned briefly by participants in two of the five focus groups. This incident is 
seen as a tipping point, highlighting that Muslim communities are repeatedly targeted 
because of their religion and ethnicity. ‘The police do the right thing to terrorists, but 
sometimes people are not terrorists and they label them as terrorists and that is 
wrong.’40 A participant states that the police  
admitted to making mistakes. And I think they’re looking at things in a very 
mature way of late. But I do feel that the wider public … don’t trust the police as 
much as they should.
41
  
Another participant states that: ‘We are happy that they are trying to stop terrorism. 
What else do we want? It’s for our security.’ 42  However, this same level of 
enthusiasm is only shared by Focus Groups One, Two, and Three, with the other two 
focus groups grudgingly accepting that certain aspects of counterterrorism policing 
are a necessary evil, and blaming extremists and terrorists for the negative media 
coverage. It is worth noting here that perceptions amongst the older participants 
towards counterterrorism policing are much more positive than those amongst the 
younger participants. A young male participant states that: ‘Being a practicing 
Muslim, [is not the same as] being an extremist, because that’s just two different 
things. Extremists are people that are off their heads basically.’43 Similar sentiments 
are shared across each of the five focus groups, viewing violent extremists rather 
than Islam as the problem. Participants of all five focus groups feel wrongly labelled, 
and often – unjustly – linked to terrorism. Scholarship over the last decade 
recognises that there has been a shift, indicating that Asian males are perceived as 
the new folk devils.
44
 Moral panic links Asian communities to violence, drugs, and 
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terrorism, perpetuating the image of stereotypical Muslims as extremists and 
terrorists.
45
  
7.4 The impact of perceptions of Pursue and Prevent on alienation, 
extremism, and identity 
Generally, negative media discourse links Islam and British Muslim communities to 
extremism and terrorism. This in turn has increased a sense of alienation and 
isolation that these communities experience ‘both as a result of ascription and of 
active acquisition of an identity as the classic other’.46 Moore et al. write that Islam 
and Muslims are depicted as being opposed to dominant British cultural and political 
values, as elusive as those values may be. The most common words they found ‘in 
relation to British Muslims were terrorist, extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and 
militant, with very few positive nouns used’. 47  Political and social discourses, 
selective representations, and fast dissemination of biased messages through the 
media have created a hostile environment for Muslims in the UK and worldwide. 
This is felt acutely in minority communities in the midst of alien and alienating 
societies. A programme such as Prevent causes, according to some,
48
 the further 
alienation of Muslim communities because it is led by government imperatives, 
which operate on the assumption that there are legitimate and illegitimate Muslims, 
with the latter group being excluded from participating as active citizens. The 
Prevent Review makes it clear that  
the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious 
belief emphatically is not. But we will not work with extremist organisations 
that oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law, 
democracy and full participation in our society.
49
 
What is not clear is where the line between legitimate and illegitimate Islam is 
drawn. Further, such an approach assumes a direct link between radicalisation and 
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violent extremism, despite evidence to the contrary.
50
 A sense of alienation has had a 
direct impact on how Prevent is perceived by Maybury’s Muslim communities.  
7.4.1 Understanding alienation and its effects on Muslim communities 
According to Dean, alienation can be categorised into three subtypes: powerlessness, 
normlessness, and social isolation.
51
  
By alienation is meant that men pursue goals, and use means in their pursuit, 
determined either by social entities with which they do not feel intimately 
identify or by forces which they may be unable to recognize at all. … The 
growth of alienation implies that the range of choice open to the ordinary 
individual, the area of discretion available to him, is declining.
52
 
The three elements mentioned above are all evident within the focus groups' data. 
Powerlessness is a feeling of separation from effective control over one’s economic 
destiny, and a sense of helplessness – of being used for a purpose other than one’s 
own. Further, helplessness can also be ascribed to other power relations and is not 
solely ascribed to economic barriers.
53
 Those in positions of relative powerlessness 
‘may be constrained or marginalized whilst the perspectives of those in positions of 
relative power in the engagement process may dominate’.54 It is those with power 
who define Muslims, and the media plays a large role in this process.
55
 The secular 
Muslim emerges in close connection with the exertion of power by the state, and 
presents an identity which ruptures ‘political designations and normative 
designations by Muslims of what Islam is or Muslims are’.56  
Individuals in mass society … are to an ever-increasing extent involved in 
public affairs; it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore them. But ordinary 
individuals have ever less of the feeling that they can understand or influence 
the very events upon which their life and happiness is known to depend.
57
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There is agreement amongst participants of all five focus groups that they and their 
communities feel a sense of helplessness in shaping how they and their communities 
are seen by wider British society.  
Feelings of powerlessness and fatalism discourage political action while increasing 
political apathy. Apathy is defined as diminished motivation, and is not attributable 
to decreased levels of consciousness, cognitive impairment, or emotional distress.
58
 
Helplessness is accompanied by fatalism. Fatalism represents a prolonged frustration 
of urgent need, which stems from individuals attempting to measure up to unrealistic 
goals, which in turn comes from the disparity between individuals’ aims and 
accomplishments.
59
 Similar sentiments are shared amongst all five focus groups. One 
participant states that: 
Terrorism in principle may have a particular definition, but then, in effect 
discriminates against a particular group of people and puts them at a 
disadvantage. And I think that’s what seems to be happening with [us] around 
terrorism and extremism.
60
 
Another participant states that media representation and government policies 
‘certainly cause anger within the community’. 61  Over time, this anger, and an 
inability to do something about negative perceptions and the continuing state of 
affairs, turns to political apathy and fatalism, as described by Rosenberg.  
Normlessness is a lack of clear norms, or norm conflict. Horney writes that feelings 
of normlessness emerge from conflicts such as religion versus the success 
imperative, the stimulation towards materialism versus the ability to obtain such, and 
the alleged freedoms of the individual versus their actual limitations.
62
 This aspect of 
alienation becomes particularly clear when discussing freedom of expression and 
British values later in the chapter. One of the participants expresses his concerns, 
stating that:   
People should have the ability to have their own choices and not be oppressed, 
but I think sometimes, in a way we oppress, the British oppress, they are kind 
of oppressing us because they want us to act and live the way they are living. 
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The concepts of normlessness and social isolation are based on Durkeim’s notion of 
anomy.
63
 Normlessness has three characteristics: a ‘painful uneasiness or anxiety, a 
feeling of separation from group standards, and a feeling of pointlessness or 
purposelessness that no certain goals exist’.64 This purposelessness is described as 
‘the absence of values that might give purpose or direction to life, the loss of intrinsic 
and socialized values, the insecurity of hopeless disorientation’.65 Ruesch links the 
concept to social mobility. Some cultural differences, such as not drinking alcohol or 
the wearing of the hijab, hinder the social mobility of Muslims in the UK.
66
 Social 
isolation is also linked to the above characteristics. It includes ‘a feeling of 
separation from the group or of isolation from group standards’.67 This sense of 
separation centres on the issue of British values. Members of all five focus groups 
are confused about what exactly these values are, an issue which appears to concern 
the participants of Focus Group Five most (the focus group with community leaders 
and imams); but all note that the media represents Muslim communities in opposition 
to them. The collapse of religious values ‘hollowed out the edifice of the British 
national identity’.68  In this development, alternative ideologies such as socialism 
have also become less powerful. Despite the fact that Britishness remains an obscure 
set of values, politicians and the media continue to refer to them, and they are linked 
to democracy, equality for women, and the rights of the individual. 
7.4.2 Alienation in the context of Prevent and other counterterrorism 
measures 
Despite the fact that all focus group participants are second and third generation 
British, there is a general consensus that they are often not accepted as such but seen 
as Muslims first. One participant states: 
We don’t get treated British. … Like you are from Germany … you probably 
know people that get targeted as German Nazis. But not all of you are the same 
are you? That is how we feel as well.
69
 
Another participant states that: 
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I think in a way we … try to mix in more with other communities. … Say 
someone was white British, we might try to mix in with them … social, or 
we’ll do something else, but we wouldn’t talk about religion openly because 
we feel awkward about it. 
70
 
Participants across all five focus groups feel a sense of isolation because of their 
Muslim heritage and identity.   
There’s a sense of Muslims overall feeling they are British, but … when 
there’s a double standard taking place, like, for example, when it comes to the 
EDL, then Muslims have a sense of concern. Why is this happening to us when 
we also feel that we’re an important part of this community? We want to 
contribute to the benefit of this community. Why are we, as Muslims, 
discriminated against, and isolated and targeted? Marginalised? So then, 
obviously it creates further frustrations for many Muslims.
71
 
Similar experiences are shared by participants from each of the five focus groups. 
One of the participants, an imam and chaplain at the local hospital, links the isolation 
to the Prevent policy stating: 
I don’t think they’re doing themselves many favours in how they’re dealing 
with this strategy. If you isolate a community then because there’s not that 
equilibrium, there’s not that balance across the board, then one community is 
going to feel disgruntled, frustrated, because they may be always under the 
spotlight whilst another community gets away with it.
72
 
The findings are also corroborated by a Maybury Council report titled 
‘Understanding Communities’, which reveals that many Muslims in Maybury feel 
that racism is on the increase. A rise in prominence of groups such as the EDL and 
the BNP highlights this. The report further states that ‘language around the Prevent 
agenda [has] been very divisive and [has] marginalized communities that we need to 
work with’.73  
When asked, participants across all five focus groups report being frustrated because 
they are linked to extremists and terrorists by the media and members of other 
communities in Maybury. Focus Groups One and Five appear to be least concerned 
about this. One of the participants shares an experience where one of her white 
neighbours is reported to have said:  
The only thing that you guys will do is strap a bomb to yourself. That really 
hurts when somebody says that because you’ve been brought up here, we 
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believe that this is our country and when someone else says that to you it really 
hurts.
74
  
Comparable experiences are shared by two other participants, in Focus Groups One 
and Three.
75
 This type of experience, and a number of similar experiences shared by 
the participants, highlights how neighbours and colleagues link them to extremism 
and terrorism, though often unwittingly and in innocent situations, because they are 
Muslim. A myriad of similar experiences within Muslim communities appear to have 
led to a collective sense of marginalisation, often based on the vicarious experiences 
of others and media representation.
76
 The data suggest that because of the 
preconceived notion that other communities expect cultural assimilation and are not 
as open to cultural differences, Muslim communities perceive being Muslim as a 
barrier to integration. One of the participants states that she does not feel comfortable 
talking about her religion because of her preconceived belief of being labelled a 
terrorist by those from other faiths. Being Asian, she feels, marks her out as a 
Muslim, making integration more difficult.
77
 There is a shared feeling amongst 
participants of all five focus groups that counterterrorism policing and Prevent are 
isolating their communities.  
I don’t think they’re doing themselves many favours in how they’re dealing with 
this strategy. If you isolate a community then … there’s not that equilibrium, 
there’s not that balance across the board, then one community is going to feel 
disgruntled, frustrated, because they may be always under the spotlight whilst 
another community gets away with it. Now, in terms of communities, some 
people may look at that and say no, no, that’s certain parts of the government 
that are to blame for that and they’ll leave it there. But other people will take 
that to the extreme and associate that with, for example, the white community. 
And then obviously it can create tensions amongst communities as well.
78
 
A House of Commons Select Committee, reporting on the prevention of violent 
extremism, and a Demos report, support this view.
79
 Both state that the language 
used around Prevent is leading to an increase in intercommunity tensions, and even 
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threatens ‘to undo a number of good initiatives that contribute to the community 
cohesion because of the link to counter-terrorism’.80  
Prevent, and counterterrorism policing activities, it appears, are seen as a tipping 
point, a confirmation that authorities are targeting Muslim communities because of 
their faith and ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, participants of all five focus groups 
acknowledge the need for some counterterrorism measures, although some 
participants within Focus Group Two do so grudgingly. However, the use of stop-
and-search, Prevent, and other Pursue measures heightens the sense of alienation felt 
by Maybury’s Muslim communities. Over the years, a general sense of resentment 
has led to feelings of indifference, and ultimately political apathy. Rather than 
recognising Prevent as an opportunity to engage with wider society and the 
authorities, it is perceived as yet another threat to these communities.    
This fatalistic attitude receives general expression in the idea that we will 
always have wars, depressions, corruptions and prejudice and that there is no 
point in trying to do anything about it.
81
 
Despite the efforts of front line staff in Maybury, and their attempts to socialise 
counterterrorism policy, reinforced negative perceptions of Prevent have created 
barriers which are difficult to overcome. Participants perceive that Prevent, and its 
damaging monolithic media representation of Muslim communities, are a barrier 
towards integration and tackling extremism.  
They shouldn’t treat the Muslim community as a monolith but understand the 
diversity within that. And when I mean monolith, I mean not just monolith in 
terms of ethnicity, they might recognise ethnicities, but also the religious 
traditions that we come from. Because the antidote for any type of terrorism or 
violence or any kind of extremism is good grounded, founded on Islamic 
teachings.
82
 
Participants of four of the five groups perceive Prevent programmes as a front for 
police action and intelligence gathering rather than a community cohesion project; 
thus the programmes have become a major cause of resentment and disinterest within 
the Muslim communities. Interestingly, Focus Group One, a group whose 
participants have worked with community engagement officers, does not feel that 
Prevent is being used for this purpose. Three participants acknowledge that 
resentment and discontent could lead to extremism within communities, although 
                                                 
80
 Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, ‘From Suspect to Citizen: Preventing Violent Extremism in a 
Big Society’ (Demos 2010) 3 
81
 Rosenberg (n 59) 10 
82
 Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5), ‘Name Anonymized.’ 
(2011) 
  206 
they reiterate that this has not happened in Maybury. ‘But it does cause anger within 
the Muslim community’, one said. 83  Pursue and Prevent have reinforced the 
community’s feeling of alienation, increasing the sense of political apathy and 
fatalism amongst Muslim communities in Maybury.
84
 Therefore, these communities 
are less likely to engage with the government ‘because they [are] more cynical 
towards what the government [is] trying to achieve’.85 All focus group participants 
feel that counterterrorism policing and Prevent have heightened their sense of 
alienation. This has led to divisions between Maybury White and Asian 
communities, but also to political apathy because participants feel that nothing can 
be done.
86
 
7.5 Extremism and Prevent 
Prevent’s main purpose is to respond to jihadi extremism. ‘In doing so, we must be 
clear: ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem.’ 87  Focus group data 
indicate that individuals in Maybury do not see extremism as a top local priority. 
Pursue, and particularly Prevent, are seen as inadequate responses to extremism per 
se. In fact, they may even exacerbate the problem. Data further suggest that Prevent 
is unable to address the issues of extremism in Maybury’s Muslim communities 
because it does not provide opportunities to openly address relevant issues within 
these communities. According to the Prevent Review, there are 25 priority areas in 
the UK, Maybury included, where intelligence suggests that extremism and 
terrorism-related activities may be occurring. This implies that communities in these 
areas are either seen as vulnerable to, or supportive of, extremist ideology, justifying 
Prevent interventions.  
7.5.1 Understanding extremism in the context of Prevent  
It is important to briefly define extremism because Maybury’s Muslim community’s 
perceptions about what extremism is, and when it is acceptable, differ significantly 
from the views presented in the Prevent policy and in the media. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, extreme is defined as ‘not usual; exceptional; … far from 
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moderate, especially politically’.88 Extremism is the holding of extreme political or 
religious views; it is a form of fanaticism.
89
 Defining extremism is therefore 
problematic because political and religious views are contextual and based on ‘value 
judgments, not objectively identifiable features of someone’s belief systems or 
rhetoric’. 90  Prevent seems to view extremism as a readily identifiable 
characterisation and causation of political violence. The coalition government 
replaced the phrase ‘violent extremism’, used by Labour’s Prevent strategy, with 
‘extremism’, claiming that the term was ambiguous and caused confusion, thus 
giving the impression ‘that the scope of Prevent [is] very wide indeed and included a 
range of activities far beyond counter-terrorism’91. All of those interviewed regard 
extremism per se as a problem. That said, when asked what extremism is, and how it 
links to political violence, all national and local professionals have different opinions 
and definitions. Most agree on one point, that criminal behaviour and the use of 
violence differentiate terrorism from extremism. Many involved nationally, although 
acknowledging that extremism is problematic, associate extremism, in the context of 
Prevent, with Islam and its opposition to British values.
92
 A senior Home Office 
Official refers to groups such as the EDL as hooligans and a nuisance, but argues that 
they are not a threat to UK national security.
93
 Some national policymakers and 
politicians (four out of fifteen) link extremism to the rejection of British values. All 
five focus group participants, and many of the front line staff in Maybury (fifteen out 
of twenty) take a much broader interpretation of extremism, and include far-right 
activism as well as the ‘hijacking’ of Islam for political and violent purposes.94 
Senior local officials, front line staff, and focus group participants believe that to be 
successful, Prevent must address all forms of extremism, arguing that the far-right is 
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feeding off jihadi extremism and vice versa.
95
  
In an attempt to narrow the definition of extremism, the Prevent Review constructs a 
definition that is much broader and ambiguous than the previous phrase. It describes 
extremism as the  
vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the 
death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.
96
 
According to this definition, one might surmise that groups such as the Scottish 
National Party and Sinn Fein should also be categorised as extremist groups. 
However, despite this broad definition, it appears that in the context of terrorism and 
Prevent, extremism is viewed in terms of jihadi extremism, Al Qaeda ideology, and 
the failure of migrant and Muslim communities in particular to integrate and adopt 
British values.
97
 Politicians and the media depreciate other forms of extremist 
ideology such as the far-right and nationalism, which are not framed as being 
opposed to British values and are often linked to hooliganism and criminality rather 
than political violence,
98
 despite the attacks in Norway in 2011.
99
 Despite comments 
by politicians and the odd paragraph in the Prevent document about the far-right, the 
strategy remains almost exclusively based on jihadi extremism. Local officials were 
told by the Home Office not to include groups such as the EDL in Prevent work in 
Maybury (see 6.2 and 6.3).
100
  
According to Pratt, extremism suggests fanaticism, and connotes a degree of 
intensity or sharpness of focus. He suggests that extremism may also refer to the 
opposite of being ‘at the margins’, and that it is being at, or claiming, the centre. Any 
group or ideology which excludes alternative solutions while claiming the relevant 
central position exclusively and proclaiming the normative tradition intensively, 
should also be considered extreme in its nature. Religious or traditional group 
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identities are taken to the extreme, not by moving away from the centre but 
conversely, by intensifying self-understanding and self-proclamation as representing, 
or being, the centre.
101
 Any policy which seeks to challenge any form of extremism 
must therefore clearly articulate its purpose and provide guidance about what is 
considered unacceptable, and when a certain viewpoint crosses the line from 
moderate to extreme.
102
 The Prevent Review fails to clearly articulate what 
extremism is, and does not state when it becomes so. It states that the 
purpose of Prevent is not to convince the majority of people that terrorism is 
wrong – they need no convincing. Rather, the purpose is to enlist the support of 
the people in our country to reach the much smaller minorities who may be 
drawn to terrorism, often through extremist views.
103
  
In line with its definition of extremism, the solution presented in the Review is to 
increase a sense of belonging and citizenship to make communities more resilient to 
extremist ideology and terrorism. ‘We believe that Prevent depends on integration, 
democratic participation, and a strong interfaith dialogue.’104  Prevent attempts to 
achieve its purpose through its three objectives, which are: to challenge extremist 
ideology, to protect vulnerable communities, and to support sectors and institutions 
where a risk of radicalisation exists. Notably, addressing the underlying causes of 
extremism per se is absent.  
7.5.2 Prevent’s inability to address extremism 
So why does all of the above matter? Jackson suspects that the real hoped-for 
purpose of Prevent, both old and new, is to produce docile subjects who accept 
British government policy and its values without seriously questioning or opposing 
them, rather than engaging citizens who, if necessary, are willing to challenge 
them.
105
 One of the key dangers, according to Jackson, is that the Prevent strategy 
does not facilitate robust and open debate on controversial issues of foreign policy 
and securitising particular viewpoints. Focus group participants share similar views.  
They have their own opinions and … they’re strong about their opinion. … 
And if you try to debate that then they think that you’re a bit of an extremist, so 
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you’re afraid of that, being labelled as something so you wouldn’t even try to 
defend … it.106 
The fear of being labelled an extremist, or worse, has made the subject of extremism 
and terrorism a ‘taboo’ subject amongst Maybury’s Muslim communities.107 This 
point is confirmed by fifteen people the researcher spoke to, but who did not 
formally want to participate in the research. According to the focus group data, and 
contrary to Jackson’s arguments, it is not the Prevent policy itself which created this 
situation, but its negative media representations over the last decade or so. These 
negative perceptions, participants argue, are stifling their freedom of expression and 
driving those with extremist views underground, where resentment and anger can 
fester and where views and resolutions to adopt violence go unchallenged.  
In Maybury, Prevent fails to create the safe space spoken of by Sir Norman 
Bettison,
108
 which should occupy the middle ground between extremism and violent 
extremism, because of the stigma attached to it. Paradoxically, this is exactly the 
situation Prevent aims to avoid. ‘In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalization 
tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go 
uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge.’109 
Freedom of expression is an issue that was raised in the focus groups. Participants in 
these four groups feel that social and political pressures are inhibiting their freedom 
of expression, which in turn affects their willingness to engage with Prevent. 
Afghanistan and Iraq appear to be less of an issue than the ability to freely discuss 
and hold dissenting views without the fear of being branded extreme by the state. 
Such an opinion is shared by participants from four of the five focus groups. None of 
the participants or professionals make any claims that Prevent is used to spy on 
Muslim communities in Maybury. However, all the participants rely on the media 
and/or the experiences of friends and family to shape their opinions about Prevent. 
The older participants, and the carers in Focus Group One, rely more on word of 
mouth, while the younger participants, the imams, and community volunteers rely on 
the media and word of mouth. Despite the lack of evidence to support the assertion 
                                                 
106
 Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 81) 
107
 Asian Male, Community and youth worker for local charity, mid 30s (FG 5) interview (n 82); 
Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19) 
108
 Sir Norman Bettison (NP6), ‘Former Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and ACPO Prevent 
Lead.’ (2011) 
109
 HM Government (n 49) 63 
  211 
that Prevent is a guise for surveillance in Maybury, participants still have their 
suspicions.  
If someone is going to pay the police to look up on Muslim communities and 
then target them, I’m not going to have faith in them. Like someone getting 
paid to spy on you, would you trust them?
110
 
I think it could be true because it has been in the newspapers a few times that 
people have been spied on. And I don’t think that it is right as well. … It is an 
invasion of privacy … It’s like they want privacy and it is being exposed.111   
According to four of the five focus groups, the notion of being monitored by the 
state, as well as the possibility of statements being picked up and misconstrued by 
the media, means that participants and their communities are less willing to talk 
about issues of extremism and terrorism.  
I think it has impacted on communities a great deal over the past five years … 
People do [worry about it], yes people don’t talk. … Because they scrutinise 
everything, like documentaries [have] recordings of what the imams have said, 
and I think they … read more into it than what they actually said. So I think 
people … just don’t, or won’t [talk].112 
Especially people who are religious, they may be afraid to … with people from 
other cultures, because they feel like they might be judged. If there is a social 
gathering or something … they might be reluctant to go to that because they 
think that other people might be judging.
113
 
These statements illustrate why participants feel reluctant to discuss these issues or 
engage with Prevent programmes. One of the participants states that not addressing 
extremism is partly cultural.  
Because of our culture, our faith, we all keep silence within.  If there is an issue 
taking place within our community we see it, but we don’t realise that it is 
actually happening. So I think we are kind of blind [and ignore] that there is a 
problem.
114
  
These are all contributing factors as to why focus group participants feel that they 
would not challenge extremism in their communities even if it existed. There is also 
the fear of becoming stigmatised and labelled as an extremist, or upsetting the 
community by saying the wrong thing.
115
 These topics are avoided because cultural 
values produce negative reactions to extremism, and because of their failure to 
satisfy the positive pressing needs of individuals and their communities.
116
  
                                                 
110
 Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17) 
111
 Asian Male, attending the local college, early 20s (FG 2) interview (n 17) 
112
 Asian Female, Parent of five, not working, mid 40s (FG 3) interview (n 19) 
113
 Asian Female, parent of three, working part-time, mid 30s (FG 3) interview (n 20) 
114
 Asian Male, attending the local college, late teens (FG 2) interview (n 17) 
115
 B Latané and JM Darley, ‘Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies’ (1968) 10 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 215 
116
 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (Fordham University Press 2005) 
  212 
Participants across all five focus groups feel alienated from the economic and 
political process because they are Muslims.  
If we were allowed to talk, we would have more freedom of speech, then 
people would tell you their stories and then you can see where they are coming 
from as well.
117
 
According to Grimm, public discourse is fundamental to any healthy democracy, and 
is based on the premise of the freedom of expression, allowing individuals to express 
opinions and learn from one another, or challenge them if necessary. These ‘rights 
constitute a comprehensive freedom of communication’.118 It is the deprivation of 
these rights through political and media discourse which has created a feeling of 
alienation from mainstream British society. One of the imams states that Prevent 
needs to create a space to bring together affected parties and discuss extremism 
without the fear of becoming a state target, even if this means speaking about 
uncomfortable and even offensive matters.
119
 Because Prevent does not allow for 
such an open debate, these thoughts, feelings, and aspirations are hidden from others 
and remain unchallenged. John Stewart Mill writes that such a state of affairs not 
only deprives society of truths, but also removes from individuals the ability to 
challenge misrepresentations.
120
 Further, because of the possible consequences, these 
topics are eschewed and ignored in social interactions and conversations; the issues 
therefore remain unaddressed.
121
  
The Home Affairs Committee notes the effects of alienation. They comment that 
although violent radicalisation is declining within Muslim communities, there is  
growing support for non-violent extremism, fed by feelings of alienation, and 
while this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging post for 
violent extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general 
and for the police in particular. There also appears to be a growth in more 
extreme and violent forms of far-right ideology.
122
 
Participants across all five focus groups repeatedly state that extremism is not a 
problem within their communities in Maybury; they acknowledge, however, that 
foreign policy, media perception, counterterrorism measures, and the perception that 
Prevent might have been used to spy on their communities has an alienating effect on 
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their communities, causing a possible increase of individual and community 
vulnerability to extremism. This alienation reinforces political apathy within these 
communities. Apathy, Rosenberg writes, is self-reinforcing, deterring even active 
individuals from becoming involved because of the widespread absence of 
support.
123
 Political apathy is exacerbated by the decision of the local Council of 
Mosques and its affiliated organisations to withdraw their support for Prevent 
following the counterterrorism operation which led to the arrests of local people.   
7.6 Communication and trust: Other barriers for Prevent 
The majority of participants in all five focus groups have heard about Prevent, 
although there is one participant in Focus Group One and two in Focus Group Two 
who have not heard of the policy.
124
 Some of the participants have taken part in 
Prevent programmes, or worked with the community engagement officers. Prevent 
as a brand creates barriers between the communities in Maybury and front line staff. 
Levels of trust vary, but nonetheless create barriers. All of the national and local 
professionals interviewed are aware of the negative connotations associated with the 
Prevent brand. Prevent courses are often advertised as interfaith or community 
cohesion programmes, which tags on some work in the area of extremism.
125
   
I didn’t advertise my project when I was recruiting people and saying this is a 
big Prevent project. What I said is, this is a project about exploring extremism 
and we’re going to use Northern Ireland as a model … Prevent can be in small 
letters, it doesn’t have to be in the poster advertising the thing. I know who’s 
funded it, I’ll write the report to the funders.126 
Despite this negative association, participants in Focus Groups One, Three, and Five 
describe openly who has worked with community engagement officers funded by 
Prevent. This work is seen as positive. Overall, it appears that it is media 
representation, and a limited number of vicarious experiences of counterterrorism 
policing which have shaped negative local perceptions. Perceptions about local 
Prevent programmes are also largely shaped by national media reports, as most 
communities are often unaware that they have been engaging in Prevent programmes. 
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This highlights a major deficiency in the local Prevent delivery plan. The research 
data suggest that there are discussions between the council and gatekeepers within 
the local Muslim communities; however, the message about Prevent does not appear 
to have penetrated beyond a narrow set of individuals within the community. The 
disruption of the flow of information means that Muslim communities in Maybury 
continue to rely on media coverage and the vicarious experience of others to shape 
their opinions of Prevent, exacerbating negative perceptions.  
In Maybury, community engagement officers increase awareness of Prevent by 
attending local mosques and other local meetings. ‘In the mosque we had police 
come in constantly. They did target our mosque a lot. … They told us about 
counterterrorism and so forth.’127 Similar comments are made within all five focus 
groups, suggesting that participants and the communities are, at least to some degree, 
aware of counterterrorism policing and even some of the Prevent programmes going 
on in Maybury. Community engagement officers introduced Prevent to members of 
Focus Groups One and Five. Speaking about an encounter with one of the local 
community engagement officers, a participant states that ‘because of the lack of 
understanding, we [did] not fully understand police work … we were able to speak in 
our language, he helped us understand the police better’.128  It is because of the 
engagement work of these police officers, after the counterterrorism incident in 
Maybury in 2009, that barriers between the authorities and the communities have 
begun to come down. The front line staff and focus group participants acknowledge 
this.  
7.6.1 Trust, legitimacy, and Prevent 
Issues of trust and legitimacy have already been mentioned implicitly in the above 
discussions. Legitimacy represents an ‘acceptance by people of the need to bring 
their behaviour into line with the dictates of an external authority’.129  It reflects 
social values such as normative, moral, or ethical feelings of responsibility which 
defer towards institutions.
130
 Public support, and the legitimacy accorded to 
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institutions and/or individuals, are based on performance.
131
 How communities and 
the authorities interact is crucial. Fairness, Sunshine and Tyler write, is central, and 
levels of trust increase or decline accordingly.
132
 Trust is central: ‘To say we trust 
you means we believe you have the right intentions towards us and that you are 
competent to do what we trust you to do.’ 133  Conferring legitimacy on to 
organisations supposes that they are trustworthy, effective, and fair, and that they 
share similar social and cultural values, and interests, and have a strong commitment 
to local communities.
134
 Part of the process of obtaining communities’ consent relies 
in the sharing of information and listening to the problems of these communities.
135
    
One of the most important sources of dissatisfaction is unequal treatment.
 136
 In 
Maybury,  
you have Christian and Muslim communities that are often segregated in terms 
of where they live, where they are educated and work. This lack of interaction 
fuels mistrust between communities. The extremists feed on this mistrust.
137
  
Further, participants of all five focus groups feel that younger Asian Males in 
particular are being unfairly treated by the police, a situation which adds to the 
distrust between communities and the police. The local council is seen in a harsher 
light. ‘I’d say the council are just going to s*** all over you.’138 This comment 
highlights how the majority of participants feel about Maybury Council. When asked 
whether and how the police could improve tackling terrorism, the common response 
is: ‘Yes it could. … Everyone wants to be treated equally and also have a little bit of 
freedom.’139 Another participant states that  
We should have justice, equal opportunities and equal treatment. When you get 
treated differently, you get aggressive and angry about the whole situation. 
And if you want to get your voice heard you have to get aggressive.
140
  
Similar experiences are shared within all five focus groups. Loader and Mulcahy 
note that public perceptions towards the police are fraught with issues of authority, 
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social order, and security. Figures from the 2010/11 British Crime Survey suggest 
that 72 per cent of Asians across the UK are confident that the criminal justice 
system is fair. This, it must be noted, is considerably higher than amongst the general 
population.
141
 In their study about Prevent, Innes et al. reiterate this point, stating 
that ‘this is an important finding because it challenges the often repeated claim that 
Muslim communities in the UK are being profoundly alienated and disenchanted 
with the workings of the Prevent programme … The actual situation is somewhat 
more complex’.142  
As suggested, the situation in Maybury is more complex. Willingness to engage with 
Prevent, it appears, is based on a number of factors: a distrust in the police and the 
local council in general, the work carried out by the community engagement officers, 
and the perception that Prevent propagates British values at the expense of diversity 
and local issues. The data suggest that Muslim communities prefer to resort to their 
informal social control resources to solve problems, including extremism, if at all 
feasible, before getting the police involved. Innes et al. arrive at a similar 
conclusion.
143
 Many participants share negative experiences about the police, or how 
they feel perceived by the police.  
Because I am a Muslim I am fearful, the way people look at me and the police 
look at me because since all this terrorism things happened, the image has 
changed. It’s a negative image.144 
Despite some negative experiences, participants across all five focus groups note that 
they still have a certain degree of trust in the police, though not in the local 
council.
145
 Levels of trust in the police appear to depend on gender and age. Focus 
group data suggest that older Muslim males (aged 23 and over), and females who 
speak English, have more trust in the police compared to younger males (aged 18-23), 
and females who speak little or no English.  
When asked to measure their level of trust in the police on a scale of 1-10, younger 
males indicate 5, whereas females and older male participants indicate between 6 and 
8. Once again, the true significance of this evaluation may be appreciated only when 
comparing these levels to those given by the general public. According to one imam, 
despite the police admitting mistakes, the wider public do not trust the police as 
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much as they should. ‘I think the police are trying [to improve community relations]. 
… I think they are looking at things in a very mature way of late.’146 The work of the 
community engagement officers is seen in a positive light by the participants of 
Focus Groups One and Five who state that their work, and an increase in ethnic 
minority police officers who speak their language, have improved their knowledge of 
policing and their levels of trust in the police. Conversely, participants of Focus 
Group Two, all younger males, have less faith in Asian police officers. ‘No, Asians 
seem worse’,147 one participant comments.   
I know the police, in terms of Asian police officers especially if they work on 
Prevent sort of things, they tend … [to] look at us as if we are terrorists more 
than a white person would.
148
 
Overall, despite the trust in the police, participants still feel that Prevent does not 
address the concerns of the local community. Extremism and terrorism remain taboo 
subjects within Maybury’s Muslim communities, not because of Prevent but because 
of the aforementioned external factors.  
7.8 Conclusion 
Academic literature and media commentary about Prevent, such as the works of 
Awan, Githens-Mazer, and Lambert, and Pantazis and Pemberton, indicate that 
Prevent may have an adverse effect on Muslim communities in the UK.
149
 This 
assumption, however, is not supported by the evidence gathered throughout the 
research project. It appears that Prevent has had only a limited effect on Maybury’s 
Muslim communities. The data suggest that it is the media, and the vicarious 
experiences of others, that have had a major impact on Muslim communities in 
Maybury, and how they perceive Prevent. It appears that Prevent has not been able 
to address extremism in the area for two reasons: (1) participants are not aware of, or 
are unwilling to acknowledge, problems of extremism in the area; and (2) people in 
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these communities are unwilling to acknowledge that there might be a problem. It 
should be acknowledged that although Prevent programmes do not appear to have 
had a substantial impact and influence on perceptions, the work of the community 
engagement officers is seen as positive, particularly because of their open approach. 
In fact, both the focus group and interview data appear to indicate that the work of 
these officers has broken down some of the barriers which appeared after a major 
counterterrorism operation in the area. The data also indicate that the officers have 
increased levels of trust in the police in those sections of the communities in which 
they have worked.   
This chapter and the data indicate that there is a sense of ambiguity present in the 
participants’ perceptions of Prevent. These ambiguities relate to the understanding of 
how Prevent works nationally and in Maybury. Despite efforts by the local 
authorities, and the media coverage, Prevent remains associated with surveillance, 
and focus group participants still feel that Prevent is too narrowly focused on 
Muslim communities. At the same time, participants across all five focus groups 
admit that more needs to be done to tackle extremism, including far-right extremism. 
Participants acknowledge that although they do not feel comfortable about current 
Prevent and counterterrorism strategies, or their perceptions thereof, something 
needs to be done to prevent extremism taking hold in Muslim communities. Many 
attributes of Prevent are perceived as ambiguous, such as how extremism is defined 
in reference to British values and linked to jihadi extremism rather than extremism 
per se. Participants admit that both they and their communities are burying their 
‘heads in the sand’. This may be due to an increased sense of alienation, set in 
motion by hostile national political and media discourses. Consequently, feelings of 
anger and resentment have turned into political apathy and fatalism. Negative 
perceptions, mostly based on vicarious experiences and/or media discourses about 
Prevent and Muslim communities, have created an environment where Maybury’s 
communities have self-imposed restrictions on their freedom of expression because 
of possible adverse consequences. Although there is no evidence of spying, as 
described by Kundnani,
150
 the media discourse is sufficient to place doubts in the 
minds of the participants. Before Prevent can be successful, these barriers need to be 
broken down, and a space created where extremism can be addressed without fear or 
favour with a government willing to listen to the problems of local Muslim 
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communities rather than pushing an agenda based on populism, assimilation, and 
integration.  
 220
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis is structured around two key elements: (1) a policy analysis of Prevent, 
and (2) a study of the policy’s implementation and impact in Maybury. The main 
body of the thesis is organised around the following research objectives as outlined 
in Chapter 1, which are:
1
  
a) analyse and critique the ideas which inform the Prevent policy;2 
b) analyse and critique the conflicts and tensions which have arisen within the 
Prevent policy at national level, as well as the implications for local 
delivery;
3
 
c) analyse and critique the tensions and conflicts which have arisen between 
organisations involved in the local implementation of Prevent such as the 
police and local authorities, and consider the implications for the delivery 
process;
4
 and  
d) analyse and critique the impact of counterterrorism policing and prevention 
on local Muslim communities, and how they have shaped community 
perceptions and willingness to engage with authorities in counterterrorism 
policing and the Prevent agenda, while considering the wider implications for 
Prevent and Pursue.
5
 
This chapter is primarily organised around the latter three objectives: the policy 
analysis and the study of the policy's implementation and impact, and the insights 
provided by the research into policy, organisational, and impact tensions. Each 
section also refers to the two literature review chapters mentioned in the first 
objective. The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise the findings of the thesis, 
bringing together the national, local, and community aspects, while considering the 
wider implications of the policy, the identified organisational tensions, and the 
impact on Muslim communities.  The thesis captures the non-static nature of the 
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Prevent policy, and demonstrates that the policy was developed as it was 
administered, and administered as it was being developed.
6
  
The Prevent policy blurs the boundaries between crime prevention and social policy, 
creating a sense of ambiguity amongst national and local professionals. Associated 
tensions and ambiguities refer to the scope of Prevent, and whether social policy 
should be criminalised, or whether crime prevention should be socialised. In the case 
of Prevent, these tensions centre on the roles of community cohesion and policing in 
preventing violent extremism. Organisational tensions refer to managerial and 
inter/intra organisational problems which have arisen throughout Prevent’s 
implementation, and which highlight the extent to which policymakers, bureaucrats, 
and local managers have reinterpreted and even resisted features of the Prevent 
policy when using their own discretion.
7
 The implementation of Prevent has blurred 
the organisational boundaries between the agencies involved. The difficulties 
associated with delivering Prevent in Maybury highlight the impact of the 
ambiguities around Prevent’s purpose and its associated tensions, and demonstrate 
the difficulties associated with evaluating preventative programmes.  
National and local professionals and policymakers believe that Prevent represents an 
important innovation in counterterrorism policy in the UK. However, Prevent was 
conceived in a way which embodied inherent policy and organisational tensions and 
which are difficult to resolve. These tensions relate to the aforementioned 
ambiguities and to the blurring of counterterrorism, prevention, and social policy. As 
highlighted in Chapter 5, national policymakers and professionals are divided about 
the inclusion, and benefits, of community cohesion in Prevent. Most local 
professionals believe that the inclusion of community cohesion is essential to the 
success of Prevent in Maybury.
8
 In part, the implementation problems related to the 
ambiguous nature of the 2009 Prevent policy, which provided local authorities with a 
significant degree of autonomy. As discussed in Chapter 6, Maybury’s local 
authorities mainly focused on community cohesion, and interfaith and awareness-
raising programmes, rather than the ‘hard core’ Prevent programmes such as 
Channel favoured by the government. Even after the publication of the Review, there 
remains a sense of uncertainty about how to achieve Prevent’s aims and objectives, 
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knowing that community cohesion, an approach favoured by local professionals, is 
now separated from Prevent. In the words of Maybury Council’s chief executive: 
We had a more even-handed approach, which has actually, I think, convinced 
people that it is violence we’re against, not Muslim radicalism or any other sort 
of radicalism. It’s the violence, whether it be right-wing violence or violence 
that’s Al Qaeda inspired.9  
Although there is a sense that something needs to be done, some national and most 
local policymakers and professionals do not agree with the changes made by the 
Prevent Review, in particular the separation of Prevent and community cohesion.
10
 
As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, Prevent’s ambiguities, the support for community 
cohesion, the autonomy granted to Maybury’s local authorities, and the fact that 
many of those delivering Prevent programmes in Maybury are unfamiliar with 
national policy, means that the delivery of Prevent is altered to suit the knowledge 
and skills of local professionals, and to tackle the perceived needs/problems of local 
communities.  Contrary to expectation, the local delivery of Prevent has little direct 
impact on community perceptions, and a limited impact on community engagement. 
Rather, negative perceptions of Prevent and Pursue are largely formed through 
exposure to the media, and the experiences of friends and family, perceptions which 
are difficult to challenge.  
8.2 Policy tensions: Blurring of policy agendas 
CONTEST aims to ‘reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from 
terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’.11 As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, and supported by the research data in Chapters 5 and 6, 
CONTEST is regarded as innovative for two reasons: (1) it is divided from 
traditional approaches to counterterrorism, and (2) it has developed into a much more 
holistic counterterrorism strategy by pulling all aspects of counterterrorism, 
including prevention, together into one transparent strategy. Prevention, as 
acknowledged by the Home Affairs Committee, is ‘not solely the function of a 
counter-terrorism strategy, but in fact must be regarded as a part of a much wider 
approach to attitudes and attitudinal change’.12 As Lord Carlile points out, this is the 
‘first time that a government had gone down this sort of conceptual line towards 
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preventing this particular criminal activity’.13  The research participants generally 
agree that both CONTEST and Prevent are innovative approaches to 
counterterrorism, but acknowledge that its innovativeness has caused tensions as the 
different agencies have adjusted to the inclusion of new partner agencies who have 
not traditionally been involved in counterterrorism.
14
 However, ‘the current breadth 
of focus of Prevent – from community work to crime prevention – sits 
uncomfortably within a counter-terrorism strategy’.15 Many of the policy tensions 
and problems with implementation relate to the newness of the policy, which is 
ambitious but remains ambiguous in nature, particular in regards to local delivery 
options.   
Prevent’s overarching purpose, to reduce the support for extremism and terrorism 
within British communities, is clear enough. It aims ‘to prevent people being 
radicalised and becoming terrorists and also to ensure that communities do not feel 
under the sort of pressure, which may lead to … individuals being radicalised’.16 
Further, it attempts to address 
all forms of terrorism. … We remain absolutely committed to protecting 
freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean 
challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist 
ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to stop people moving from 
extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.
17
 
However, hidden behind this simplistic notion are a number of fundamental, though 
disputed, concepts. First, how does a society challenge extremist ideology and 
prevent individuals and communities from supporting and engaging in terrorist-
related activities? Second, how can criminal/social policy increase the resilience of 
vulnerable communities? Further, Prevent also relies on the simplistic notion that 
radicalisation and extremism result in violence. Rather, as Bartlett and Miller 
suggest:  
Radicalization is simply the process by which individuals are introduced to an 
overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from 
moderate beliefs towards extreme views. To be radical is to reject the status 
quo, but not necessarily in a violent or even problematic manner. Some 
                                                 
13
 Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2), ‘Former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislations.’ (2011) 
14
 Chapter 5.2 
15
 Communities and Local Government Select Committee, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth 
Report of Session 2009-10’ (HMSO 2010) 3 
16
 Lord Alexander Carlile (NP2) interview (n 10) 
17
 HM Government, ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HMSO 2011) 6 
 224
radicals conduct, or encourage terrorism whilst many others do no such thing, 
and actively and often effectively agitate against it.
18
 
Rather than answering these questions, this thesis examines the tensions which arise 
between politicians, policymakers, front line staff, and communities as a result of the 
fundamental challenges, conflicting ideologies, simplistic notions, and approaches to 
preventing extremism and terrorism. Despite its clear mission statement, local and 
national policymakers and professionals feel a sense of ambiguity about how to 
delivery Prevent locally within the confines of its national framework.  
By comparison, Crawford distinguishes two different approaches to crime 
prevention: situational crime prevention centres on criminal events and aims to 
reduce opportunities to offend; social crime prevention focuses on people and their 
dispositions towards committing acts of criminality.
19
 Aspects of situational crime 
prevention, in particular target hardening, feature in Prepare. Social crime 
prevention, or the prevention of extremism, is suitably defined as ‘the total of all 
policies, measures and techniques … aiming at the reduction of the various kinds of 
damage caused by acts defined as criminal by the state’.20 As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the academic literature separates prevention into three categories: primary, secondary, 
and tertiary prevention.
21
 Although there has been a shift within Prevent, policy 
continues to focus on secondary prevention, a move which is only partially supported 
by local and national professionals. Instead, this approach should be part of a wider 
Prevent strategy including primary prevention.   
As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, policy tensions relate to the ambiguities which exist 
within the Prevent policy and to ideological differences. The Prevent Review claims 
that New Labour’s Prevent policy had criminalised community cohesion, a view 
supported by many experts.
22
 Under New Labour, the Prevent agenda was closely 
linked to, and coordinated with, three other policy areas: community cohesion, 
community empowerment, and race equality. The policy claimed to tackle all forms 
of extremism,  
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A community which isolates extremism of all forms is likely to be one where 
people have more confidence to build relationships with one another and 
increase community cohesion.
23
  
However, both Prevent policies target Muslim communities in the UK, one of the 
reasons why this approach represents secondary prevention.  
The House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee 
states that community cohesion needs to be separated from its counterterrorism 
aspects because prior to 2011, Prevent blurred the line between social and criminal 
policy.
24
  
Too often matters of vital public importance – jobs, homes, schools – are 
swallowed up in the maw of ‘law-and-order’ discourse, and publicly addressed 
as if the only important consideration was whether these deficiencies might 
lead to crime, vandalism and hooliganism.
25
 
Muslim communities under New Labour were at the heart of Prevent. ‘They offered 
important information and intelligence: our own in-built early warning system.’26 
This raised the question of whether Prevent, as some believed,
27
 was built to gather 
intelligence rather than tackle extremism through community cohesion.
28
 The 
government failed to communicate Prevent’s purpose, which remained ambiguous. 
Chapter 7 highlights the impact of negative perceptions on the local delivery of 
Prevent. The Prevent Review attempts to address these tensions, separating the 
prevention of extremism from community cohesion. The Review continues to target 
Muslim communities, and focuses even more than the previous policy on identifying 
individuals at risk through its local partners. As such, the Review is moving Prevent 
to the ‘hard’ end of secondary prevention, using social policy as surveillance tools – 
an attempt to criminalise social policy.  
A shift from community cohesion towards intelligence gathering and information 
sharing has caused tensions between national and local authorities. The research data 
suggest that most participants agree that changes were necessary but disagree with 
the shift away from community cohesion. These tensions are particularly pronounced 
between those involved with Prevent nationally and local professionals in Maybury, 
who also do not agree with the government’s shift away from community cohesion 
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and its more narrow focus on jihadi extremism.
29
 ‘We were surprised actually when 
the national strategy came out … We don’t agree with the current scenario.’30 As 
noted in Chapter 6, without exception, local professionals believe that community 
cohesion, or aspects of it, should remain part of Prevent, arguing that Prevent is 
becoming disconnected from the day-to-day experiences of people within their 
communities.
31
 Maybury’s Muslim communities perceive Prevent and the 
government approach to community cohesion as a top down attempt intended to 
integrate Muslim communities into British society. It is perceived as an instrument 
used to gather intelligence, rather than a policy to address social and economic 
deprivation and inequality.
32
   
As noted in Chapter 6, local professionals feel that the government is not listening to 
their concerns, and that the changes to Prevent are driven by politics rather than 
evidence. There are further worries that the Review is driven by concerns about Al 
Qaeda and not the broader issues of extremism. In the view of local professionals, 
the Prevent Review creates barriers rather than opportunities to develop the informal 
and neutral spaces spoken of by Sir Norman Bettison.
33
 These barriers include how 
extremism is defined, the targeting of Muslim communities, and the exclusion of 
non-violent groups with extremist opinions which are perceived to oppose the British 
values supported by the government.
34
     
As noted in Chapter 6, there is no agreement amongst the local and national 
participants on what extremism is and what its links are to political violence and 
extremism. Although Prevent provides a clear definition of extremism, a definition 
seen as too narrow by the majority of participants, its message remains ambiguous, 
precisely because of the lack of knowledge about the factors that lead from 
extremism to political violence. In the absence of agreement, and the 
acknowledgement by participants that further research is needed in this area, tensions 
about how to respond to extremism are inevitable. These tensions appear during 
Prevent’s local implementation where a lack of central government direction, and a 
lack of skills and knowledge at local level, have led to an array of community 
cohesion projects aimed at reducing extremism. At the same time, this outcome is 
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criticised by the government and parliamentary committees, which argue for a 
separation of community cohesion and Prevent.  
One might argue that it is not surprising that Maybury’s local professionals support 
community cohesion projects aimed at reducing extremism within communities 
under the guise of Prevent. This support could be perceived as an attempt to secure 
self-preservation by maintaining levels of funding for local community cohesion 
projects which may otherwise have not been funded. Crawford suggests that front 
line practitioners have the capacity to capture resources designed for crime 
prevention and channel them into community cohesion activities. This would suggest 
that the inverse of the criminalisation of social policy, the socialisation of criminal 
policy, could also occur.
35
 Chapter 6 highlights this point, and demonstrates that 
most Prevent programmes in Maybury focus on community cohesion, including 
work on far-right extremism, a practice which was stopped under the coalition 
government.
36
 What is more surprising, however, is the support of the police officers 
working on Prevent, who appear to have realised the importance of community 
engagement and cohesion as a tool to prevent radicalisation. ‘Security is always 
delivered through consent, never through force. … Sustaining this … over the long 
term will only be possible if the police secure active consent from the community.’37 
Community-centred projects, led by the local authority in partnership with the police, 
are regarded as integral to Prevent’s long-term success. The support of the police for 
community cohesion, primary prevention, and the inclusion of local authorities is 
surprising because previous research suggests that the organisational subculture of 
the police devalues preventative work.
38
 As argued in Chapter 3, and reiterated in 
Chapter 5, some police officers still resist the devolution of certain crime-fighting 
tasks, such as counterterrorism, to inexperienced local authorities, the private sector, 
or voluntary organisations.
 39
 According to the academic literature, police officers 
involved in Prevent all recognise the role community cohesion plays in preventing 
extremism.
40
 In Maybury, there is no evidence to suggest that the police are 
obstructive or unwilling to engage in community cohesion and Prevent work. On the 
contrary, counterterrorism officers and community engagement officers are 
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supportive, and even encourage this approach to prevent extremism in Maybury, 
recognising its long-term value.
41
 
Further tensions have emerged between Muslim communities and the Prevent policy, 
especially as it is seen to target solely Muslim communities. The Review’s re-
definition of extremism, casting it as views and behaviours which oppose British 
values, is also questioned by many of the focus group participants who see 
themselves as both British and Muslim. Participants in Maybury agree that 
extremism is defined too narrowly, and is often seen as regressive. Maybury’s 
Muslim communities do not perceive extremism as a priority.
42
 Furthermore, 
participants contend that Prevent’s definition is much too narrow, focusing on 
ambiguous values while devaluing the cultural and ethnic heritage of minority 
communities. Most participants argue that the political rhetoric and the media 
discourse about extremism centre on jihadi extremism and its connection to terrorism, 
marginalising groups and even entire communities because of their ethnicity, 
religious beliefs, and perceived links to violent and non-violent jihadi ideologies. 
Focus group data suggest, however, that extremism is not seen as a top local priority 
in Maybury. 
The data suggest that policy tensions have affected the delivery of Prevent, partly 
because of disagreements about how to tackle extremism locally. As stated in 
Chapter 7, negative media reaction has led to a decrease in participation amongst 
local communities in Maybury. These tensions highlight the difficulty of 
implementing preventative policy, as well as the ease with which social policy can 
become criminalised. Cohen argues that general prevention should be supported 
because of its intrinsic merits, and not just as an adjunct to criminality and, in this 
study, extremism.
43
 Prevent fails to engage in broad primary prevention, and more 
importantly it fails to communicate the purpose of this policy to the public, and to the 
agencies and front line staff involved in designing and delivering local Prevent 
projects. The breakdown of communication between central government and local 
authorities means that Prevent continues to focus on jihadi extremism and not 
extremism per se. Despite political rhetoric and the odd paragraph in Prevent, the 
data and other evidence suggest that Prevent is actually mainly about jihadi 
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extremism. This is despite local officials pointing out that intolerance of religious 
and cultural differences feeds both jihadi and far-right extremism. Whether other 
local authorities have raised similar concerns is unknown because this study focuses 
on Maybury. This is one of the limitations of this thesis, the inability to generalise 
the concerns of local officials and Maybury’s Muslim communities.  
Policy tensions can be summarised in a number of key points. Despite support from 
government, the Prevent Review appears to have received lots of criticism. The 
criticism focuses on the exclusion of community cohesion from Prevent. The 
government has not convinced many of those working on Prevent that the changes in 
the Review were necessary and effective. The separation of community cohesion 
allows Prevent to focus on terrorism prevention, while the Integration Strategy can 
focus on community cohesion and tackling extremism. This allows for greater policy 
cohesion and better management of these different policies because it is somewhat 
clearer what the policy objectives are. Yet, despite support for the inclusion of 
community cohesion, there is little evidence to support the contention that 
community cohesion has had a positive or negative impact on extremism in Maybury. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates poor evaluation of Prevent, and a lack of evidence for either 
success or failure of the Prevent programmes. Figure 6.3 in Chapter 6 demonstrates 
that the majority of programmes have a community cohesion focus, and have had 
little or no impact on levels of extremism in Maybury’s Muslim communities. Due to 
the lack of evaluation and evidence, it is difficult to measure the impact of 
community cohesion on extremism. With the separation of the two policies, each 
with its own defined policy objectives, it should be easier to measure policy impacts 
and outcomes. Any reversal to an approach focused on community cohesion should 
be based on stronger qualitative and quantitative research. The above suggestion 
does not imply that there is no need for investment in community cohesion. On the 
contrary, primary prevention and community cohesion have merits but should be 
separated from the narrower focus of Prevent. The drawbacks of divorcing these two 
policies result in the downplaying of cohesion, increasing the vulnerability of its 
funding and paving the way for austerity.
44
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8.3 Organisational tensions 
Many of the organisational tensions are linked to the aforementioned policy tensions. 
The data highlight that most organisational tensions appear between various central 
government agencies, and between central government and local authorities. Cross-
departmental tensions persist across government, a phenomenon which is not unique 
to Prevent.
45
 Within the multi-agency framework of Prevent, it is not surprising that 
interests and priorities differ amongst the different partners.
46
 In his earlier work on 
crime prevention, Crawford notes that there is a tendency for the police and the 
Home Office to ‘mould and constrain the actions and attitudes of individuals that 
constitute them’.47 The Review consolidates many aspects of Prevent, centralising it 
and giving more oversight to the Home Office. The Review greatly diminishes the 
role of the Department of Communities and Local Government, while increasing 
cross-departmental work with, for example, education. 
Since its inception, there has been pressure to integrate Prevent more effectively into 
neighbourhood policing and local crime prevention initiatives.
48
 This integration has, 
however, been problematic. Many policymakers are suspicious of local authorities’ 
motives, and question their ability to carry out counterterrorism prevention work 
effectively. Some criticise the management of Prevent funds and the lack of 
evaluation, and question the value of ‘misguided’ or spuriously related community 
cohesion projects by local authorities. The police are seen as the ‘motor’ of Prevent 
because they are perceived as the most qualified organisation. There is, however, a 
consensus that a successful Prevent policy relies on partnerships, though some 
participants argue that the freedom of local authorities should be limited.
49
 Giving 
evidence to a Select Committee, Sir Norman Bettison states: ‘I am very clear that if 
Prevent [is] left to the police it would fail.’50 The majority of the participants, both 
nationally and locally, share this view.  
Preventing extremism is also not a priority for Maybury’s schools, which are very 
reluctant to engage with Prevent.
51
 This demonstrates the difficulty of integrating 
prevention into sectors such as education where it competes with a myriad of other 
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priorities. How the Review will achieve and push the prevention of extremism in the 
education sector remains to be seen.  
Further, organisational tensions are also linked to funding and evaluation.
52
 Rigorous 
evaluation can be costly, at times costing more than the actual programme. With a 
smaller budget, evaluation is less rigorous, and success is often based on the 
perceptions of those delivering a programme.
53
 Although government austerity is 
mentioned, many of the arguments related to funding are not necessarily about 
amounts but about its allocation and how it has been spent. ‘Money got in the way … 
it got distorted into activities that were a priority for the different councils.’ 54 
Baroness Neville-Jones points out that ‘not only did you get some things … which 
were regarded as objectionable, but you got an awful lot of money just wasted’.55 
The media ran a number of stories claiming that Prevent funds had been used to fund 
non-violent jihadi extremist groups such as Street in East London, while other local 
authorities funded projects such as Champion. These projects became symbols of 
state intrusion and mismanagement, with Prevent becoming synonymous with spying 
and intelligence gathering.
56
 The Review states that funding should be based on 
effectiveness, and that the government would no longer fund organisations which 
oppose fundamental British values, even if these groups are not engaged in or 
supportive of violence. As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5, some academics and 
policymakers believe that some of these groups have been successful in turning those 
at risk of radicalisation away from violence.
57
 Politically, the funding of such groups 
became untenable after a series of newspaper articles accusing the government of 
supporting extremist organisations.
58
  
Interviewed professionals in Maybury argue that the short-term nature of funding 
makes it difficult to set up long-term projects. Most local professionals agree that 
Prevent funding in Maybury has been adequate, but the evaluation of the projects has 
been weak. Some local professionals argue that the competition for funding in 
Maybury has led to tensions between various providers rather than cooperation to 
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improve the delivery of Prevent programmes.
59
 A police officer seconded to 
Maybury Council confirms that ‘certain organisations … [are] moneymaking 
organisations who charge a lot of money to deliver some very simple projects, with 
some very simple outcomes’.60  
Finally, as highlighted by the police Prevent lead,
61
 and discussed in Chapter 6, there 
appears to be a lack of skills and knowledge amongst the local front line staff and 
third sector providers of Prevent projects. At the same time, there also appears to be 
a lack of knowledge at the national level about the problems local communities face 
and why they are vulnerable to extremist ideologies.
62
 This lack of knowledge, and 
the apparent failure of the coalition government to engage with the concerns of local 
authorities, appears to have altered what the policy in practice has become: an 
exercise in community cohesion and awareness-raising, rather than projects which 
tackle the issues of extremism and radicalisation within affected communities. As 
aforementioned and in Chapter 6, the lack of central government direction and a 
clear and precise policy on how extremism should be prevented locally, has led local 
authorities in Maybury to concentrate exactly on the sort of project which has a 
community cohesion focus.  
To summarise, organisational and policy tensions are closely linked. There are few 
local organisational tensions because the police and the local authority rely on the 
existing CSP framework together with the expertise of individuals who have worked 
in a multi-agency environment before.
63
  There does, however, appear to be a lack of 
practical skills and knowledge in the area of extremism. However, organisational 
tensions remain between the regional CTU and the Home Office because information 
sharing is often inadequate. The information provided on the counter-terrorism local 
profiles is non-specific and means that many of the projects in Maybury are generic. 
This raises the question about the Review’s purpose because generic projects are 
more suited to primary prevention. If Prevent focuses mainly on community 
cohesion, the role of the police should be minimal. Under the Review, with a more 
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counterterrorism-focused Prevent, the role of the police is crucial because it solves 
many of the issues related to information transfer.  
8.4 Community perceptions 
The aforementioned tensions appear to have a limited impact on community 
perceptions. Rather, Maybury’s Muslim communities’ perceptions and willingness to 
participate in Prevent projects appear to have been shaped largely by a prevailing 
negative media and political environment, and the shared experience of others. 
Despite the participants’ acknowledgement that media characterisations of Muslims 
in the UK and Prevent are flawed, their representation is generally accepted. 
Participants feel that they are stereotyped and seen as extremists or terrorists because 
of their ethnicity and faith. Provoking feelings of insecurity and alienation creates 
barriers between their communities, other local communities, and the authorities.
64
 
These barriers combine with the negative experiences of acquaintances and others 
with the police, influencing their levels of trust in local authorities and the police, 
and shaping their perceptions of the state’s legitimacy.65  
The media frequently portrays Prevent as a surveillance programme which relies on 
ethnic and religious profiling, and as a programme which funds groups which 
support the state’s policies as well as extremist organisations.66 National and local 
professionals admit that Prevent's image is tainted, but deny that Prevent has been 
designed for surveillance purposes. Local communities doubt this and feel that 
Prevent could be used for surveillance, and to subjugate their communities to 
normative British political and cultural values.
67
 These ideas continue to permeate 
the public conscience despite a lack of supporting evidence in Maybury. Rather, 
focus group participants acknowledge that their perceptions about Prevent have been 
shaped largely by national media coverage. It appears from these findings that the 
government has failed to clearly articulate Prevent’s purpose to the public, and that 
front line staff also fail to challenge the negative characterisation.
68
    
Focus group participants also confirm that adverse media coverage has led to a sense 
of alienation, though they admit that this is at times self-imposed rather than driven 
by local events. Media representations and government policies ‘certainly caused 
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anger within the community’. 69  The inability to challenge and change these 
prevailing perceptions and the status quo, have over time led to political 
disengagement and fatalism. As expected, many participants and members of their 
communities feel both British and Muslim, a problematic notion given that Islam is 
often depicted as a religion opposed to fundamental British values. Participants feel a 
sense of isolation because of the dual aspects of their identity which appears not to 
conform to public perceptions. A House of Commons Select Committee 
acknowledges that the language used around Prevent is at times counterproductive, 
and even threatens to undo some good work that has been done under the banner of 
counterterrorism.
70
   
Prevent’s inability to create a safe space is linked to a negative political discourse 
around terrorism, Islam, and Muslim communities in the UK. Participants agree that 
extremism and terrorism have become taboo subjects within Maybury’s Muslim 
communities. Prevent is regarded as a policy which, according to one participant, 
‘peddles government values’ and does not oppose or challenge the status quo and 
government policy.
71
 The fear of becoming stigmatised by an extremist label, 
individually or as a community, means that extremism goes unchallenged. Negative 
rhetoric around Prevent, it appears, deters those in the position to challenge 
extremism from doing just that. Limiting freedom of expression, participants argue, 
means that extremist attitudes often go unchallenged because of the fear of 
incrimination. Sensitive topics such as extremism and terrorism are eschewed in 
social interactions, while its causes remain unaddressed. Media representation, 
counterterrorism policing, and negative perceptions about Prevent have a 
marginalising effect, increasing communities’ sense of vulnerability to extremism 
precisely because grievances remain unaddressed. As a result, extremism often 
remains unchallenged within affected communities.
72
  
Despite the limited impact of Prevent, aspects of Pursue, in particular a number of 
terrorism-related arrests in the Maybury area in 2009, have had a direct impact on 
local participation in Prevent programmes. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
                                                 
69
 White Male, community volunteer, involved in inter-faith community work across the North of 
England, mid 30s (FG 5), ‘Name Anonymized.’ (2011) 
70
 Home Affairs Select Committee (n 9) 
71
 Former Member of the National Young Muslim Advisory Group (Asian Female, NP15), ‘Name 
Anonymized. Also Involved a Youth Worker Previously Involved in Prevent Programmes in the 
North of England.’ (2011); Richard Jackson, ‘The Failed Paradigm of Prevent’ (Soundings, 2011) 
<http://soundings.mcb.org.uk/?p=35> accessed 30 May 2012 
72
 Chapter 7.5 
 235 
counterterrorism raids led to the disengagement of Maybury’s Council of Mosques 
from Prevent.
73
 Due to the Council of Mosque's position as gatekeepers between 
Muslim communities and local authorities, the communities’ engagement with 
Prevent programmes has been low. Nevertheless, as a result of efforts by the police, 
the council, and community engagement officers (CEOs), community relations have 
improved. The data indicate that individuals and groups who work with community 
engagement officers show increased levels of trust in the police but not in the local 
council. It appears that the CEOs' open and honest approach, and willingness to 
listen to the concerns of local communities and share information when possible, are 
major factors in the increased levels of trust in the police. Yet, younger males often 
regard police officers from Muslim communities with disdain. Their levels of trust 
are the lowest, whereas trust towards the same officers from older generations has 
increased.
74
 The interviews reveal that experiences with the police mainly relate to 
criminal activities rather than counterterrorism, and perceptions of the latter are 
based on the experiences of others who mainly reside in the Midlands and London.  
8.5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has achieved its initial fieldwork objectives in seeking to explore the 
implementation of the Prevent policy at national and local levels. With the exception 
of two people, the former head of MI5 and the local Prevent lead from the Probation 
Service, all of those approached participated. Sufficient data were gathered to 
explore and analyse each of the latter three research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 
and reiterated in this chapter. The participation of former Cabinet ministers, senior 
civil servants, and senior police officers on the one hand, and front line staff and 
members of Muslim communities on the other, has allowed this thesis to bring 
together the local and national aspects of Prevent policy between 2007 and 2012, and 
explore the tensions, issues, and impact of this policy nationally and locally. This 
study also provides additional insights and knowledge to the policy debate on 
preventing violent extremism, and complements a number of related studies.
75
 When 
appropriate, and with reference to the study results, some findings were generalised. 
Innes et al. note, for example, that Prevent’s successes are often based on personal 
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experiences and gut feelings. The research data suggest that this is also the case in 
Maybury.  
There are some limitations to this study. As discussed in Chapter 4, qualitative 
research is time consuming, thereby limiting the fieldwork coverage. The resulting 
findings, therefore, are open to interpretation and may be considered to be location-
specific. Hence, it is difficult to generalise the findings of this small-scale case study. 
Aspects of this study, though, are more generalisable than others. The findings from 
the interviews with national policymakers, for example, provide a broad insight into 
the tensions which exist at national level, and are easier to generalise than the case 
study findings. The difference between the experiences of Maybury’s Muslim 
communities to those in London and Birmingham is hard to gauge. Studies by Innes 
et al. and Spalek suggest that communities in their study areas have become more 
involved in Prevent than those in Maybury.
76
 Local factors such as the decision by 
Maybury’s Council of Mosques to disengage from Prevent, and a lack of local 
awareness of Prevent, may account for the difference in willingness to engage with 
local authorities. Also, the fieldwork was carried out prior to and just after the 
publication of the Prevent Review, before the Review’s changes could have any real 
impact on the local delivery of Prevent and its projects.  
Due to time limitations and the broad focus of the thesis on the Prevent policy, 
specific Prevent programmes such as Channel or local programmes could not be 
examined in any great detail. Rather, the thesis provides the broad context for future 
research into programmes such as Channel, the study and evaluation of local Prevent 
programmes, and more detailed comparative research with other local crime 
prevention initiatives such as work on gangs, to examine what lessons can be learned 
and knowledge transferred. Further studies might include case studies to measure the 
impact of the Prevent Review on local delivery and its impact on local Muslim 
communities.  
The Prevent Review has entrenched Prevent’s focus on jihadi extremism and on 
assimilation, which is based on the adoption of British cultural values. According to 
community participants, this focus on the adherence to ‘British values’, which has 
been emphasised by the media and politicians, has been counterproductive.
77
 As 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, assimilation to these values appears problematic because 
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Prevent not only fails to define them but also frames them as British rather than 
universal.
78
 The first point is about communication, and the second is about 
exclusion. Sales notes that British values are linked to identity.
79
 The political 
environment and the portrayal of Muslim communities in the media have created ‘a 
feeling of separation from the group or of isolation from group standards’.80 The 
findings in Chapter 7 suggest that participants feel that being Muslim excludes them 
from mainstream society because of their cultural and religious affiliation to Islam, 
despite the fact that they cherish many of the same universal values as the 
mainstream. The idea that a person can only have one identity is contentious, and 
many people have multiple identities, Hobsbawn argues.
81
 Rather, Prevent should 
focus on the promotion of good values, regardless of whether these are universal, 
British, or even religious. Shifting the focus to good values would be less exclusive, 
allowing communities and individuals to maintain multiple identities rather than 
being expected to conform to one overarching identity. Accepting and tolerating 
multiple identities and associated values would allow individuals to be British and 
Muslim because one should not preclude the other.  
Throughout this thesis, participants mention the need for community cohesion and 
primary prevention. The Prevent Review has moved Prevent away from community 
cohesion and towards surveillance, using the social, health, and education sectors to 
increase the flow of information. How this will affect Prevent in the future remains 
to be seen. However, the Review fails to resolve tension about the merits of 
community cohesion in tackling extremism. As noted in Chapter 6, front line staff 
repeatedly comment that jihadi extremism leads to the mobilisation of far-right 
extremism, which in turn leads to more extreme reactions from jihadists, a 
phenomenon called cumulative extremism.
82
 ‘The risk is that cumulative extremism 
leads to a spiral of mobilization and counter-mobilization, which requires an 
altogether different set of policy and security tools.’83 As Sir Norman Bettison sagely 
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states: ‘We won’t arrest our way of this problem. … What are we doing about 
festering hatred?’ 84  Indeed, what happens when those imprisoned for terrorism 
offences are released from prison? The long-term success of Prevent should be based 
on diverting those with extremist beliefs away from violence.  
Consecutive Parliamentary committees have suggested that Prevent, community 
cohesion, and tackling extremism per se should be separated. The Review attempts  
such separation, but the government’s Integration Strategy fails to provide a 
complementary approach to tackling extremism based on primary prevention and 
community cohesion. This approach needs to be better resourced and driven by local 
authorities rather than the police, because local authorities have a better knowledge 
of their communities. Sufficient support from the centre must also be given. The 
Integration Strategy is well placed, but it is insufficiently developed to complement 
Prevent and address real and perceived grievances which can be exploited by 
extremist groups.  
Recent events in Woolwich have reignited the debate about the legacy of the Prevent 
policy, and whether the blurring of social and criminal policy is, or would be, 
helpful.
85
 As demonstrated, there are inherent tensions relating to the policy content 
and organisational issues within Prevent. Some of these tensions are addressed in the 
Review, and going back would only reopen similar policy debates and tensions. 
However, other recent events may also reshape the future of Prevent. The Boston 
bombings and the attacks in Norway demonstrate the threat of the ‘lone wolf’ and 
radicalisation through the Internet.
86
 How will Prevent tackle extremists who have 
little connection to any communities and even less contact with state agencies?  
The role of the newly elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in 2012, and 
the availability of resources to Prevent and the Integration Strategy represent 
ongoing concerns. PCCs, elected on their ‘ability’ to tackle local crime issues, may 
not share the government’s priorities around extremism and terrorism, and may 
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divert funds to projects that have higher local priorities.
87
 The national government’s 
attempts to assert national priorities, such as terrorism, may lead to further tensions 
which have not been explored in this thesis but may affect Prevent in the future.
88
 
This thesis has demonstrated that ambiguity has caused tensions within Prevent. 
Prevent’s intentions, though multiple, need to be clearer. The policy needs to be clear 
about where the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of extremism is 
drawn. The policy needs to be clear about how rights, such as the freedom of speech, 
are protected, especially within communities where extremist views are held. Further, 
if the separation between Prevent and tackling extremism remains, questions should 
be raised about what resources should be available to the Integration Strategy. In the 
long-term, Prevent’s success relies upon the success of the Integration Strategy, 
which has broader aims, including tackling the root causes of extremism per se.   
As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the effectiveness of Prevent also relies on 
successful evaluation. The Review and participants acknowledge that evaluation 
needs to be improved.
89
 It is important to make this point because it is widely 
acknowledged by academics and governments that the threat of extremism will 
remain indefinitely. Evaluation is crucial to improve efficiency and find what works 
and what does not, as well as to make sense of implementation effects and 
unintended consequences. This would increase the evidence base, and best practice 
could then be shared amongst practitioners.  
Recent events in Norway, Boston, and Woolwich have highlighted the problem of 
‘lone wolves’. Thus, Prevent needs to adapt to current challenges, which include 
threats from jihadi extremism and the far-right.
90
  Recent events have demonstrated 
the need for Prevent. This thesis maps some of the tensions which any future review 
of Prevent should take into consideration, ensuring that delivery provides the desired 
policy outcomes. The thesis further supports the case for better evaluation and 
knowledge transfer to improve activities and outcomes.  
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